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INTRODUCTION 
________ 
THE following lectures on constitutional law were delivered 
under the auspices of the Political Science Association of the University of 
Michigan, in the months of March and April, 1889. The thought occurred to 
Henry C. Adams, Ph.D., the president of that association and Professor of 
Political Economy and Finance, that it would be of advantage to the 
students in the various departments of the University, to hear a course of 
lectures on the constitutional law of the United States historically 
considered.1 In accordance with the thought thus conceived this course 
was planned, and the interest manifested in it from the beginning was 
such as to lead to the belief that the publication of the lectures in 
permanent form would meet, in part, the wants of students of law and of 
political science throughout the country. 
The subject to which the lectures relate, the constitutional law 
of the United States, is a branch of jurisprudence which Chief-Justice 
Sharswood declared to be “peculiarly the pride and glory” of our country; 
and it has been said with entire propriety to be “the specially 
characterizing part of our legal system.” One may examine the pages of 
Blackstone’s “Commentaries” from beginning to end and he will not be 
able to find a word devoted to the subject of constitutional law as such, 
the very term not being even named by the learned commentator on the 
laws of England. Not only is the term one of modern use, but 
constitutional law as a distinct branch of jurisprudence had its origin and 
development in the United States. While the remark of Dc Tocqueville is 
certainly not true, that “the English Constitution has no real existence,” 
yet the fact remains, that English constitutional law has been so little 
                                                 
1 The University Calendar for the year 1888-89 shows the total number of students in the 
University of Michigan to be 1,882, divided as follows: Department of Literature, Science, 
and the Arts, 824; Department of Law, 400; Department of Medicine and Surgery, 371; 
School of Pharmacy, 106; Homoeopathic Medical College, 73; College of Dental Surgery, 
108. 
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developed as a distinct branch of jurisprudence that the latest writer on 
the British constitution has thought it necessary to go into a learned 
disquisition to prove that “so-called constitutional law” is, in reality, a part 
of the law of England. He concludes his argument by declaring that the 
constitutional law of England “forms as interesting and as distinct, though 
not as well explored, a field for legal study or legal exposition as any 
which can be found. The subject is one which has not yet been fully 
mapped out. Teachers and pupils alike, therefore, suffer from the 
inconvenience as they enjoy the interest of exploring a province of law 
which has not yet been reduced to order. This inconvenience has one 
great compensation. We are compelled to search for the guidance of first 
principles.” 1 It is evident, therefore, that while England may have what 
Earl Russell was pleased to call “a matchless constitution,” yet 
constitutional law as a distinctive branch of jurisprudence occupies a very 
subordinate place in the legal system of that country, in comparison with 
the place which it fills in the system of jurisprudence prevailing in the 
United States. And what is true of England in this respect is true of the 
other countries of Europe in greater or less degree. The reason why this is 
so will appear as we proceed. 
It is to be remembered that written constitutions have been 
the distinguishing feature of American institutions. It was in this country, 
for the first time in the history of the world, that written constitutions, 
based on the idea of the preexistent right of all men to be free, became 
the organic law of government. The Constitution of the United States was 
not, however, the first of the written constitutions to be adopted in 
America, even though nothing be said of the Articles of Confederation. The 
States had adopted written constitutions of their own before the Federal 
Constitution was established.2 In this country all constitutions, with two 
                                                 
1  Dicey’s “ Law of the Constitution,” p. 34 (1886). 
 
2 The dates of adoption were as follows: Delaware, I776; Georgia, I777; Maryland, I 776; 
Georgia; I 777; Maryland, I776; Massachusetts, I780; New Hampshire, I 784; New 
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exceptions, have been written, and none are now unwritten.1 Written 
constitutions were a necessity with us, because we have insisted from the 
beginning that sovereignty resided in the people, and as the people could 
not themselves, in their collective capacity, well exercise the powers of 
government, they consented, through written constitutions, to entrust the 
exercise of those powers to their representatives, taking care, however, to 
prescribe by definite constitutional provisions certain limitations on those 
powers which their representatives should be unable to transcend. The 
honor has been said to belong to Virginia of having established the first 
Republican constitution ever adopted in America.2 
How far written constitutions are advantageous, whether their 
excellencies are greater than their defects, are questions upon which 
political theorists have been divided in opinion, and concerning which it is 
not our purpose here to make inquiry. European nations have been 
watching our experiment from the beginning, and the tendency of 
European states, from the time we set the example, has been plainly in 
the direction of written constitutions. John Adams, writing in 1815, said: 
“Since we began the career of written constitutions, the 
wisest, most learned, and scientific heads in France, Holland, Geneva, 
Switzerland, Spain and Sicily have been busily employed in devising 
written constitutions for their several nations…. But has there been one 
that satisfied the people? One that has been observed and obeyed, even 
for one year or one month? The truth is, there is not one people of Europe 
that knows or cares anything about written constitutions. There is not one 
nation in Europe that understands, or is capable of understanding, any 
constitution whatever. Pattern et aquam, et vinum et circenses are all that 
they understand, or hope, or wish for. If there is a colorable exception, it 
                                                                                                                                                        
Jersey, I 776; New York, I 777; North Carolina, I776; Pennsylvania, I776; South 
Carolina, I778; Virginia, I776.  
1 At the time of the Revolution Connecticut and Rhode Island had unwritten Constitution, 
which continued in force until I8I8 and I842 respectively. 
2 Cooke’s “ Virginia,” p. 440. 
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is England. … These, sir, were the results of ten years’ careful, attentive, 
anxious, and [if without vanity I may use the word] philosophical 
observation in France, Spain, Holland, Austrian Netherlands, and 
England.” 1  
But notwithstanding these somewhat pessimistic views of the 
elder Adams, the tendency then manifested in Europe in favor of written 
constitutions was not so wholly ephemeral as he imagined, and to-day 
written constitutions constitute the fundamental law of most of the 
European governments. The idea that may be said to have originated in 
America, has not only taken good root in Europe, but has made its 
appearance on the Continent of Asia. While these lectures were being 
delivered the Emperor of Japan was promulgating a written constitution at 
the Imperial Palace in Tokio, and making solemn oath to abide thereby.2 
The reasons which induced this action on his part are of interest, as 
showing the tendency of the times. The Emperor at the time of 
promulgation said: 
“In consideration of the progressive tendency of the course of 
human affairs, and in parallel with the advance of civilization, We deem it 
expedient, in order to give clearness and distinctness to the instructions 
bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of Our House and by Our other 
Imperial Ancestors, to establish fundamental laws formulated into express 
provisions of law, so that, on the one hand, Our Imperial posterity may 
possess an express guide for the course they are to follow, and that on 
the other, Our subjects shall thereby be enabled to enjoy a wider range of 
action in giving us their support, and that the observance of Our laws shall 
continue to the remotest ages of time.” 
                                                 
1  “Life and Works of John Adams,” vol. X., p. 150. 
 
2  On February 11, 1889, a written constitution was promulgated in Japan. 
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However, it does not follow that because a State has a written 
constitution, constitutional law is to become a recognized branch of its 
jurisprudence. Constitutional law is a branch of the jurisprudence of our 
country because in our written constitutions we have not only divided the 
powers of government between the three great departments, but have 
made the judiciary coordinate with the legislative and executive 
departments, giving it power to pass on the constitutionality of laws. This 
is a peculiarity of the American system of government, and explains why it 
is that constitutional law is the characterizing feature of our legal system. 
Foreign commentators on the Federal Constitution have, like Sir Henry 
Maine, spoken of the Federal Supreme Court as a “unique creation of the 
founders of the Constitution.” 1 As a matter of fact, however, there is little 
in the Constitution of the United States that is new. A learned writer has 
recently said that the method provided for the election of the President 
was about the only feature which it contained that was not suggested by 
the State Constitutions.2 But even that was borrowed from the 
Constitution of Maryland, which provided a similar method for the election 
of its senators.3 Before the Federal Constitution was framed the 
constitutions of the several States had established supreme courts within 
their States, and those courts exercised the power of declaring legislative 
acts void, when in conflict with their respective constitutions, before ever 
the Supreme Court of the United States asserted a similar power in 1803, 
in the great case of Marbury v. Madison.4 Chief-Justice Brearley of the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, in a case before the Court at a session at 
Hillsborough, in September, 1780, announced as the opinion of himself 
and his associates that the judiciary had the right to pronounce on the 
constitutionality of laws. And this is thought to be the first in the line of 
decisions which have established the right of the courts to declare 
                                                 
1 Maine’s “ Popular Government,” p. 217. 
 
2 New Princeton Review, September, 1887. 
 
3 See 2 Pitkin’s “ Political and Civil History of the United States,” p.302. 
4 I Cranch, 137 
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legislative acts void when they are in conflict with the Constitution. This 
was followed in Rhode Island in 1786 by a similar decision, and one which 
led to the trial of the judges by the Legislative Assembly with a view to 
their removal from office. Neither of these decisions is found in the 
Reports, as there were none published in either of these States at that 
time. Again, in 1792, the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that an 
Act passed by the Colonial Legislature in 1712 was ipso facto void as 
being in contravention of Magna Charta. The Court declared that it was 
against common right as well as against the Great Charter, to take away 
the freehold of one man and vest it in another without any compensation, 
or even a trial by the jury of the country.1 There was no precedent in 
ancient or modern judicial history, before these cases were decided, which 
warranted a court in asserting such a principle, and it was difficult for men 
trained under the English system of jurisprudence, to conceive the idea 
that a mere court should assume the prerogative of setting aside a law 
enacted by the legislature and approved by the executive. 
It is well understood that in Great Britain sovereignty resides 
in the Parliament, and that it can change the Constitution at its pleasure. 
The Parliament can prolong the duration of its own legal existence beyond 
the period for which it was elected, as it did when it passed the Septennial 
Act. And it may change the manner of the descent of the Crown, as it did 
when it passed the Act of Settlement. No matter what law the Parliament 
may pass, no court can set it aside as enacted in contravention of the 
Constitution. The saying of De Lolme is familiar. “It is,” he says, “a 
fundamental principle with English lawyers that Parliament can do every 
thing but make a woman a man and a man a woman.” The German 
Empire has no Federal judiciary unless it be the Imperial Court of last 
resort, das Reichsgericht, established at Leipzig; and it is well known that 
that court has no power to pass on the constitutionality of a law which has 
                                                 
1 Bowman v. Middleton, I Bay, 252. 
 
 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
11
been enacted by the Bundesrath and the Reichstag.1 In France, too, the 
Cour de Cassation has no right to pass on the constitutionality of a law 
which has passed the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. In Spain, 
while the Supreme Court is entrusted with the trial of Cabinet Ministers 
and high public functionaries, it cannot set aside a royal decree, or a 
legislative act which has passed the Cortes. There is said to be no 
comprehension in that country between constitution-making and law-
making power.2 In Switzerland, the Federal Legislature is considered to be 
the authorized interpreter of the Constitution, and the sole judge of its 
own powers, the Federal Court being bound to enforce every law which 
the legislature enacts.3 It is also the rule in Belgium that the legislative 
department of the government is the judge of its powers, the judiciary not 
being concerned therewith. In short, there is not in Europe to this day a 
court with authority to pass on the constitutionality of national laws. But 
in Germany and Switzerland, while the Federal courts cannot annul a 
Federal law, they may, in either country, declare a cantonal or state law 
invalid when it conflicts with the Federal law.4 Some Swiss jurists claim 
that the Federal courts cannot enforce a law passed by the Federal 
Legislature of Switzerland if it conflicts with the Federal Constitution. And 
in the same way certain of the German jurists assert that if an ordinance 
were issued in Germany by the Emperor and Bundesrath, trenching on the 
field of imperial legislation [which should have the assent of the 
Reichstag], the Reichs-gericht should decline to enforce it. But we 
understand that the current of theory and practice is the other way in both 
countries. 
From the fact that in England sovereignty resides in the 
Parliament, and that it can alter the Constitution according to its pleasure, 
                                                 
1 Archiv fur Öffentliches Reckt; herausg. von Laband und Stoerk; Bd. ii., s. 103. 
2 Curry’s “ Constitutional Government in Spain,” p. 94 (1889). 
3 Adams & Cunningham’s “ Swiss Confederation,” p. 267 (1889). 
 
4 Jellinek, “Gesetz und Verordnung,” p. 401. 
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it happens that the very words constitutional and unconstitutional have a 
different meaning in that country from what they possess in the United 
States. In this country where the judiciary are empowered to pass on the 
constitutionality of laws, an unconstitutional enactment is in reality no 
law, because, ordained in violation of constitutional provisions, it will not 
be enforced by the courts. But in England where the judiciary are without 
this power, it is quite otherwise. In that country political reasoners of the 
Bentham school have objected to the use of the term constitutional, on 
the ground that it has no meaning, or that, if it has, it means every thing 
and any thing. Lord Brougham, however, insisted that the word had an 
intelligible meaning, and that it was perfectly correct to speak of a law as 
being unconstitutional. According to his understanding, a law in England 
may be said to be unconstitutional when it sins against the genius and 
spirit of the government. And, by way of illustration, he says: 
“A bill passed into a statute which should permanently prohibit 
public meetings, without consent of the government, would be as valid 
and binding a law as the Great Charter, or the Act of Settlement; but a 
more unconstitutional law could not well be devised.” 1 
And so Mr. Freeman tells us that: “ When an Englishman 
speaks of the conduct of a public man being constitutional or 
unconstitutional, he means something wholly different from what he 
means by conduct being legal or illegal.”2 This he explains by saying that 
if the ministers of the Crown should continue in office after it had been 
made apparent that they had lost the confidence of the House of 
Commons, in so doing they would not be guilty of any illegal act which 
could be made the subject of a prosecution or impeachment, but they 
would be acting in contravention of the conventional code of the 
Constitution. 
                                                 
1 Brougham on the “ British Constitution,” p. 285. 
2  Freeman’s “ Growth of the English Constitution,” p. 109. 
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The lectures which follow are concerned with the development 
of the constitutional law of the Federal Government, and that development 
is to be sought in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
It has been said that the Constitution created this court for the purpose of 
construing that instrument. So far as the ordinary forms of power are 
concerned it is evident, as Mr. Justice Miller told the students in the Law 
School of Michigan University in an address not long since delivered before 
them, that it is by far the feeblest department of government. “It has no 
army, it has no navy, and it has no purse. It has no patronage, it has no 
officers, except its clerks and marshals, and the latter are appointed by 
the President and confirmed by the Senate.” Feeble as it may thus appear 
to be, yet in reality the Supreme Court of the United States is more 
powerful in its influence on the character of the government than is the 
President or the Congress. It may decide that what the Congress and the 
President have sought to enact into law is not law, and it may by 
construction and interpretation declare what meaning shall be attached to 
the Constitution and the laws enacted thereunder, moulding them 
according to its views. The court has been styled, and quite properly so, “ 
the living voice of the Constitution.”1 
When we reflect, therefore, that the Constitution is not simply 
the work of those who in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 framed it, 
but is in large measure the work of the men who in the Supreme Court of 
the United States have been engaged for a century in construing and 
interpreting it, we are led to the conclusion that a study of the 
development of the constitutional law of the country naturally commences 
with a study of the place which that court occupies in the Constitutional 
system of the United States. And this accordingly was made the subject of 
the first lecture in the course. No part of our system of government 
deserves a closer study than this, and none reflects more credit on the 
country. “No feature,” says Professor Bryce, “in the government of the 
                                                 
1 Bryce’s “ American Commonwealth,” p. 266. 
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United States has awakened so much curiosity in the European mind, 
caused so much discussion, received so much admiration, and been more 
frequently misunderstood, than the duties assigned to the Supreme Court 
and the functions which it discharges in guarding the ark of the 
Constitution.” 1 
That the first lecture in a course on Constitutional 
Development in the United States should be delivered by Thomas M. 
Cooley, LL.D., was especially fitting and appropriate. For by common 
consent he has come to be considered the most eminent constitutional 
jurist of his generation, the successor of Mr. Justice Story as an 
expounder of the Constitution. The profession are always ready to listen 
with interest to whatever he has to say concerning the Constitution and 
the laws. In this lecture, after directing attention to certain leading and 
controlling facts in relation to the Constitution, Judge Cooley explains the 
place of the Supreme Court in our Federal system, and considers the more 
important cases involving questions of constitutional law, decided by the 
court prior to the appointment of Marshall. The influence on Constitutional 
Development of John Jay, the first Chief-Justice of the United States, is in 
this lecture appropriately referred to. Webster once said with truth, that 
“When the spotless ermine of the judicial robe fell on John Jay it touched 
nothing not as spotless as itself.” 
The second lecture, “Constitutional Development as Influenced 
by Chief-Justice Marshall,” was delivered by Henry Hitchcock, LL.D., of St. 
Louis, Mo. Mr. Hitchcock is known to the bar of the United States as one of 
its distinguished members, a learned lawyer, and accomplished scholar, 
whose name as we write is being mentioned with favor for the place on 
the bench of the Federal Supreme Court made vacant by the death of 
Justice Matthews. In this lecture he has portrayed the public life and 
                                                 
1 Bryce’s “ American Commonwealth.” p. 237. 
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services of Marshall as a soldier, lawyer, legislator, diplomatist, and 
statesman, as well as his judicial career. Few there probably are who will 
call in question the conclusion of the lecturer when he says, that no 
judicial career in history affords a parallel to that of Marshall. Lord 
Mansfield united his name forever with the Commercial law of England as 
the creator of that branch of English law. Lord Stowell identified his name 
for all time with the Admiralty Law, and Lord Nottingham his with that of 
Equity Jurisprudence. So the name of Marshall will be linked through the 
coming years with the Constitutional Law of the United States. He not only 
laid the foundation, but raised the superstructure of our splendid system 
of constitutional law. And the student should remember that this work was 
more difficult of accomplishment than was that done by either Mansfield, 
or Stowell, or Nottingham. What those great judges did was not the result 
of their own unaided minds, for they had the benefit of a knowledge of the 
writings of the continental jurists in similar fields of labor. Marshall’s task, 
on the other hand, was to reach conclusions in matters concerning which 
there were no precedents at home or abroad. His task was to “cleave his 
way through a pathless forest, with no help but the resources of his native 
genius and sagacity.”1 He was pre-eminently the expounder of the 
Constitution. It was once said of Lord Mansfield that the most sober jurist 
contemplating the temple of commercial law which Mansfield reared, 
might with enthusiasm exclaim: Si monumentum quaeris, circum-spice.2 
Changing the phraseology we might more appropriately apply the remark 
to Marshall and the temple of constitutional law. 
The third lecture, “Constitutional Development as Influenced 
by Chief-Justice Taney, was delivered by George W. Biddle, LL.D., 
Chancellor of the Bar Association of Philadelphia. Mr. Biddle was the life-
long friend of Chief-Justice Sharswood, of Pennsylvania, one of the 
greatest judges that commonwealth ever possessed. Justice Sharswood in 
                                                 
1 Magruder’s “ Life of Marshall,” p. 165. 
2 Story’s “ Miscellaneous Writings,” p. 276. 
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dedicating to Mr. Biddle one of his publications announces that he does so 
in testimony “of the highest admiration of his qualities as a man, a citizen, 
an advocate, and a jurist.” The period included in Mr. Biddle’s lecture is a 
very important one in the history of the country, and one appealing to the 
interest of every student of our constitutional system. As Chief-Justice 
Taney presided in the Supreme Court of the United States for more than a 
quarter of a century, and during the period of the Civil War when the court 
was called on to decide questions of vital importance growing out of the 
complications of the time, the potency of his influence on Constitutional 
Development will be readily appreciated. Taney is considered as next to 
Marshall the greatest of the Chief-Justices. And the student of 
constitutional law will find on a careful reading of the opinions that while 
Taney’s views of the Constitution were somewhat less in the direction of 
centralization of power than were those of Marshall, he was ready to 
sustain the powers of the Federal Government, and ever did so to the 
satisfaction of the country, with the exception of the unfortunate decision 
which he pronounced in the Dred Scott case. He was a learned and 
profound lawyer, whose power of subtle analysis, Mr. Justice Curtis said, 
exceeded that of any man he had ever known.1 It has always been 
considered a fortunate circumstance, that for a period of over sixty years 
the great office of Chief-Justice of the United States was occupied by only 
two persons, thereby securing to our system of constitutional law, and to 
our national jurisprudence, uniformity and completeness. 
The fourth lecture, “Constitutional Development as Influenced 
by Decisions of the Supreme Court since 1864,” was delivered by Charles 
A. Kent, A.M., a member of the bar of Michigan, who for eighteen years 
was a respected professor in the Law School of the University of Michigan. 
The period covered by the lecture includes the judicial careers of Chief-
Justices Chase and Waite. It is a period of great historical interest and 
importance, the court having been called to pass on the Thirteenth, 
                                                 
1 See Tyler’s “ Memoir of Taney,” pp. 511, 512. 
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Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, on the legislation of the period of 
Reconstruction, the great question involved in the Legal Tender Cases, 
and other questions of grave and serious import. During this time the 
principle was established that we possessed under the Constitution “An 
indestructible Union of indestructible States.” There was developed, as a 
consequence of the struggle for national existence in which the 
government was engaged, a school of constitutional construction of 
perhaps more liberal tendency than any that had hitherto existed. And the 
Constitution of the United States became, by changes made in its formal 
expressions as well as in the spirit of its construction, an instrument of 
government quite different from that framed by the Fathers. It still 
remains, however, the most conservative instrument of government 
known to the world, commanding our respect and veneration, and giving 
assurance to all our people that peace, happiness, and prosperity await us 
so long as we conform to the provisions which are therein contained. The 
changes which the Constitution underwent during this period, and the 
many questions of constitutional law then raised and settled, are happily 
stated in the lecture referred to. 
The fifth lecture was delivered by Daniel H. Chamberlain, 
LL.D., at one time Governor of South Carolina, and now a well-known 
member of the bar of the city of New York. The people of the United 
States live under a dual form of govenment, being subject in certain 
matters to the National Government, and in certain other matters to the 
government of the States. And as the opening lecture in the course was 
devoted to a consideration of the place of the Federal Supreme Court in 
our constitional system, it was entirely fitting that the closing lecture 
should treat of the place of the State Judiciary in the same system. The 
lecture delivered by Governor Chamberlain will be found to contain an 
interesting discussion of the relations which exist between the States and 
the United States, and the opinion is advanced, that after the Declaration 
of Independence and prior to the adoption of the Federal Constitution the 
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States were sovereign and independent, but since the adoption of that 
Constitution the States and the United States have each been sovereign 
within the limits marked out by that instrument. The respective limits of 
the jurisdiction of the State and Federal courts are clearly stated, the 
State judiciary being possessed of all the judicial power belonging to a 
sovereign State which is not vested by the Constitution in the United 
States. The extent to which the Supreme Court of the United States will 
go in following the decisions of a State court in matters of local law is next 
stated; and then a comparison is instituted between the character of the 
State and Federal judiciary as a body. In the opinion of Governor 
Chamberlain there has not been a time when the average of judicial ability 
of the State judiciary, in at least the oldest and best governed of the 
States, has fallen below the average ability displayed by the Federal 
judiciary. I venture in this connection to add the following opinion on the 
same subject from the recent work of Professor Bryce: 
“Of the State judges it is hard to speak generally, because 
there are great differences between State and State. In six or seven 
commonwealths, of which Massachusetts is the best example among 
eastern, and Michigan among western States, they stand high—that is to 
say, the post will attract a prosperous barrister, though he will lose in 
income, or a law professor, though he must sacrifice his leisure. But in 
some States it is otherwise. ... In the Federal courts and in the Superior 
courts of the six or seven States just mentioned it is equal to the justice 
dispensed in the Superior courts of England, France, and Germany. In the 
remainder it is inferior, that is to say, civil trials, whether the issue be of 
law or fact, more frequently give an unsatisfactory result; the opinions 
delivered by the judges are wanting in scientific accuracy, and the law 
becomes loose and uncertain.”1 
                                                 
1 “ American Commonwealth,” pp. 497, 498. 
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Mr. Justice Stanley Matthews, whose recent death deprived 
the Supreme Court of one of its most brilliant and accomplished members, 
took a deep interest in this course of lectures from the time it was planned 
to the date of his death. He had been invited to deliver the fourth lecture, 
covering the period of Constitutional Development since 1864, and had 
consented to do so, hoping to employ the leisure of his summer vacation 
of 1888 in preparation. He made some collection of material for the 
purpose when he was stricken with illness, compelling him to cancel his 
engagement “with extreme reluctance and much regret,” and finally 
resulting in his death. But even after he recognized the necessity which 
compelled him to abandon his purpose, he continued in several letters to 
express his interest in the course, as may be seen from the following 
extract taken from a letter dictated from his sick chamber not many 
weeks before his death. He writes: “I deeply regret the disability which I 
foresaw would prevent my taking part in the interesting course of lectures 
before the University of Michigan, of which you send me the program. I 
congratulate you on the list of strong, able, and sound men whose names 
constitute the list. I hope when the lectures appear in print to be able to 
study and enjoy them, as I shall no doubt profit by them.” 
He then adds certain suggestions in regard to the publication 
of the lectures, which he thought would add greatly to the permanent 
value of the work. And in a letter which he requested his wife to write less 
than a week before his death, he again declares that he very much regrets 
that he is not to take part in the discussion, adding that he would have 
liked to have his name appear in connection with the publication. The 
University of Michigan would have experienced a profound satisfaction if 
Mr. Justice Matthews had been permitted to present to its students his 
views of the development of the Constitution; but in the Providence of 
God, that was not to be. 
As the lectures relate to the Constitution of the United States, 
it may not be inappropriate to briefly direct attention to the leading 
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historic facts connected with the origin of this Great Charter of the 
government. On the 21st day of February, 1786, the legislature of Virginia 
passed a resolution, introduced by Mr. Madison, appointing commissioners 
to confer with commissioners to be appointed by the other States with a 
view of considering “how far a uniform system in their commercial 
relations might be necessary to their common interest and their 
permanent harmony.” Accordingly there assembled at Annapolis, in 
September, 1786, delegates from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, and Delaware. Resolutions were passed by them recommending a 
convention of delegates from all the States, “to devise such further 
provisions as might appear necessary to render the Constitution of the 
Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union.” This 
resolution was presented to Congress, and that body, on the 21st of 
February, 1787, resolved that: 
“It was expedient that on the second Monday in May next, a 
convention of delegates, who shall have been appointed by the several 
States, be held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revising 
the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several 
legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed 
to in Congress and confirmed by the States, render the Federal 
Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the 
preservation of the Union.” 
The convention thus provided for began its work in May and 
continued its deliberations without intermission until the 17th day of 
September of the same year, when its work was completed and submitted 
to the States for their ratification. All of the States but Rhode Island had 
participated in the deliberations of the convention, and a majority of the 
delegates of each of the States represented affixed their signatures to the 
instrument as finally agreed on. The convention had not confined its 
attention to a revision of the Articles of Confederation, as had been 
contemplated in the resolution of Congress under which it was acting, but 
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formulated an entirely new instrument, creating a government of an 
entirely different nature from that then existing. It provided that the 
ratification of the Constitution by nine States should be sufficient for its 
establishment between the States so ratifying the same. The Constitution 
having been transmitted to Congress by George Washington, the 
President of the Convention, that body directed, on September the 28, 
1787, that it be submitted “to a convention of delegates, chosen in each 
State by the people thereof, in conformity to the resolves of the 
convention.” And thereupon the legislatures of the several States called on 
the people to send delegates to their State conventions, take the matter 
of ratification into consideration, and report the result to Congress. Rhode 
Island alone declined to call a convention. The Constitution was thus 
submitted to the people for adoption, and the question gave rise to a 
bitter conflict of opinion. As Von Hoist has said, “ the decision hung upon a 
single hair.”1 But on July the 2d, 1788, the President of Congress informed 
that body that the Constitution had been ratified by the conventions of 
nine States, and a committee was on that day appointed to report an act “ 
For Putting the Said Constitution Into Operation.” On September the 13th 
it was agreed that the government under the Constitution should be 
inaugurated on March the 4th, in the city of New York. The senators- and 
representatives-elect to the Congress were slow in assembling, and a 
month elapsed beyond the time agreed on before a quorum was obtained 
for the transaction of business. And it was not until April the 30th that 
Washington took the oath of office as President of the United States, the 
Centennial of which event is being fittingly commemorated in the city of 
New York, even as these pages are running through the press. Well might 
Sir James Mackintosh write: “America has emerged from her struggle into 
tranquility and freedom, into affluence and credit; and the authors of her 
                                                 
1 I Von Hoist’s “Const. Hist, of the United States,” p. 50. A change of 2 out of 60 votes in 
New York, of 5 out of 168 votes in Virginia, and of 10 out of 355 votes in Massachusetts 
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Constitution have constructed a great permanent experimental answer to 
the sophisms and declarations of the detractors of liberty.” 1 
It has been said that the lawyers of the colonies were of 
necessity better fitted for constitution making than any body of legislators 
in the world. And this remark we believe is entirely true. The controversies 
which led to the secession of the colonies from the mother country turned 
on questions of law. The colonists complained of a violation of their 
natural and constitutional rights at the hands of Great Britain, and the 
colonial lawyers were the leaders in the contest. They, therefore, studied 
profoundly works on government, and on the philosophy of history, as 
well as the philosophic writers on jurisprudence. Moreover, it had been for 
years their vocation to make old laws conform to the changed conditions 
of life in the new world, rejecting that which seemed unsuitable to the 
situation in which they found themselves. They were thus prepared as no 
other class of men ever had been for the construction of written 
constitutions. They were the authors of the constitutions of the States, 
and afterwards of the Constitution of the United States. 
In conclusion it may be said that the subject of these lectures 
is of general interest to every American citizen who desires to understand 
the nature of the government under which he lives, and to students in the 
various departments of knowledge who are desirous of a broader culture 
than is to be derived from the mere pursuit of their own particular 
specialties. At the same time the subject is one of particular interest to 
those engaged in certain branches of study. 
I. The subject necessarily appeals most directly to those who 
are engaged in the study and practice of the law. To all such persons a 
knowledge of the constitutional law of the United States and of its 
development is indispensable. As the specially characterizing feature of 
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our system of jurisprudence, it deserves and receives their most profound 
study 
2. The subject is one of particular interest to students of Political 
Science. It was with entire appropriateness that the lectures were 
delivered  under  the  auspices  of  a  Political  Science  Association.  The 
of the ancients was concerned with a study of the 
art of regulating the state and the means of preserving and directing it. 
And the Political Science of our day is like wise concerned with a study of 
the fundamental principles of government. Every student of Political 
Science in the United States is obliged, in the prosecution of his studies, 
to give particular attention to a study of the Constitution of the United 
States, which is the fundamental law for the government of the country. 
The student of the theories of political parties should 
remember that the Supreme Court of the United States was dominated by 
the spirit of the party of the Federalists from the foundation of the 
government in 1789 to the death of Chief-Justice Marshall in 1835, and by 
that of the Democratic party from that time to the death of Chief-Justice 
Taney in 1864, and by that of the Republican party from that day to the 
present. And he will be interested in his study of the decisions to observe 
to what extent the political convictions of the court gave color to their 
conclusions on constitutional questions. These three periods in the history 
of the court are considered respectively in the second, third, and fourth 
lectures of this series. 
3.But this subject is also of interest to the student of history. As 
Judge Holmes has said, “ the law embodies the story of a nation’s 
development.” And so it happens in our higher institutions of learning that 
instruction is provided for students of history in what is known as 
“Constitutional History,” the history of the development of the Constitution 
of the country. The student of law in our times has come to recognize the 
fact that law is, in a sense, a branch of history, and is to be studied in a 
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historic spirit and by a historic method. So true is this that a recent 
English law writer is led to say that “It were far better, as things now 
stand, to be charged with heresy, or even to be found guilty of petit 
larceny, than to fall under the suspicion of lacking historical-mindedness.”  
And as the student of law now recognizes the relation which exists 
between law and history, so also has the student of history come to 
recognize that a certain relation subsists between history and law. 
HENRY WADE ROGERS. 
LAW SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY of MICHIGAN. 
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THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT—ITS PLACE 
IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
SYSTEM. 
 
REPRESENTATIVE institutions have been aptly characterized 
by an eminent English author and lawyer as “that great secret for 
reconciling liberty with order which was never discovered by antiquity.”1 
These have had their best and highest development in the United States 
of America, and the course of lectures which is begun to-day will have for 
a general subject the Federal Judicial Power, and the part it has had in 
this development. 
In this opening lecture attention will be directed principally to 
the chief custodian of that power, the Federal Supreme Court, with a view 
to indicating as clearly as may be the place which, under the Constitution, 
it holds in the government. 
The history of the country preceding the ratification of the 
Constitution, and the series of events which resulted in the organization of 
a national government for States which before were but loosely 
confederated, it will be assumed, are too well known to require 
recapitulation at this time. We shall therefore content ourselves with the 
statement that nowhere does the national character of the Government 
appear more distinctly than in the article of the Constitution which 
provides for the judicial department, and determines what shall be the 
scope of its power. But before considering this article it will be convenient 
to take some notice of such peculiarities of the Federal Constitution as 
specially distinguish it from the fundamental laws of other countries. 
The praise bestowed by the ablest and most versatile of 
contemporary English statesmen upon the Federal Constitution is familiar 
to all Americans. What makes it deserving of his encomiums is not the 
fact that it indicates remarkable genius in its framers; that it embodies 
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new and wonderful maxims in government; or even that it demonstrates 
the founders to have had a talent for government beyond that of their 
forefathers. In point of fact the Constitution was only in a very narrow 
sense a new creation of institutions. The American Constitution, as truly 
as that of England, is a growth, and the wisdom of the founders of the 
existing Union was shown chiefly in this: that in perfecting the general 
government they disturbed as little as possible the existing institutions 
which were the growth of ages, and which were as much a part of their 
race inheritance as were their own physical and mental peculiarities and 
tendencies. At the same time, by the provision they made for the 
amendment of their work, they took care that there should be no 
ironbound structure by which growth in the future should be precluded. In 
short, the establishment of government under the Constitution was 
preservative even more than it was creative: it was meant to preserve 
and perfect the existing Union; to preserve to the States their local 
governments and inherited institutions; to exclude the possibility of 
monarchical innovations; and to perpetuate the principle of constitutional 
growth. What was particularly noticeable in the case was chiefly this: that 
the framers of the Constitution adhered so closely to the lessons of 
experience, and trusted so little to their own speculations and inspirations. 
In so far as the Constitution was a new creation, it was limited strictly to 
what seemed to be the necessities of the case. 
Whoever examines the Federal Constitution with a view to just 
interpretation, is under the necessity of bearing in mind certain leading 
and controlling facts. 
First. He is to consider the Constitution as a written instrument 
complete within itself. It does not constitute the complete structure of 
American constitutional authority and right, for the States, with all their 
powers and protections, are a part of this, and are not for a moment to be 
excluded from consideration. But national authority is conferred and 
measured exclusively by the written instrument, and prescription cannot, 
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as in other countries, aid it, or precedent enlarge it. There is also at all 
times a certainty about it which cannot exist when the Constitution is 
prescriptive and unwritten, subject, as it would then be, to continual 
change and to dispute as to what change is in fact at any time definitely 
effected. The importance of this fact will readily be perceived, but it 
cannot now be enlarged upon. 
Second. The Constitution is in terms declared to be the 
supreme law of the land; supreme not only over all citizens, but over all 
the States and all State authority. This also is a fact of paramount 
significance. 
It is implied in the definition of a constitution that it is a 
fundamental law. But it is not a necessary part of the definition that it 
shall be a supreme law. Most constitutions, neither in their intent nor as 
administered, are supreme in the sense that the government itself in its 
several departments is held by the constitution in strict control, as is 
intended shall be the case with the American Union. Take up any history 
of Europe during the present century, and nothing will be found more 
often recorded than the grant of constitutions by princes to their subjects. 
But the authority that granted could also revoke, and it is seldom that a 
constitution has acquired any permanence. The instrument which thus for 
its very existence depended upon the pleasure of a prince could not 
possibly in any true sense be a supreme law. When the government, 
whatever the form, grants a constitution, it necessarily remains supreme 
over it. Quite emphatically has this been true of all unwritten 
constitutions. Fundamental laws which derive their origin from prescription 
must assume the existence of a government which is in possession of 
sovereign powers, and whose laws, therefore, from time to time enacted, 
must from the very fact of this sovereignty be supreme. The constitution 
of England is no exception to this rule: it is and must be in subordination 
to the Parliament, and the Parliament may at any time exercise the power 
to enact laws in modification of its principles. The “omnipotence of 
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Parliament” is thus seen to be not a figure of speech merely, but a 
potential reality. 
Third. This fundamental difference between the American 
Constitution and the constitutions of other countries, whereby the one is 
made the supreme law while others are subordinate, invites mention of 
the different theories on which the structures of government respectively 
are erected. 
The theory on which all government in America is constructed, 
is that sovereignty is in the people. This is not theory merely, for its 
acceptance makes it the most important and vital fact in government. 
According to American ideas it is the only true theory, which because it is 
true ought to be accepted as a foundation fact everywhere; but the usage 
of the world is otherwise. Nor is it surprising that it should be so, for 
nearly all government has originated in despotism, represented either by 
a single ruler or by some small oligarchy, and the growth of constitutional 
liberty has consisted in gradually winning from the despotism a concession 
of certain rights and privileges. But the concession that the government is 
not sovereign can never by possibility be won through usage. The 
theoretical sovereignty may pass from king to parliament, as it did with 
the rise of parliamentary power in England; but first and last in that 
country, and almost everywhere else, the sovereignty has attached to the 
power of legislation. It is therefore subject to constitutional restraints only 
so far as they may have moral force: they can possess no other. 
  The builders of the Constitution of the United States, on the other 
hand, were to create a governmental structure at once, not to wait for one 
to grow. The only governments then in existence whose authority they 
recognized were their State governments, and these had all been 
constructed on the theory of sovereignty in the people. A general 
government must necessarily be framed on acceptance of the same 
theory: I, because there was then no general authority exercising 
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supreme power over the people to construct one for them; and 2, because 
any other theory was foreign to the ideas on which the Revolution had 
been undertaken and independence achieved. The Constitution, when 
framed, was therefore referred to the people of the States for their 
acceptance, and the ratification by them as the sovereign authority made 
it what in terms it was declared to be, the supreme law. 
Fourth. When we look into this supreme law, we note as its 
most prominent characteristic that the powers of government are to be 
exercised, not by the sovereign authority, but by officers and departments 
created as agencies for the purpose, and clothed for the time being with 
certain delegated functions. The legislature is itself one of these agencies, 
with powers limited in the delegation, so that in the nature of things it is 
impossible that it should assert and take to itself the complete legislative 
power, expressed in the term “legislative omnipotence,” which is claimed 
and exercised by the Parliament of the British Empire. 
This want of sovereignty in the government, or in any branch 
thereof, follows so necessarily from the manner in which the Constitution 
was called into existence, that the tenth article of the amendments was 
scarcely necessary to make it plain that “The powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively or to the people.” Chief-Justice 
Marshall expressed the principle in somewhat different words when he 
said: “The Government of the United States can claim no powers which 
are not granted to it by the Constitution “; adding as a rule of construction 
that ‘‘the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or 
given by necessary implication”1; and again when he said that the 
Constitution “contains an enumeration of the powers expressly granted by 
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the people to their government.”1 They are enumerated, but to the full 
extent of the grants made they are supreme. 
The grant of judicial- authority it is declared by the 
Constitution “ shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or which 
shall be made under its authority; to all cases affecting embassadors, 
other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; 
to controversies between two or more States, between a State and 
citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between 
citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, 
and between a State and citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens, or 
subjects.”2 
Manifestly the grant was intended to embrace every possible 
federal question. And what is a federal question? First we may say, every 
question which concerns the federal authority, and the decision upon 
which may tend to preserve that authority in its integrity, or, if erroneous, 
to weaken, undermine, or defeat it. Every question, therefore, of the 
validity of an act of Congress, or of any authority claimed or exercised 
under an act of Congress, or under the Constitution itself, is a federal 
question. The judicial power may therefore be said in general terms to be 
co-extensive with both the legislative and executive; for the exercise of 
authority by either may be the subject of a case in law or equity between 
parties whose interests it may affect. It is co-extensive also with the 
treaty-making power in so far as that power in its exercise can present 
judicial questions.  
But there are federal questions which arise outside the sphere 
of either the federal, legislative, or executive power, so that the grant to 
                                                 
1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 187. 
 
2 Constitution, Article 3, § 2. 
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the judicial department may be justly said to be broader than that made 
to either of the others. Such a question was presented when in the 
Dartmouth College case a corporation claimed that a State enactment 
remodelling its charter impaired the obligation of a contract.1 The question 
presented concerned State authority, not federal, and the wrong if there 
was one could neither be righted by the Congress nor by the President, for 
no power of redress had been given by the Constitution to either; it was a 
wrong done under assumed State authority, and must have passed 
unredressed but for this grant of judicial power, which embraced it 
because the case which presented the question was one arising under the 
Federal Constitution. Such a question was presented again when after the 
civil war certain of the States undertook to impose legislative punishments 
for treasonable conduct; 2 and also in many other cases which need not 
now be named. To bring a case at law or in equity within the scope of the 
federal judicial power, it is enough that the question which it presents is 
one which depends for solution upon the Federal Constitution; it need not 
otherwise concern the federal authority. 
We may pass over the fact that the judicial power is made to 
extend to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, since the 
legislative embraces them also, and notice that it is made to include cases 
to which embassadors, other public ministers, and consuls are parties, the 
purpose being to keep the foreign relations of the country exclusively 
under the control and protection of the federal power, and to exclude the 
jurisdiction of State courts, which, both from their number and from the 
State authority not being charged with responsibility in respect to 
international affairs, would constitute unsuitable tribunals for the trial of 
cases in which international controversies would be likely to arise. But 
further on in the grant we perceive that it is not limited to federal cases, 
but is made to embrace large classes of cases where the question may not 
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be federal in any sense. Such a case is a controversy arising between two 
or more States, in which the questions for decision may in no degree 
touch or affect the federal authority, or be different from that which might 
arise in a State court between two private citizens. Such also is a 
controversy between two parties claiming lands under grants of different 
States. But though the question in these cases would not be federal, the 
reason for the grant of jurisdiction is federal, since the purpose is to give, 
for controversies in which State tribunals might be suspected of partiality, 
a tribunal as free from such suspicion as from the nature of the case 
would be possible. 
We see, therefore, that the grant of judicial power covers the 
whole field of federal jurisdiction, so that no question of national authority 
can be raised to which it does not extend; that it also embraces every 
possible right, privilege, or exemption that may be claimed under the 
Federal Constitution, whether created or given for federal reasons or for 
the benefit of the citizen as an individual; and that beyond all these it is 
made to reach cases which otherwise must go for decision to tribunals not 
altogether impartial, with the not improbable result of provoking State 
jealousies and disturbing the peace of the Union. In short, the grant was 
meant to be a grant not only adequate for all the purposes of a shield to 
national authority, but also, where federal questions were not involved, to 
constitute a bond of union and a protection against disturbing 
controversies which would otherwise be without suitable means of 
peaceful and orderly settlement.  
It is to be observed of this grant, however, that while it 
prescribes the extent of federal judicial power, it does not confer that 
power upon particular courts. The establishment of courts was left to 
Congress; and not until they were created and their jurisdiction defined, 
would it be determined how much of this power would be referred for 
exercise to one federal court or to another, or indeed whether the whole 
should be assigned to federal courts. A subsequent clause of the judiciary 
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article provided that “In all cases affecting embassadors, other public 
ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the 
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction”; but this was the extent to 
which express grant was made to any court. This is particularly to be 
noted and borne in mind, since, with the single exception mentioned, 
every federal court must show legislative authority for the jurisdiction it 
assumes to exercise. And it may be added that there never has been a 
time in the history of the government when the complete judicial power 
has been devolved for execution upon particular courts. Something less 
than this has been thought to accomplish the purposes of the 
Constitution. 
It is further to be observed that the grant made is of judicial 
power only. Judicial power is the power to take cognizance of 
controversies of a judicial nature, to determine what the law is that 
governs them, and to apply and enforce that law as between the litigants. 
It is implied that there shall be a tribunal clothed by law with authority to 
hear the case, and parties lawfully subjected to the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal so that its judgment shall bind them. When these things concur, 
the tribunal can speak with authority, and what it declares to be the law 
must be taken to be the law; when either of these things is wanting, the 
tribunal misjudges, if it speaks at all, for its utterances, though they be 
given deliberately and in form of solemn judgment, will bind no one. 
It is commonly said that the Federal Supreme Court is the 
authorized exponent of the Constitution, and that its construction is to be 
accepted as final. But when the requisites to authoritative judicial action 
are noted, it is clearly seen that questions of construction must commonly 
arise first before some other authority. This is so even when the questions 
arise between litigants; for the jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court 
is for the most part appellate, so that it considers a question of 
constitutional authority only by way of reviewing the action of some other 
court. The question is not unlikely to arise first in a State court; and for 
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the purposes of review the Judiciary Act, which was one of the earliest 
measures adopted by the Federal Congress, has provided for an appeal 
from the State to the Federal Supreme Court. Provision has also been 
made by law, under which a party to a case in a State court, which 
presents a federal question, may have it removed to the proper federal 
court for trial before the State court shall have passed judgment upon it. 
In either case the final judgment, when ultimately made by the Federal 
Supreme Court, is conclusive upon the litigants. 
But the federal question that thus arises in a State court may 
be one of the constitutional validity of a State law, and the decision which 
sustains the claim made under the Federal Constitution may necessarily 
hold the State law to be invalid. Some such cases have already been 
referred to, in which, by the solemn judgment of the Federal Supreme 
Court, State laws, whose validity had been affirmed by the State judiciary, 
were nevertheless annulled. Other cases, such as the attempted State 
taxation of the national bank,1 and the attempted State grant of a 
monopoly of its navigable waters,2 are notable instances in which great 
States, proud of their sovereignty, have had their most deliberate action 
called in question, and annulled by a single entry on the journal of a court. 
The settlement of the most insignificant neighborhood 
contention could not be more undemonstrative nor more effectual. 
But the federal question, instead of arising between litigants, 
may be first presented in the federal legislature. It must always be first 
presented there when it involves the constitutional power to enact a 
proposed federal law. But when thus presented it is a legislative, not a 
judicial question, and it does not pertain to the judicial authority to 
express an opinion, or to give advice upon it. The same is true when the 
proposed legislation is adopted by the two houses, and presented to the 
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President for his approval: the President must determine for himself any 
question of constitutional power which his approval may involve. If he 
decides against the proposed law, and it is not passed over his objections, 
no judicial question concerning it can be presented, for the plain reason 
that, what was attempted to be done having proved wholly ineffectual, it 
is not possible that it should be the subject of a judicial controversy. 
Whatever federal question was involved must, therefore, remain without 
any such authoritative decision as would conclude any department of the 
government, or any citizen in case the same question should arise in the 
future. It may thus happen that federal questions will receive the 
deliberate attention and be finally acted upon by Congress and the 
President, without the possibility of judicial intervention for the correction 
of any errors of opinion into which they may have fallen. 
When the federal question concerns proposed legislation which 
fails of adoption, any opinion the federal judges may have upon it can be 
of no practical importance, and an erroneous conclusion by the political 
departments can introduce into the federal system no disorders. There are 
cases, however, in which the political departments of the government may 
take important affirmative action, which nevertheless cannot be reviewed 
in the courts. These are cases in which the questions involved are purely 
political, and cannot, therefore, become the subject of a suit at law or in 
equity between parties litigant. Such a case is presented when there is 
contention over the possession of lawful State authority, and when 
Congress or the President intervenes under the constitutional duty to 
guarantee to the States a republican form of government.1 Such cases 
arose when the States were being reorganized under the reconstruction 
acts after the civil war. Such decision as the political departments of the 
government reached in these cases was final and conclusive, from the 
very fact of the questions presented being exclusively political. But such 
cases are not numerous, and the fact stands as the general truth that the 
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federal judiciary is the authoritative expounder of the Constitution, 
because its judgment in matters of construction it has the power to 
enforce. 
This is a great power; and there being included in it the power 
to annul not only Federal but State enactments, the fear has often been 
expressed that it must at length give the judiciary a preponderance in the 
government. The Federal Supreme Court is final judge of its own 
authority; and the judges have thus the power, as Mr. Jefferson, in his 
alarm at their supposed encroachments, pointed out, “to lay all things at 
their feet.” 1The alarm has proved uncalled for. Those who follow me in 
this course will be able to show very clearly that, though the federal 
judiciary has not always kept within the undoubted limits of its authority, 
it has more faithfully guarded both the rights of the States and of the 
citizen than has either of the political departments of the government, and 
that we owe to it and not to them the clear and authoritative declaration 
that the Constitution, with its guaranties of liberty, “is a law for rulers and 
for people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with its shield of 
protection all classes of men at all times and under all circumstances.” 
In two historical cases the court ventured to express formal 
opinions on federal questions without having such jurisdiction of a case as 
would empower it to give relief. The result should have been anticipated: 
the utterances, not being authoritative, were not obeyed. Mr. Jefferson 
treated with no respect the opinion of Chief-Justice Marshall, that it was 
the duty of his secretary to deliver a judicial commission which had been 
signed by his predecessor2; and Mr. Lincoln, representing a different 
political organization, rejected quite as emphatically the opinion of Chief-
Justice Taney, that Congress was without constitutional power to exclude 
                                                 
1 7 Works, 193. 
 
2 Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch, 137. 
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slavery from the territories.1 Each party in its turn was solemnly 
reverential of the utterances of the court, which accorded with its views; 
and the bitter complaints of those who rejected the authority of the court 
as final arbiter of constitutional questions, with which the federal parlors 
were eloquent in 1801, were echoed back sixty years later in Tammany 
wigwams. 
In the main, however, it can be said that the court has kept 
closely within its jurisdiction. Edmund Burke once said: “Whatever is 
supreme in a state ought to have, as much as possible, its judicial 
authority so constituted as not only to depend upon it, but in some part to 
balance it. It ought to give a security to its justice against its power. It 
ought to make its judicature, as it were, something exterior to the state.” 
As nearly as possible, this has been accomplished in America. The judges, 
in respect to tenure of office, are altogether independent of the 
legislature; and in the making of laws, which is the highest expression of 
sovereignty under the Constitution, they have no participation. Neither do 
they have any part in executive power. 
We do not overlook the fact that it is possible for the 
President, or for Congress, and especially for both acting together, very 
seriously to embarrass the court, and to limit its action as an authorized 
expounder of the Constitution. It is remembered that, in one case, in the 
exercise of its power to assign judicial authority to particular courts, the 
Congress, by law, took away the right of appeal to the Supreme Court in a 
certain class of cases, with the avowed object of preventing the court 
deciding a constitutional question which the cases were expected to 
present.2 It would not be impossible by law to increase the membership of 
                                                 
1 Scott v. Sanford, 19 Howard, 393. 
 
 
2 See McCardle’s Case, 7 Wallace, 506. 
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this court of final resort with a view to the effect of the change on 
constitutional questions, as, indeed, it has been charged was once done. 
It may also be said that cases will arise in which the court will 
be powerless to enforce its own judgments without executive aid, and that 
the President, who should give the aid, may, instead, withhold it. 
Something like this did in fact take place during the controversy between 
the State of Georgia on the one side and the Cherokee Indians and the 
missionaries among them, on the other, during the presidency of Andrew 
Jackson. One arm of the government was thereby in the particular case 
paralyzed. But a similar thing might quite as likely occur to block the 
proper operations of government in other directions. It is matter of history 
that on more than one occasion it has been seriously proposed in 
Congress to defeat a treaty duly ratified by refusing an appropriation 
necessary to give it effect, and that in the case of Jay’s treaty with Great 
Britain an attempt in that direction came near succeeding. Had it 
succeeded it would have been a political crime of great magnitude, the 
consequences of which might have been such as to endanger the Union 
itself. But to say that such wrongs are possible under institutions so 
carefully framed as ours, is only to say that it is not in the nature of things 
that all evils in government should be completely and perfectly guarded 
against. The alternative to independent departments of government with 
powers that may possibly be abused, is a despotism with powers the 
abuse of which would be certain. We reject the despotism, and happily we 
are able to see, in the light of a century’s experience, that the probability 
that at any time one department of government will defeat the proper 
exercise of authority by another, by refusing the necessary co-operation, 
is not so great as to give ground for fear of serious danger to the 
constitutional structure. When the fact is considered that from the 
foundation of the government to the present day parties have divided 
upon constitutional questions, sometimes one party controlling the 
government and sometimes another, and that the antagonisms on 
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questions of construction have been more violent and determined than on 
any others, it is surprising, not that such abuses have occurred, but that 
they have been so few in number. 
When the duty was devolved upon Washington to organize a 
government under the Constitution, no appointments he was called upon 
to make were more important to the country than those of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court. Especially was that of Chief Justice of first 
importance. An error in this regard might have brought into the federal 
system mischiefs that in a little time would have become inveterate and 
irremediable. The Constitution was then to be delivered to the several 
departments of a new government for practical application and 
construction. In the aggregate and in detail it had been the subject of 
earnest controversy in the several States, and the question of its 
acceptance by the people was for a long time doubtful. But with 
acceptance the controversy over it did not come to an end. The 
Constitution was still to be interpreted and applied according to the 
meaning it should be found to express. Those who had not agreed upon 
its meaning in the abstract were still less likely to agree when the 
questions of interpretation came to be presented in the concrete. The 
decision upon them when thus presented might determine whether the 
Constitution was to be a bond of union or a rope of sand; for the practical 
construction might make it the one or the other. 
When the time is considered, and the circumstances under 
which the duty of authoritative construction must be entered upon, one 
cannot fail to be impressed that peculiar qualifications were essential in 
the person who should preside over the body to whom that duty would be 
entrusted, and who would give direction to its thought. He ought certainly 
to be a learned and able lawyer; but he might be this and still fail to grasp 
the full significance of his task. A mere lawyer might see in the 
Constitution nothing but an agreement of parties, to be construed by 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
41
technical rules; it required a statesman to understand its full significance, 
as an instrument of government instinct with life and with authority. 
No other man prominent in the public councils, and generally 
known to the country, possessed in so eminent a degree the varied 
qualifications essential to the task as did John Jay. He had been one of the 
leaders in preparing the mind of America for independence through the 
public press. He had drafted the first Constitution of New York, and when 
it was put into effect he was made Chief Justice of the State under it. Very 
soon, however, he was called into Continental service, and as member of 
Congress was made its presiding officer. But he remained in Congress but 
a short time, and was then sent abroad as Minister to Spain. With Franklin 
and Adams he negotiated the treaty of peace and independence, and 
coming home was appointed to the post of Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He 
contributed articles to the Federalist in advocacy of the Constitution, and 
was a member of the Convention of New York which ratified it. The duties 
of all these official employments he performed with admirable skill and 
fidelity, but they were not allowed so completely to engross his thoughts 
as to preclude his looking beyond them to fundamental principles of right 
and justice that should govern the action of every citizen. He was among 
the first to perceive the infinite wrong of human slavery, and the wretched 
inconsistency of a people fighting for liberty with the right hand while with 
the left holding their fellow-men in hopeless and brutalizing bondage; and 
with views not more philanthropic than statesmanlike, he made himself an 
active member of a society which had for its object, by abolishing slavery, 
to bring the practice of his country more nearly into harmony with its 
professions, and to relieve the horizon of the future of the dark cloud 
which while slavery existed must inevitably hang over it. He was thus in a 
true sense a broad as well as an experienced statesman, jurist, and 
diplomatist; and in no other position in the government were his great and 
varied attainments calculated for such eminent usefulness as in that to 
which the wisdom of Washington now summoned him. 
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On every hand difficulties surrounded the organization of the 
new government, but the questions with which the judiciary would have to 
deal were not only in themselves intricate and troublesome, but they were 
peculiarly susceptible of appeals to popular prejudice and passion. First, 
there was the question of enforcement of debts to British creditors 
contracted before the Revolution, and which it was hoped might be 
defeated under State statutes of limitation notwithstanding the provisions 
of the treaty of peace which undertook to save them. Next were questions 
of confiscation of estates and debts of loyalists or enemies, under State 
acts passed while the war for independence was in progress. Back of all 
these was the question of the liability of a State to suits by individuals in 
the federal courts. The federal judicial power had been made to extend to 
cases at law and in equity “between a State and citizens of another 
State,” and “between a State and citizens thereof and foreign states, 
citizens, and subjects.” It had been very commonly assumed while the 
question of ratification was pending, that while these provisions would 
admit of suits by the States in the federal courts, it was not their meaning 
or their purpose to allow the States to be made defendants in the federal 
courts against their will. The idea of a sovereign state being thus forced to 
respond to the suits of individuals was abhorrent to the prevailing 
sentiments of many States, and to the judgments of able men in all 
sections. Among the States to which such a liability would be particularly 
obnoxious were Virginia, then first in power, and New York, from its 
central position and commercial importance, almost equally necessary to 
the Union. 
When the question was presented to the Federal Supreme 
Court for decision in the fourth year of Washington’s administration, we 
have the recorded opinion of Mr. Randolph, his Attorney-General, that a 
wide-spreading flame had been kindled in Virginia over the British debts, 
and that the friends of the general government were far inferior in 
numbers to its enemies. The fact was equally true of New York. The 
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opposition in the former State was led by Patrick Henry, and in the latter 
by George Clinton, each a host in himself, and with a strong hold on the 
popular feeling, acquired by patriotic service in the Revolution. In some 
other States the opposition to State suability was equally pronounced and 
aggressive. 
A weak court would have bent before the popular fury, and it 
might easily have done so with assignment of such plausible reasons as 
would have preserved for it the judicial character. The question was 
presented in a case which excited intense interest throughout the 
country,1 and which was decided at the February term of the court, 1793. 
The State of Georgia had been sued in the Federal Supreme 
Court by the citizen of another State, but had refused to recognize the 
jurisdiction, and had protested with no little feeling and vigor against the 
indignity of being thus brought like a common debtor into court. The 
protest called in question the national character of the government, and 
denied sovereignty to the Union. It was true that the Constitution had in 
the plainest terms declared that the Supreme Court should have original 
jurisdiction of cases to which a State should be a party with a citizen of 
another State as adverse litigant, but for the protesting State it was 
denied that the words, however plain, could be universally applied, or 
could be so applied at all as to reach the case in question. All provisions of 
the Constitution, it was said, must be reasonably interpreted, as we must 
suppose that they were understood by the people who adopted them, and 
so interpreted, the one in question could mean to give the court 
jurisdiction of a case between a State and a citizen of another State only 
when the State itself should voluntarily invoke the jurisdiction. It could 
never have been intended to give to any court the power by its process to 
bring a State before it as a delinquent, and the States would never have 
ratified a Constitution which proposed it. They were sovereign States. 
                                                 
1 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas’ Rep., 419. 
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They did not resign their sovereignty in ratifying the Constitution, and 
therefore retained it still. They consented, indeed, to the formation of a 
federal government with a Federal Supreme Court as a valuable agency in 
that government. But it is inconsistent with the very nature of sovereignty 
that a tribunal created as a convenience in government should exercise a 
superior and controlling power over the sovereign itself to subject it to 
judgments. This would be to make the agent the master, and that, too, of 
a sovereign, though, in the nature of things, a sovereign can have no 
master. 
Very slight consideration of this protest is needed to make 
plain that, if assented to, it placed the Union and its government at the 
mercy of the several States. If the States were sovereign in any such 
sense as they had been before the Constitution, and if the Union was 
federal and without sovereignty, then nullification of a federal law to which 
a State objected might well be defended as a constitutional right, and 
secession of a State as a remedy for supposed wrongs would be perfectly 
logical. The question which the case presented was therefore one which, 
as it involved the nature of the Union and the general rules of 
constitutional construction, far transcended in importance the interests 
involved in the particular case, or in any number of similar cases which 
might come before the court. The question, in short, was, whether the 
Constitution was a bond of national unity, or such federal league only as 
would be dissoluble at the pleasure of any party to it. 
One of the justices of the court planted himself upon the 
protest of the State as the expression of true constitutional doctrine. 
Justice Wilson, the ablest and most learned of the associates, took the 
national* view, and was supported by two others. The Chief Justice was 
thus enabled to declare as the opinion of the court that, under the 
Constitution of the United States, sovereignty belonged to the people of 
the United States. When experience disappointed the expectations they 
had formed of the Confederation, the people in their collective and 
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national capacity established the Constitution. “It is remarkable that, in 
establishing it, the people exercised their own proper sovereignty, and 
conscious of the plenitude of it, they declared, with becoming dignity: We, 
the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this Constitution. 
Here we see the people acting as sovereigns of the whole country, and in 
the language of sovereignty establishing a Constitution by which it was 
their will that the States should be bound, and to which the State 
constitutions should be made to conform.” And the deduction was 
irresistible: the sovereignty of the nation was in the people of the nation, 
and the residuary sovereignty of each State in the people of each State. 
Nothing could be plainer than this opinion; nothing more 
unequivocal. The people of the United States by sovereign act had formed 
the Constitution to make more perfect the Union which had existed 
before. After this clear and authoritative declaration of national 
supremacy, the power of a court to summon a State before it at the suit 
of an individual might be taken away by the amendment of the 
Constitution—as was in fact done—without impairing the general 
symmetry of the federal structure, or inflicting upon it any irremediable 
injury. The Union might survive and accomplish the beneficent purposes 
entrusted to it, even though it might lack the power to compel the States 
to perform their obligations to creditors. We shall not pause to show—
what indeed is self-evident—that the Union could scarcely have had a 
valuable existence had it been judicially determined that powers of 
sovereignty were exclusively in the States or in the people of the States 
severally. Neither is it important that we proceed to demonstrate that the 
doctrine of an indissoluble Union, though not in terms declared, is 
nevertheless in its elements at least contained in the decision. The 
qualified sovereignty, national and State, the subordination of State to 
nation, the position of the citizen as at once a necessary component part 
of the federal and of the State system, are all exhibited. It must logically 
follow that a nation as a sovereignty is possessed of all those powers of 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
46
independent action and self-protection which the successors of Jay 
subsequently demonstrated were by implication conferred upon it. 
Mr. Jay did not long remain at the head of the federal 
judiciary, because the country demanded his services in other fields, 
where the need of them seemed for the time to be more urgent. The value 
of his labors in negotiating the treaty with Great Britain was so great that 
the jurist has since been almost forgotten in the diplomatist, but any 
careful review of the work of the court organized under his leadership 
must take notice of the fact that he, first of all, laid down the doctrine 
which reconciled constitutional State sovereignty with national supremacy 
and permanent union. 
 Of his other decisions mention will be made only of one1 in 
which was presented the question of the effect of the treaty of peace upon 
the rights of British subjects to recover debts due to them before the 
Revolution, but which the States had sequestrated while the war 
continued. The decision that the sequestration did not prevent recovery by 
the creditor was in recognition of the great principle that a treaty, like the 
Constitution itself, is in respect to matters properly embraced in it, the 
supreme law. 
Near the close of the term of President John Adams Mr. Jay 
was solicited by him to accept a new appointment as Chief Justice. “In the 
future administration of our country,” said the President to him, “the 
firmest security we can have against the effects of visionary schemes or 
fluctuating theories will be in a solid judiciary; and nothing will cheer the 
hopes of the best men so much as your acceptance of this appointment. 
You have now a great opportunity to render a most signal service to your 
country.” Every word of this was strictly true. But Mr. Jay’s career in 
performing signal services for his country had already been a long one, 
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and he might justly say that as in paying the debt of patriotism he had 
never stopped to count the cost to himself, or to question in any degree 
the claims made upon him, he might now without reproach decline to 
resume the ermine he had once worn so honorably, and leave the dignity 
with the labor to be taken up by another. It was only after he had declined 
that the President, with rare perception of fitness, filled the place by the 
appointment of John Marshall. 
Between the time of Mr. Jay’s resignation and this 
appointment the decisions by the court had not been numerous, but some 
of the cases which have lasting importance it may be worth our while to 
mention now.  
One of these was a case in which the amplitude of federal 
power to levy taxes was asserted and explained, and the meaning of the 
term “ direct taxes,” as used in the Constitution, was expounded.1 
Another was a case in which, in clear and most emphatic 
terms, was again affirmed the paramount authority of a treaty over State 
action and State laws.2 
In another, the meaning of the term ex-post-facto law, as 
used in the Constitution, in forbidding the passing of such laws by the 
States, was determined, and it was settled that all laws are not ex post 
facto merely because they concern past transactions, but that the term 
includes only those which are of a criminal nature, and which impose 
punishments or increase in some way a criminal liability for past conduct. 
Nor was this all. The opinion was by Mr. Justice Chase, a violent partisan 
of the federal school, who on some occasions exhibited his partisanship 
most unbecomingly on the bench; but who, nevertheless, as the organ of 
the court, gave authoritative utterance to certain principles on the due 
observance of which State rights must largely depend. These were: 
                                                 
1 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dallas, 199.  
2 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dallas, 199.  
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First. That State legislation is to be held presumptively valid at 
all times, and that the presumption is to be applied even when authority 
has been exercised which in its nature is judicial. 
Second. That the proper authority for determining the validity 
of State legislation, when no federal question is involved, is not the 
federal but the State judiciary, whose decision on a purely State question 
should be accepted and followed.1 
These are valuable principles, and in point of constitutional law 
as sound as they are valuable. 
This general survey of the federal judicial authority will be 
concluded here. The Supreme Court has seemed to be gradually gaining in 
dignity and power with the growth of the country and of its Interests, but 
its real importance was never greater than at the first. And the judges, 
who occupied the bench before the time of Marshall are entitled to have it 
said of them that what they did was of incalculable value to representative 
institutions, not in America alone, but throughout the world. They 
vindicated the national character of the Constitution; they asserted and 
maintained the supremacy of the national authority; they made plain for 
the statesmen as well as the jurists who should come after them the true 
path of constitutional interpretation; and while doing so, they also justified 
in the States, as regards purely State questions, the same right of final 
judgment which they asserted for the Union in respect to questions which 
were national. From that time on it was reasonably certain that whatever 
party might be in possession of the government, and however much when 
out of power, in its conventions and through its leaders, it might have 
lauded and magnified State rights and State sovereignty, it would, when 
in possession of power, vindicate the national supremacy against any 
attempt to nullify it, so that whether a Jackson or a Lincoln should be the 
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head of the government when the trial of the Constitution should come, 
the utterance of the Executive would be clear and determined, that at all 
cost and all hazard the national life would be defended and an indissoluble 
Union be perpetuated.  
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LECTURE II. 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AS 
INFLUENCED BY CHIEF-JUSTICE MARSHALL. 
By HENRY HITCHCOCK, LL.D. 
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CHIEF-JUSTICE MARSHALL. 
ON the tenth day of May, 1884, there was unveiled in the city 
of Washington, at the western front and almost within the shadow of the 
Capitol, a noble statue of bronze, upon whose granite pedestal is the 
inscription: 
JOHN MARSHALL, 
CHIEF-JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
ERECTED BY THE BAR AND THE CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES, A.D. MDCCCLXXXIV. 
 
The Chief-Justice of the United States presided at the simple 
but impressive ceremony. In accordance with separate resolutions of both 
Houses,1 it was held in the presence of the two Houses of Congress, the 
chief officers of the various departments of the government, the 
descendants of Chief-Justice Marshall, and many citizens. 
The statue is of heroic size. The Chief-Justice is seated, 
wearing his robe of office, and in the attitude of delivering a judgment. 
Strength, dignity, and gentleness are blended in the venerable 
countenance. Felicitously conceived and admirably executed by the son of 
a distinguished associate,2 whose own distinction in art and filial love and 
reverence for his subject alike designated him for the work, it 
“represents,” in the words of Chief-Justice Waite3 “the reverence of the 
Congress and the Bar of the United States for John Marshall, the 
Expounder of the Constitution.” It is no disparagement to the eminent and 
learned men who shared his labors to say that Chief-Justice Marshall was 
                                                 
1 Senate Report, No. 544, 1st Sess. 48th Congress. 
 
2 W. W. Story, son of Mr. Justice Story. 
3 See “ Proceedings,” etc., 112 U. S. Reports, pp. 744, 748. 
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not only the official head, but by far the most conspicuous and influential 
member of the Supreme Court during the thirty-four years of his service. 
In his brief address at the unveiling of the statue Chief-Justice Waite said: 
“But before this is done, let me say a few words of him we 
now commemorate. Mr. Justice Story, in an address delivered on the 
occasion of his death, speaks ‘of those exquisite judgments, the fruits of 
his own unassisted meditations, from which the court has received so 
much honor,’ and I have sometimes thought even the bar of the country 
hardly realizes to what extent he was, in some respects, unassisted. He 
was appointed Chief-Justice in January, 1801, and took his seat on the 
bench at the following February term. The court had then been in 
existence but eleven years, and in that time less than one hundred cases 
had passed under its judgment. ... In short, the nation, the Constitution, 
and the laws were in their infancy. Under these circumstances, it was 
most fortunate for the country that the great Chief-Justice retained his 
high position for thirty-four years, and that during all that time, with 
scarcely any interruption, he kept on with the work he showed himself so 
competent to perform…He kept himself at the front on all questions of 
constitutional law, and, consequently, his master-hand is seen in every 
case which involved that subject. … Hardly a day now passes in the court 
he so dignified and adorned, without reference to some decision of his 
time, as establishing a principle which, from that day to this, has been 
accepted as undoubted law. … And when at the end of his long and 
eminent career he laid down his life, he and those who so ably assisted 
him in his great work had the right to say that the judicial power of the 
United States had been carefully preserved and wisely administered. The 
nation can never honor him, or them, too much for the work they 
accomplished.” 
 The Supreme Court Reports show how large was the share of 
the great Chief-Justice in the labors of those thirty-four years. In the 
thirty volumes from 1st Cranch to 9th Peters, both inclusive, are reported 
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1,215 cases, in 94 of which no opinions were given, and 15 are reported 
as decided by the court, no judge being named. In the remaining I, I06 
cases opinions were filed, and in 519 of these Marshall delivered the 
opinion of the court, the remainder being unequally divided among the 15 
judges who were his associates during that entire period. During the same 
period dissenting opinions were filed by Marshall in eight cases in all. The 
most important of these, and the only one involving a constitutional 
question, was Ogden v. Saunders, decided in 1827.1 From the 
organization of the court, in 1790, until Marshall’s appointment, in I80I, 
six decisions2 were rendered involving questions of constitutional law. 
From I80I to I835, sixty-two such decisions were given, in thirty-six of 
which the opinion of the court was written by Marshall, in the remaining 
twenty-six by some one of seven other judges.3 Of his five associates in 
                                                 
1 To these may be added the case of Rose v. Himely, decided in 1808, reported 4 Cranch, 
241, in which Marshall delivered the opinion of the court: but which, as to the question of 
jurisdiction under the law of nations, in case of a seizure on the high seas, was overruled 
in Hudson v. Guestier, 6 Cranch, 281. See also Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch, 423, and 
Van Santvoord’’s Lives of the Chief-Justices, pp. 380-83. 
 
2 Chisholm v. Georgia, reported 2 Dallas, 419. Hylton v. U. S., re 
ported 3 Dallas, 171. Hollingsworth v. Va., reported 3 Dallas, 378. 
Colder v. Bull, reported 3 Dallas, 386. Fowler v. Lindsey, reported 3 
Dallas, 411. Cooper v. Telfair, reported 4 Dallas, 14. 
3 This enumeration is believed to be accurate, though it includes some cases not 
classified by Judge Curtis under the head of Constitutional Law in the digest to his 
“Decisions of the Supreme Court, U. S.,” and some cases not included in the collection of 
Chief-Justice Marshall’s decisions, published in one volume, in 1839, under the title of “ 
Marshall on the Constitution,” In the latter book are also included three constitutional 
decisions made by him on the circuit: the most important being his opinion on the law of 
treason at the trial of Aaron Burr, in August, 1807, reported in the appendix to 4 Cranch, 
p. 470, the other two being the cases of Brig Wilson v. United Stales, reported I 
Brockenbrough, 423, and United States v. Maurice, reported 2 Brockenbrough, 96. For a 
revised index of constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court from 1790 to 1835, see 
Appnedix I. 
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I80I,1 increased in 1808 to six,2 Bushrod Washington alone survived after 
1811, his death occurring in 1829.3 
These details illustrate the relations which the Chief-Justice 
bore to his associates. It is not strange, in view of his acknowledged 
intellectual supremacy, the exalted reputation which he had acquired in 
varied and highly important public service at home and abroad, and his 
singularly winning personal traits, that the history of his labors during that 
period should be in so great part the history of the Supreme Court itself. 
The work of that court cannot be justly estimated without 
taking into account the earlier conditions under which it was performed. 
Not only, in the words of Chief-Justice Waite, “were the nation, the 
Constitution, and the laws in their infancy,” but an absolutely new and 
momentous problem of political science was to be solved, —whether it 
was possible to successfully work a scheme contemplating the 
contemporaneous supremacy, in each of thirteen independent 
commonwealths, of two governments, distinct and separate in their 
action, yet commanding with equal authority the obedience of the same 
people, so that each in its allotted sphere should perform its functions 
without impediment to or collision with the other.4 For us, that problem is 
so completely solved by the experience of a century that few Americans 
realize what Professor Bryce calls 5 “ that immense complexity which 
                                                 
1 Cushing, Paterson, Chase, Washington. Moore. 
 
2 Todd, J., appointed under Act of February 24, 1807, took his seat at February Term, 
1808. 
 
3 Of Marshall’s six associates at the January Term, I835, when he sat for the last time, 
Story and Duval were appointed in I8II, Thompson in I823, McLean in I829,Baldwin in 
I830, and Wayne in January, I835. 
 
4 Patrick Henry, in the Virginia Convention, denounced “ these two coordinate, 
interfering, unlimited powers of harassing the community” as “ unexampled, 
unprecedented in history, the visionary projects of modern politicians,” and “ a political 
solecism.” See Elliot’s Debates, Vol. III. (2d ed., 1836), p. 148. For other gloomy 
forebodings and predictions by him, see lb., pp. 47-51, 58, 156. 325-8, 436, 546. 549. 
 
5 The American Commonwealth, Vol. I., Pt. I., Ch. II., p. 14. 
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startles and at first bewilders a student of American institutions.” Its 
solution depended, in part, upon the interpretation and enforcement of a 
written constitution which, as Mr. Webster said in his argument, and 
Marshall repeated in his decision, in Gibbons v. Ogden,1 enumerated but 
did not define the powers which it granted; and thus that scheme 
assigned to the Supreme Court, as a co-ordinate department of the 
national government, a part never before undertaken by such a tribunal. 
Even if the Federal Constitution, when promulgated for adoption, 
had been accepted by all parties as theoretically perfect, and its provisions 
as open to but one construction, still a bitter and all but fatal experience 
gave warning of the dangers to be apprehended from the local and State 
jealousies, the selfish and conflicting interests, which even during the 
struggle for independence had brought the government of the 
Confederation into contempt.2 But it was not so accepted. What Von Hoist 
calls “the worship of the Constitution,”3 was of later growth. “The 
historical fact is,” says that author, quoting a phrase of John Quincy 
Adams, 4 “that the Constitution had been “ extorted from the grinding 
necessity of a reluctant people’ ”  5 ; and again: 
“ We are compelled to say with Justice Story, that we ought to 
wonder, not at the obstinacy of the struggle of 1787 and 1788, but at the 
fact that despite every thing, the Constitution was finally adopted. The 
simple explanation of this is that it was a struggle for existence, a struggle 
for the existence of the United States.” 6 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 9 Wheaton, 189. 
2 See I Story’s Comm. on Const, of U. S., §§ 252, 254. 
 
3 Von Hoilt’s Constitutional History of the United States, VoL L., 
Ch. II., pp. 68-75. 
4 J. Q. Adams’ Address, “ The Jubilee of the Constitution,” delivered in 1839, before the 
New York Historical Society. 
5 Von Hoist’s Const. Hist of U. S.. VoL I., p. 63. 
6 Ib., p. 62. 
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I need not remind you of the fierce though unsuccessful 
opposition to it, notably in the Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia 
Conventions. Of the last, Marshall, then thirty-three years’ of age, but 
already a recognized leader of the Virginia bar, was a distinguished 
member.1 With the ratification of the Constitution, on June 21, 1788, by 
New Hampshire, the ninth State, followed by Virginia on June 25th, and 
New York on July 26th, the! Union under the Constitution became an 
accomplished fact. But it was carried by dangerously narrow majorities, —
in the New York Convention by only 30 votes to 27, in that of Virginia by 
89 to 79, and in that of Massachusetts by 187 against 168.2 It has been 
said3 that if submitted to popular vote it would have been rejected. The 
objections to its adoption, the gloomy apprehensions of despotism as its 
result, are forcibly summed up by Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries,4 
and one of these was, that the powers of the judiciary were far too 
extensive. 
For the time, these doubts and fears were overborne by the 
tide of rejoicing which swept over the country when its ratification was 
assured.5 But history records that it was “with an aspect grave almost to 
sadness, and with a voice deep and tremulous “that Washington, after 
taking the oath of office as President, on April 30, 1789, addressed to the 
two Houses of the first Congress those solemn words: “The preservation 
of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 For Marshall’s speeches in the Virginia Convention in defense of its provisions 
concerning taxation, the militia, and the judiciary, see 3 Elliot’s Debates (2d ed., 1836), 
pp. 222, 419, 551. 
 
2 Fiske’s Critical Period of American History, pp. 331, 338, 344. 
 
3 Bryce, The American Commonwealth, Vol. I., p. 223. 
 
4 Vol. I., §§ 297. 298. 
 
5 Fiske, Critical Period, etc., p. 339. 
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considered as deeply, perhaps as finally, staked on the experiment 
entrusted to the American people.”1  
It was soon apparent that “ the more the legal consolidation of 
the Union became an accomplished fact, the greater was the reaction of 
particularistic tendencies against the increased pressure. The mere fact of 
the adoption of the Constitution could not at once change the real state of 
affairs or the modes of thought of the people.” 2 
The arena was changed: the conflict between the centrifugal 
and centripetal forces remained. Party lines were soon and sharply drawn 
between those who held “mistrust of the government to be the corner-
stone of freedom,” and those who saw in its supremacy and strength the 
only hope of escape from anarchy and civil war. Years afterward, Marshall 
himself, in his Life of Washington, described the conflict as one by which 
the whole country was 
“divided into two great political parties, the one of which 
contemplated America as a nation, and labored incessantly to invest the 
federal head with powers competent to the preservation of the Union. The 
other attached itself to the State governments, viewed all the powers of 
Congress with jealousy, and assented reluctantly to measures which 
would enable the head to act, in any respect, independently of the 
members.”3 
The strife between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, presently 
known as Republicans, was raging fiercely before Washington’s first term 
as President was half through. The measures, the men, the events at 
home and abroad, which were its occasion or its pretext, belong to 
political history; but in connection with them soon emerged, in the 
                                                 
1 Bancroft. Hist. Const U. S., Vol. II., p. 363., 
 
2 Von Hoist, Const. Hist. U. S., Vol. I., p. 83. 
3 Marshall’s Life of Washington, Vol. V., p. 33. 
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debates of Congress, in the wrangles of the press, and the vituperative 
arguments of political pamphleteers, questions of constitutional right and 
power. Each party more and more invoked the provisions or the omissions 
of the Constitution in support of its own measures or in condemnation of 
those of its opponents. 
Justice Story, in 1833, appropriately dedicated to Chief-Justice 
Marshall his “Commentaries on the Constitution” “as to one whose youth 
was engaged in the arduous enterprises of the Revolution, whose 
manhood assisted in framing and supporting the Constitution, and whose 
maturer years have been devoted to the task of unfolding its powers and 
illustrating its principles.” 
As these words imply, Marshall’s public life and services began 
long before his appointment as Chief-Justice. His earlier fame as soldier, 
lawyer, legislator, diplomatist, and statesman has been, for later 
generations, completely overshadowed by his greatness in that office. And 
yet those earlier labors were in fact the necessary preparation for that 
greatness. 
In May, 1775, at the outbreak of the Revolution, Marshall, 
then nineteen, was a lieutenant, in 1777 a captain, in the patriot army,1 in 
which he served more than five years. He was engaged in the battles of 
Great Bridge, Iron Hill, Brandywine, Germantown, and Monmouth, serving 
also under Major Lee at Powles Hook, and under “Mad Anthony Wayne” in 
his daring and successful assault at Stony Point. He shared with 
conspicuous cheerfulness and patience the sufferings and privations at 
Valley Forge, where his singularly sweet and serene temper made him the 
idol of his comrades, who regarded him, says a contemporary, as not only 
brave, but signally intelligent, and constantly appealed to him as the 
arbiter of their disputes.2 Often employed as Judge-Advocate, he became 
                                                 
1 Story’s Discourse, etc, Miscell. Writings, pp. 647, 648. Flanders’ Lives of the Chief Justices, Vol. II., pp. 286-
300. 
2 Van Santvoord’s Lives of the Chief Justices, pp. 309, 310. 
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personally acquainted with Washington, and also with Alexander Hamilton, 
then a member of Washington’s staff, whose unreserved friendship he 
afterwards enjoyed, and of whose consummate ability and inestimable 
public services as soldier and statesman he held the highest opinion. 1 
In 1780, after attending a course of law lectures by Chancellor 
Wythe, at William and Mary College, he was admitted to the bar, and, 
after a few months more of active service in the army, began the practice 
of law in 1781, at first at his home in Fauquier County, Virginia, but 
removing to Richmond about the time of his marriage in 1783. He rose 
rapidly to distinction, not by the arts of the advocate, for he had neither 
melody of voice, nor grace of gesture, nor elegance of style, but by sheer 
intellectual force, —By an extraordinary clearness and penetration of mind 
and power of condensed statement, and by what William Wirt long 
afterwards described 2 as “one original and almost supernatural faculty—
the faculty of developing a subject by a single glance of his mind, and 
detecting at once the very point on which every controversy depends. No 
matter,” adds Wirt, “what the question, though ten times more knotty 
than the gnarled oak, the lightning of Heaven is not more rapid nor more 
resistless than his astonishing penetration. … All his eloquence consists in 
the apparently deep self-conviction and emphatic earnestness of his 
manner, the correspondent simplicity and energy of his style, the close 
and logical connection of his thoughts, and the easy gradations by which 
he opens his lights on the attentive minds of his hearers.” 
Never seeking public station, often declining it, Marshall’s 
great popularity repeatedly charged him with its duties. Early in 1782 he 
was elected to the Legislature, in 1783 was chosen a member of the State 
Executive Council, and was again elected to the Legislature in 1784, in 
1787, from 1788 to 1792, and without his knowledge and against his will 
                                                 
1 Story’s Discourse, Miscell. Writings, p. 648. 
 
2 “ The British Spy,” pp. 178-181. Flanders, Vol. II., p. 305. 
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in 1795. To this period,1 Mr. Justice Story tells us, is to be referred the 
development of the political opinions and principles which governed his 
subsequent life, and which Marshall himself summed up, in a letter written 
long afterwards, in saying: 
“The general tendency of State politics convinced me that no 
safe and permanent remedy could be found but in a more efficient and 
better organized government;” and again: “The questions which were 
perpetually recurring in the State Legislatures, … which proved that every 
thing was afloat, and that we had no safe anchorage ground, gave a high 
value in my estimation to that article in the Constitution which provides 
restrictions on the States.” 
He was not a member of the Philadelphia Convention in 1787; 
but when the Constitution was submitted to the States, in 1788, he was 
(the same letter adds) “a determined advocate for its adoption,” and 
became a candidate for the Virginia Convention. A majority of the voters 
of his county were opposed to it, and he was warned of strenuous 
opposition unless he would pledge himself to vote against it; but he 
promptly refused, and by a triumphant majority was elected a member of 
perhaps the ablest and most illustrious body ever assembled in that State. 
Patrick Henry, then at the height of his fame, led the attack 
upon the Constitution, seconded by Grayson, Monroe, Mason, and other 
advocates of State sovereignty, and opposed by Madison, Randolph, 
Wythe, Pendleton, Marshall, and other men of note, and during twenty-
five days of keen and powerful debate the issue was in doubt. To Henry’s 
passionate denunciations of the new “consolidated government,” as based 
on principles “extremely pernicious, impolitic, and dangerous,” by which 
“all pretensions to human rights and privileges are rendered insecure, if 
not lost,” and to his strenuous objections to many of its provisions,2 
                                                 
1 Discourse, etc., Story’s Miscell. Writings, pp. 649, 651, 656-8, 662-7. 
 
2 Elliot’s Debates, Vol. III., p. 44 
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Marshall replied in three speeches, defending the provisions of the 
Constitution concerning taxation, the militia, and the judiciary,1 which 
drew from Henry the tribute of his “highest veneration and respect,” and 
an acknowledgment of his “candor on all occasions.”2 It is interesting to 
note Marshall’s view that under the Constitution, as proposed, a State 
could not be sued by a citizen of another State,3 and his emphatic 
assertion (foreshadowing his opinion in Marburyv v. Madison fifteen years 
later) of the right and duty of the federal courts to declare void a 
legislative act not warranted by the Constitution.4 
In the political conflicts which followed the adoption of the 
Constitution, the courage, the personal influence, and the great ability of 
Marshall became still more conspicuous. The Anti-Federalists, under the 
lead of Patrick Henry and his associates, though narrowly defeated in the 
Convention, controlled the politics of Virginia. Notwithstanding the 
veneration felt for Washington, and his unanimous election to the 
presidency, in no State was his administration more harshly criticised, as 
well in the Legislature as by the Democratic societies, which, modelled 
after the French Jacobin clubs,5 sprung up all over the country in 1793. 
In spite of his earnest desire and efforts to withdraw from 
public life, Marshall soon found himself an acknowledged leader of the 
Federalists, and prominent in the discussion of national affairs, for which 
                                                 
1 Ib., pp. 222, 419, 551.  
 
2 Ib., p. 578. 
 
3 “It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a court. 
The intent is to enable States to recover claims of individuals residing in other States.” 
Elliot’s Debates (ad ed., 1836), p.555 
 
4 “If they were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would 
be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to 
guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would 
declare it void.” Ib., p. 553. 
 
5 McMaster’s History, etc., Vol. II., pp. 96-107. 
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abundant and exciting material was at hand. The news of the war between 
England and the French Republic in 1793, promptly responded to by 
Washington’s proclamation of neutrality, was contemporaneous with the 
arrival of the new French Minister, Genet, whose audacious intrigues 
quickly bore fruit in partisan clamor and international complications, 
including even the unlawful fitting out of privateers in American ports, and 
the seizure of British ships by French men-of-war in American waters. The 
proclamation was furiously denounced, both as an ungrateful return for 
the assistance of France during our own Revolution, and as an 
unconstitutional exercise of power by the President; and the violence of 
partisan attacks upon the administration was exceeded only by the 
virulence of the libels which charged Washington with plotting to make 
himself king.1 Marshall boldly defended the proclamation, though 
denounced as an aristocrat and an enemy of republican principles, and at 
a public meeting in Richmond carried resolutions approving it. In 1795, 
the ratification of Jay’s treaty with England added fuel to the flame. 
Bitterly denounced by the Republicans everywhere,2 both for its 
commercial features and for its alleged unconstitutionality, it was so 
odious in Virginia that the friends of Marshall, who, against his own 
remonstrance, had again been elected to the Legislature, urged him, for 
the sake of his own influence, if not his personal safety, to take no part in 
the legislative debates on that subject.3 Resolutions had been adopted by 
a public meeting in Richmond, at which Chancellor Wythe presided, 
declaring the treaty “ insulting to the dignity, injurious to the interests, 
dangerous to the security, and repugnant to the Constitution of the United 
States.” But Marshall, with characteristic courage, determined, as he 
afterwards wrote, “ to make the experiment, however hazardous it might 
be.” A meeting was called, 
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2 Ib,, pp. 221-30. 
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“Which,” he adds, “was more numerous than I had ever seen 
at this place, and after a very ardent and zealous discussion which 
consumed the day, a decided majority declared in favor of a resolution 
that the welfare and honor of the United States required us to give full 
effect to the treaty negotiated with Britain.” 
More than this, he compelled its opponents in the Legislature 
to completely abandon their objections to its constitutionality, by an 
argument of overwhelming power, admitted on all sides to be conclusive, 
and “the fame of which,” says Story,1 “spread through the Union, 
enhancing the estimate of his character even with his political enemies.” 
In 1796 his professional reputation became national in 
connection with his first argument in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in the celebrated case of Ware v. Hylton2 known as the British 
debt case. The question involved, and which excited intense interest and 
bitter controversy in Virginia and other States, was whether, under the 
Treaty of Peace of 1783, British creditors could recover debts sequestrated 
during the Revolutionary War by an Act of the State Legislature. Marshall 
appeared for the losing side, but a contemporary relates3 that he “was 
followed by crowds, and courted with every evidence of admiration and 
respect for the great powers of his mind.” 
Washington soon after offered him the position of Attorney-
General, and subsequently the mission to France, as successor to Mr. 
Monroe, both which he declined. But in 1797 he reluctantly accepted, from 
a sense of public duty, an appointment by President Adams as one of 
three Envoys-Extraordinary to France, Gerry and Pinckney being his 
associates, to renew negotiations, the failure of which had brought the 
two countries to the brink of open war. Their mission was unsuccessful. 
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3 Kennedy’s Life of Wirt, Vol. II., p. 76. 
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Marshall himself, in his Life of Washington,1 records with grave indignation 
“the open contumely and undisguised insult suffered by the United States 
in the persons of their ministers,” whom Talleyrand in vain attempted 
alternately to browbeat and to cajole into the payment not only of tribute 
but of a bribe. The publication in the United States of the masterly official 
dispatches prepared by Marshall2 while arousing universal indignation, 
greatly increased his reputation. His return home in June, 1798, was 
literally an ovation. At a public dinner given in his honor by members of 
both Houses of Congress was proposed the sentiment, instantly repeated 
everywhere: “Millions for defence, not a cent for tribute.” 3 
Gladly returning to professional duties, he was again 
reluctantly drawn into public life. At the earnest solicitation of Washington, 
to whom the aspect of public affairs gave the deepest concern,4 he 
consented to become a candidate for Congress, —declining, for that 
reason, an offer by President Adams of a seat in the Supreme Court, as 
successor to Judge Wilson. An excited canvass resulted in his election, in 
spite of calumnies and personal attacks so gross as to call forth a letter 
from Patrick Henry5 warmly supporting him as “far above any 
competition.” He had scarcely taken his seat, in December, 1799, when 
the melancholy duty devolved upon him of announcing to the House the 
death of Washington; and the resolutions adopted on his motion, though 
written by another, contained the well-known tribute to him who was 
“First in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his fellow-
countrymen.” 6 
This session of Congress witnessed the final struggle of the 
Federal party for supremacy. Elected as a Federalist, Marshall 
                                                 
1 Ib., Vol. V., p. 633 
2 Story’s Discourse, etc., Miscell., p. 670. 
3 Van Santvoord’s Lives, etc., p.338.  
4 lb., pp. 339, 340. 
5 Flanders, Vol. II., pp. 387, 388.  
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nevertheless, in accordance with views announced during the canvass, 
voted to repeal the obnoxious clauses of the Sedition Law. But when the 
great debate took place upon Livingston’s resolutions censuring the 
President, in terms almost equivalent to impeachment, for directing the 
surrender to the British Government of Nash, alias Robbins, upon the 
charge of mutiny and murder on the high seas on board a British man-of-
war, it was Marshall who vindicated him by a speech 1 which admitted no 
reply, and which, says Story, “at once placed him in the front rank of 
constitutional statesmen, silenced opposition, and settled forever the 
points of national law upon which the controversy hinged.”2 Nash claimed 
to have been an American citizen, unlawfully impressed from an American 
brig, and that the murder with which he was charged occurred in the 
attempt to regain his freedom. This was false, but it had excited great 
popular sympathy, and gave color to the most vehement partisan 
attacks,3 under the plea of protection to American citizens and resistance 
to executive encroachments upon the constitutional right of trial by jury. 
But Marshall, with characteristic simplicity and power, distinguished the 
functions of the judiciary and the executive under the Constitution, 
demonstrating the duty of the latter to execute treaty obligations, and 
pointing out that in directing Nash’s surrender if satisfactory evidence of 
the murder should be adduced, the sufficiency of the evidence, both as to 
the citizenship and the alleged crime, was submitted entirely to the 
judge.4 This speech, it is said, was the only one ever revised by Marshall 
for publication. It is probably the best example of his forensic style, and 
well illustrates William Wirt’s remark, in a letter to a young friend,5 
                                                 
1 This speech is reprinted in the Appendix to 5th Wheaton’s Reports, note I; also in 
Wharton’s State Trials, p. 433. 
2 Story’s Discourse, etc., Miscell., p. 672. 
 
3 McMaster’s History, Vol. II., pp. 446, 447. 
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“Marshall’s maxim seems always to have been: ‘Aim exclusively at 
strength.’”  
In May, 1800, upon the disruption of President Adams Cabinet, 
he appointed Marshall Secretary of War, an appointment wholly 
unexpected, and which the latter wrote to decline; but the Secretary of 
State also resigning, he was appointed to and accepted that position. His 
term of office was short, but his great powers were again displayed in the 
dignified and skilful conduct of negotiations of great importance 1 with 
France, England, and Spain, especially the two former, involving grave 
questions of neutral and treaty rights, of contraband, blockade, and 
impressment, of British and Tory claims and ante-revolutionary debts. His 
instructions on these subjects to Mr. King, our Minister to England, are 
held to rank among the ablest of American state papers. 
With such preparation, John Marshall, at the age of forty-six, 
entered upon a judicial career to which, it is not too much to say, no other 
in history affords a parallel. On the 31st day of January, 1801, his 
nomination by President Adams to the Senate having been unanimously 
confirmed, he was commissioned Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States.  
That court had now existed eleven years; but the solution of 
the great and underlying problems of the government under the new 
Constitution had scarcely begun. Six cases involving constitutional 
questions had been determined. Two of these related to one of the 
gravest of those problems; but the later one only registered the prompt 
reversal of the former by an amendment to the Constitution. 
In July, 1792, the writ issued by the Supreme Court against 
the State of Georgia, at the suit of Alexander Chisholm, a citizen of South 
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Carolina, to compel the payment of a private claim, was returned duly 
served upon the Governor and Attorney-General. No response being made 
at the August Term, the court, in order “to avoid every appearance of 
precipitancy,” 1 postponed the plaintiff’s motion for judgment by default 
until the February Term, 1793. Great excitement and alarm arose 
throughout the Union.2 Every State was burdened with debts, enormous 
for those times.3 Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York had also been 
sued by individuals in the Supreme Court,4 and one of the objections most 
angrily urged in 1788 by the opponents of the Constitution,5 but denied by 
its advocates as unfounded,6 was now threatened to be made good. In 
December, 1792, the Legislature of Georgia passed resolutions flatly 
denying the obligation of the State, either to answer the process or to 
obey the judgment of the court. In February, the court, with one 
dissenting voice, and against the solemn protest in writing of the State, 
asserted its jurisdiction. A year later it rendered judgment by default, and 
ordered an inquiry of damages.7 To this the Legislature of Georgia 
responded by a statute, denouncing the penalty of death against any one 
who should presume to enforce any such process within its jurisdiction.8 
But the threatened collision never came. The plaintiff prudently awaited 
the result of the constitutional amendment already proposed in the 
Senate, which passed both Houses without debate, and was ratified by the 
                                                 
1 2 Dallas, 419. 
2 See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 406. 
 
3 Pitkin states that those of Massachusetts and South Carolina amounted to more than 
ten millions and a half, and those of the other States together were estimated at 
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341. 
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State Legislatures: and in Hollings-worth v. Virginia, in 1798,1 the court, 
declaring the Eleventh Amendment to have been constitutionally adopted, 
renounced “any jurisdiction, in any case, pastor future, in which a State 
was sued by the citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any 
foreign state.”2 
In 1799 another phase of that question was presented, when 
it was held, in Fowler v. Lindsey,3 that the fact that the land demanded in 
a suit between individuals was granted by and is claimed under a State, 
does not make the State a party to the suit, although the State may be 
interested in, or consequentially affected by, the decision. This highly 
important distinction was afterwards elucidated with great force by 
Marshall,4 and only four years ago was the turning-point of the well-
known “Virginia coupon cases.” 5 
In Hylton v. United States,6 in 1796, it was held that a federal 
tax on carriages was not a direct tax, and therefore not required by the 
Constitution to be apportioned among the States according to the census. 
Seventy years later the federal income tax was held valid on the same 
ground.7 
In Colder v. Bull,8 in 1798, it was held that the clause of the 
Constitution prohibiting the States to pass ex post facto laws, related only 
to penal and criminal proceedings, and that a retrospective law of 
Connecticut, affecting property rights only, and violating no contract, was 
valid. 
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In Cooper v. Telfair1, in 1800, an Act of the Georgia 
Legislature passed in 1782, banishing the plaintiff in error from that State 
and confiscating his property, was held not repugnant to the Constitution 
of the State. 
In the last two cases no decision was necessary, nor rendered, 
whether the court had power to declare void a law contrary to the 
Constitution. Such a power had already been asserted by the Superior 
Court of Rhode Island, under its colonial charter, in 1786, in the case of 
Trevett v. Weedon, —which Judge Cooley cites2 as the first instance of 
such a decision. It had been maintained with great force and clearness by 
Hamilton, in The Federalist3 and asserted both by Marshall and Patrick 
Henry in the Virginia Convention,4 and was probably sustained by the 
general opinion of the profession. Still, these two cases show5 that it was 
regarded as still unsettled: and, as we shall see, it remained for Marshall 
                                                 
1 4 Dallas, 14. 
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3 The Federalist, No. LXXVIII (J. C. Hamilton’s Ed., 1864). 
 
4 Elliot’s Debates (2d Ed.), pp. 325, 553. 
 
5 In Calder v. Bull (2 Dallas, 392), Mr. Justice Chase was “ fully satisfied” that the 
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judges have, individually, in the circuits, decided that the Supreme Court can declare an 
Act of the Congress to be unconstitutional and threfore invalid; but there is no 
adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon the point.” This probably refers to Van 
Horne v. Dorrance, in which, on the ´Pennsylvania Circuit, at April Term, 1795, Mr. 
Justice Paterson Said, in an elaborate charge to the jury (2 Dallas, 308): “Whatever may 
be the case in other countries, yet in this there can be no doubt that every Act of the 
Legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is absolutely void.”   
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to establish, once for all, the logical necessity of such a power under a 
written constitution, by demonstrating the absurdity of any other theory.  
Haybum’scase,1 in 1792, well illustrates the extreme caution, 
not to say humility, of the federal judges at that date. In 1791 Congress 
passed an Act concerning invalid pensions, directing the United States 
Circuit Courts to pass upon such claims, but their decisions to be revised 
by the Secretary of War and by Congress—in other words, making those 
courts a mere pension bureau, subordinate both to the executive and 
legislative departments. The judges all agreed, the judiciary being a co-
ordinate department of the government, that the Act was 
unconstitutional; but their action was very different from that of the 
Supreme Court in 1851, in dismissing a like case.2 In the New York 
Circuit, Chief-Justice Jay, Justice Cushing, and District Judge Duane made 
an order setting forth their reasons for declining to act as a court, but 
declaring that the “objects of this Act are exceedingly benevolent, and do 
real honor to the humanity and justice of Congress,” and that, desiring to 
manifest their “high respect for the National Legislature,” they would 
execute it individually as commissioners. In the Pennsylvania Circuit, 
Justices Wilson and Blair and District Judge Peters addressed an 
apologetic letter to the President, declining to act, for like reasons, but 
assuring him that this duty was “ far from pleasant,” and “excited feelings 
in us which we hope never to experience again.” In the North Carolina 
Circuit, Justice Iredell and District Judge Sitgreaves addressed to him a 
still more elaborate letter deploring their “painful situation,” and the 
“lamentable difference of opinion “which brought them “under the 
indispensable necessity of acting according to the best dictates of our own 
judgment “; but promising to keep the court open for five days, as 
required by the Act, in order to receive applications, though they could not 
                                                 
1 2 Dallas, 410. 
 
2 Tie United Stales v. Ferreira, 13 Howard, 40; see pp. 49-52. 
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act even as commissioners unless upon further consideration they should 
change their minds. At the August Term, 1792, the question came directly 
before the Supreme Court, on the Attorney-General’s motion for a 
mandamus requiring the Circuit Court to act upon Hay-burn’s petition for 
a pension. But though every judge on the bench had made up his mind, 
the court took the motion under advisement; and in February, 1793, 
Congress made different provision for such claims. 
It is clear that before Marshall’s time there was nothing like 
the modern estimate of either the dignity, the value, or the rightful 
authority of the federal judiciary. The reasons are obvious. It was the 
most novel feature of a novel political system, jealously denounced by its 
opponents1 as not only a dangerous intrusion upon the province of the 
State courts, but a standing menace to the State governments. Its 
defenders, including Hamilton in The Federalist,2 contended, with far more 
reason, that the federal judiciary was “beyond comparison the weakest of 
the three departments.” Not only the extent and limits of its powers were 
yet to be determined, but the still more vital question whether they would 
be sustained by a sober and law-abiding public opinion; for such courts, 
as De Tocqueville has said, “are the all-powerful guardians of a people 
which respects law, but they would be impotent against popular neglect or 
popular contempt.” 3 Before 1788, the nearest approach to a federal court 
were the Committee of Appeals appointed by the Congress in 1777, and 
its successor, the Court of Appeals, established in 1780, under the ninth of 
the Articles of Confederation. But in 1778, when the Committee of Appeals 
reversed the judgment of the Pennsylvania Court of Admiralty in the case 
of the Sloop Active, condemned as prize, not only its decision but a writ of 
injunction issued to enforce it was contemptuously disregarded by the 
                                                 
1 See Henry’s and Mason’s speeches in the Virginia Convention, 3 Elliot’s Debates (2d 
ed., 1836), pp. 325, 521, 522; also Marshall’s reply, pp. 553 et seq. 
 
2 The Federalist, No. LXXVIII. (J. C. Hamilton’s Ed., 1864), p. 576. 
 
3 “ Democracy in America “ (H. Reeve’s translation, ed., 1875), Vol. I., p. 149. 
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State officials, with no more serious consequences to them than an entry 
on the minutes of the Committee that they would hear no more appeals 
until their authority should be settled, and the solemn adoption by 
Congress of resolutions deprecating such insubordination by any State. 
Thirty years later the authority of the Committee of Appeals was affirmed, 
and the rights of the appellants in that same controversy enforced, by the 
Supreme Court of the United States.1 
It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that even in its 
earliest years the new tribunal failed to command respect. John Jay was 
its first Chief-Justice, and among his associates were Cushing of 
Massachusetts, Ellsworth of Connecticut, Wilson of Pennsylvania, Iredell of 
North Carolina, —all selected by Washington, all eminent for ability and 
public service. But for some years the volume of its business was so small 
that Chief-Justices Jay and Ellsworth found time to serve as foreign 
ministers while retaining their commissions: and a recent historian states 
that so little did its deliberations attract public attention that the room 
where its terms were held in Philadelphia for ten years, prior to its 
removal to Washington in 1801, is not positively known at this day.2 
It would be idle, in a paper like this, to attempt even a 
summary of Marshall’s constitutional decisions. I can only indicate some of 
the more important principles which they establish, with such reference to 
cases as time permits. 
The first question, in order of time, and perhaps in 
importance, was as to the power of the court to declare void an Act of 
                                                 
1 See opinion of Marshall, C. J., in United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 
115; also that of Paterson, J., in Penhallow v. Doane’s Administrators, 3 
Dallas, 82-85, in which this controversy is referred to. See also the inter 
esting summary of it in the Life of Chief-Justice Ellsworth, by Van 
Santvoord, Lives of the Chief-Justices, etc., pp. 201-4. 
2 Schooler’s History of the United States, pp. 273, 274. 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
73
Congress repugnant to the Constitution: which was determined in Marbury 
v. Madison, at the February Term, 1803.1 
The nomination of Marbury by President Adams to a judicial 
office having been confirmed by the Senate, his commission was made 
out, signed, and sealed, but had not been transmitted to him ; and Mr. 
Madison, Secretary of State under Jefferson, refused to deliver it. The 
office being one not subject to removal by the President, Marbury claimed 
that his title to it was complete, and made application directly to the 
Supreme Court, under the thirteenth section of the Judiciary Act, for a writ 
of mandamus commanding the Secretary to deliver the commission.  
It was unanimously held, in an opinion by the Chief- Justice: 
That when the commission was signed and sealed the 
appointment was complete, and vested in Marbury a legal right to the 
office: 
That to withhold his commission was violative of that legal 
right; for which wrong a writ of mandamus, if issued by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, was the appropriate legal remedy: 
But that the provision of the Judiciary Act purporting to give the 
Supreme Court jurisdiction, in a proceeding original and not appellate, to 
issue writs of mandamus to public officers, was not warranted by the 
Constitution, and was therefore inoperative and void, and the application 
must be refused. 
To us, these propositions are no more novel or sensational 
than is the idea of specific gravity, or the 47th proposition of Euclid; 
though it is said that Pythagoras celebrated the demonstration of the one 
by the sacrifice of a hecatomb, and that upon his accidental discovery of 
                                                 
1 I Cranch, 137. 
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the other Archimedes ran through the streets, half naked and wild with 
delight, crying, “Eureka!” 
Yet Mr. Justice Miller, in his historical address upon the 
Supreme Court, dwells upon the immense importance of a decision which 
subjected the ministerial and executive officers, all over the country, to 
the control of the courts, and whose application to the very highest 
officers of the government, except perhaps the President himself, has 
often been illustrated. In fact, its assertion or its denial makes just the 
difference, as Marshall tersely said in that opinion, between “a 
government of laws and a government of men.” 
But the doctrine that it is the right and duty of the courts to 
declare void a law repugnant to the Constitution, lies at the very root of 
our system of government. Marshall’s demonstration of it is so 
characteristic of his mode of reasoning that a brief extract may be 
allowed. 
 “The question,” said the Chief-Justice,1 “whether an Act 
repugnant to the Constitution can become the law of the land, is a 
question deeply interesting to the United States; but happily not of an 
intricacy proportioned to its interest It seems only necessary to recognize 
certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to 
decide it. 
“That the people have an original right to establish, for their 
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce 
to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric 
has been erected. …This original and supreme will organizes the 
government, and assigns to different departments their respective 
powers. … The powers of the legislature are defined and limited, and that 
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, “the Constitution is 
                                                 
1 1 Cranch, 176-8. 
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written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that 
limitation committed to writing, if those limits may, at any time, be 
passed by those intended to be restrained? …The Constitution is either a 
superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a 
level with ordinary legislative Acts, and, like any other Acts, is alterable 
when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the 
alternative be true, then a legislative Act contrary to the Constitution is 
not law; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd 
attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature 
illimitable. … 
“If an Act of the legislature repugnant to the Constitution is 
void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige 
them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it 
constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to 
overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem at first 
view an absurdity too gross to be insisted upon. It shall, however, receive 
a more attentive consideration. 
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must 
of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each 
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. … This is of the 
very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard the 
Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary Act of the 
legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary Act, must govern the 
case to which they both apply. 
“Those, then, who controvert the principle that the 
Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law, are reduced 
to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the 
Constitution and see only the law. 
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“This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written 
constitutions. It would declare that an Act which, according to the 
principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet in practice 
completely obligatory. It would declare that if the legislature shall do what 
is expressly forbidden, such Act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, 
is in reality effectual. ... It is prescribing limits and declaring that those 
limits may be passed at pleasure. 
“That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the 
greatest improvement on political institutions, a written constitution, 
would of itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitutions have 
been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction.” 
This unanswerable reasoning applies to every written 
constitution under which there exists an independent judiciary and a 
legislature with limited powers; and it is as much the duty of the lower as 
of the higher courts, in every case within their jurisdiction, to reject, as no 
law, a supposed law not warranted by that constitution. But in applying it, 
Marshall was as careful not to overstep the limits of judicial duty as he 
was fearless in fulfilling it, repeatedly holding that the courts ought never 
“on slight implication and vague conjecture “ to pronounce an Act of the 
legislature void, nor “unless upon a clear and strong conviction of its 
incompatibility with the Constitution.” 1 
This unique feature of our system has attracted, perhaps more 
than any other, the attention of thoughtful students. Such a power does 
not pertain to the courts of England, because Parliament is omnipotent. It 
can change, had changed,2 in vital respects, the British Constitution; 
which, indeed, is not a constitution, as we understand the term, but, as 
                                                 
1 See Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 625. 
 
2 I Blackstone’s Commentaries, p. 161.  
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well described by Professor Bryce, “merely a mass of law, consisting partly 
of statutes and partly of decided cases and accepted usages, in conformity 
with which the government of the country is carried on from day to day, 
but which is being constantly modified by fresh statutes and cases.” 
De Tocqueville admiringly dwelt upon this power,1 pointing out 
its limits, but declaring that, “within these limits, the power vested in the 
American courts of justice, of pronouncing a statute to be 
unconstitutional, forms one of the most powerful barriers which has ever 
been devised against the tyranny of political assemblies.” 
These limits are precisely what make it a judicial and not a 
political power, —a distinction which Marshall always and strongly 
maintained. They are—that it can be exercised only in a litigated case; 
that its direct force is spent in determining the rights of the parties to that 
case; and that unless and until a case has arisen for judicial 
determination, it cannot be invoked at all.2 
It follows, that questions purely political, or which are by the 
Constitution and laws committed to either the executive or legislative 
discretion, are not within the province of the courts.3 The line was sharply 
drawn, when Marshall held,4 in 1804, that the commander of a public 
armed vessel, sued for the illegal seizure of private property, was liable in 
damages for the trespass, though he was acting under the direct 
instructions of the President. 
Nor is it true that the courts, as has been sometimes said, in 
thus declaring the law, themselves control the legislature. With the 
wisdom or the expediency of a statute the courts have nothing to do, nor 
                                                 
1 Democracy in America, (ed. 1875), Ch. VI., pp. 94-100. 
2 Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheaton, 819. 
3 See Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch, 170; McCulloh v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 421, 423; 
Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 307. 
4 See Little v. Barreme, 2 Cranch, 170. 
 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
78
with its probable effect, except as an aid to its correct construction.1 Their 
sole concern is, whether it is a valid exercise of legislative power. If it be, 
they must enforce it; if not, they must reject it, —not as being a bad law, 
but as a counterfeit. “The judicial department,” said Marshall, in Osborn v. 
U. S. Bank2 “has no will, in any case.... Judicial power is never exercised 
for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the 
purpose of giving effect to the will of the law.” In Fletcher v. Peck.,3 he 
rebuked an attempt, in a suit on a private contract, between individuals, 
to collaterally impeach a legislative Act as having been corruptly passed, 
as being an inquiry “indecent in the extreme”; but he proceeded to hold 
that Act void, because it impaired the obligation of a contract. 
Questions indeed arise, and of the greatest moment, in which 
the brevity, the broad sweep, even the absence, of express constitutional 
provisions may compel the courts to resort to general rules of 
construction,4 in order that the existence of alleged powers may be 
determined from the Constitution as a whole, from its manifest spirit and 
intent, and from the circumstances 5 under which and the purposes for 
which it was framed. Concerning the application of these rules, the wisest 
and most upright judges may differ. Hence the controversy, familiar 
throughout our political history, as to the duty of a strict or a liberal 
construction. But with the people still remains the final word, the ultimate 
appeal, whenever the gravity of the occasion requires. And the self-
imposed checks and 
                                                 
1 See U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 386, 389, 390; and McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 
423. 
 
2 9 Wheaton, 866. 
 
36 Cranch, 131. 
  
4 See Bank of U. S, v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 87. 
 
5 See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 387, 388. 
 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
79
delays of the Constitution are but obstacles, as James Russell 
Lowell has happily said,1 “in the way of the people’s whim, not of their 
will.” 
The advantages of such a system are obvious. It commands 
respect and obedience to the mandates of the Constitution, by 
substituting for the discussion of abstract theories of government, and for 
dangerous conflicts between officers of state or aspirants for power, the 
deliberate adjudication of concrete rights by an impartial tribunal, invoked 
not at the will of the judge but at the demand of the parties concerned. 
That it has also disadvantages is true: notably, the uncertainty which may 
exist in respect of important questions until the opportunity for deciding 
them has arisen or is availed of. But I may no further pursue this 
interesting theme.2 
The efficiency of the judicial power under the Constitution 
being thus demonstrated, what was its extent? To what cases or 
controversies did it apply? In technical phrase, —what jurisdiction was 
conferred upon the Federal courts under the Constitution and the laws 
made in pursuance thereof; especially touching matters with which the 
State governments were or might be concerned? 
It was inevitable that the extreme advocates of State rights 
should try conclusions with the national authority, as administered in the 
Federal courts. This was attempted, now by State enactments in disregard 
of their decisions, and again by the refusal of State courts to acknowledge 
the supervisory power of the Supreme Court; the Eleventh Amendment to 
the Constitution, prohibiting suits by a citizen against a State, being in 
either case relied on. 
                                                 
1 Democracy, and other Addresses (1887)-, P. 24. 
 
2 This subject is elaborately and most ably considered by Professor Bryce in The 
American Commonwealth, Vol. I., Chapters XXIII., XXIV., pp. 236-70. 
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The first collision grew out of that legacy from the feeble days 
before the Constitution, the prize case of the sloop Active, already 
mentioned,1 which took new shape in the case of The United States v. 
Peters, decided in 1809, now seldom mentioned, but involving issues lying 
at the very foundation of later and more famous judgments. 
This vessel was condemned, in 1777, by the Pennsylvania 
Admiralty Court, as prize to an armed vessel of that State, overruling an 
adverse claim by Gideon Olmstead and others. The Committee of Appeals, 
in Congress, reversed this judgment, granting to the claimants an 
injunction forbidding the State marshal to account for the proceeds to the 
State court; in contempt of which the money was paid by the marshal to 
the State judge in 1778 and by him delivered to the State Treasurer, 
Rittenhouse, who invested it in loan certificates, which after his death in 
1801 were still held by his daughters as executrixes of his estate. In 
January, 1803, the claimants obtained, in the United States District Court 
of Pennsylvania, a personal judgment for these proceeds against 
Rittenhouse’s executrixes, and were about to enforce it; when the 
Pennsylvania Legislature passed an Act, claiming the money for the State, 
denying the jurisdiction of the court and the validity of its judgment, and 
directing the Governor to protect the persons and property of 
Rittenhouse’s representatives against any process of any Federal court 
issued against them. Renewed efforts for a settlement having failed, the 
Attorney-General, in 1808, applied to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, in Olmstead’s behalf, for a writ of mandamus commanding the 
district judge to enforce the judgment. After the fullest consideration, it 
was granted. The opinion of the Chief Justice left no doubt either as to the 
nature or the gravity of the real issue. He said:2  
                                                 
1 Also known as the Olmstead case. The earlier facts are briefly stated in the opinion of 
Marshall, C. J., in U, S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 137; and a full account of the matter is given 
in Hildreth’s History of the United States, Vol, III., Chap. XXII., pp. 155-164. 
 
2 United States v. Petters, 5 Cranch, 136 
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“If the legislatures of the several States may, at will, annul the 
judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights 
acquired under those judgments, the Constitution itself becomes a solemn 
mockery; and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by 
the instrumentality of its own tribunals. So fatal a result must be 
deprecated by all, and the people of Pennsylvania as well as the citizens of 
every other State must feel a deep interest in resisting principles so 
destructive of the Union and in averting consequences so fatal to 
themselves.” 
To the argument that the Federal courts were deprived of 
jurisdiction in the case by the Eleventh Amendment, he replied: 
“The amendment simply provides that no suit shall be 
commenced or prosecuted against a State. The State cannot be made a 
defendant to a suit brought by an individual. But it remains the duty of 
the courts of the United States to decide all cases brought before them by 
citizens of one State against citizens of a different State where a State is 
not necessarily a defendant” 
Thus backed by the Supreme Court, the district judge issued 
his writ. The attempt to serve it was obstructed by the bayonets of an 
armed guard which, under the Governor’s orders, was placed around the 
houses of the respondents by General Bright, commanding a brigade of 
Philadelphia militia. The United States Marshal proceeded to summon a 
posse comitatus of two thousand men, but gave time for reflection. Great 
public excitement ensued. The legislature passed another Act, which 
opened a door for retreat. The Governor’s remonstrance and appeal to 
President Madison to interfere was met by firm and fit refusal. The writ 
was served without violence, the State authorities gave way, and the 
money was paid over. But the national authority was still more completely 
vindicated. General Bright and his men were promptly arrested, indicted, 
and tried in the United States Circuit Court, for unlawful resistance to civil 
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process. Upon the facts specially found by a reluctant and sympathizing 
jury, plainly sharing the intense popular sympathy and excitement, but 
firmly held to their duty by Mr. Justice Washington, they were adjudged 
guilty. The sentence of fine and imprisonment imposed was executed in 
part, but the President wisely remitted the rest, on the ground that the 
prisoners had acted on a mistaken sense of duty. 
Another phase of the controversy was presented when the 
Virginia Court of Appeals, in 1813, unanimously denied the supervisory 
jurisdiction, and refused to obey the mandate, of the Supreme Court, in 
the case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, which involved the validity of a land 
title protected by a treaty. On a second writ of error, argued in 1816, the 
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed its jurisdiction in a masterly opinion 
by Mr. Justice Story;1 but while enforcing its own judgment avoided 
further controversy with the Court of Appeals by declaring void the 
judgment of that court and valid that of the inferior Virginia court in favor 
of the title. 
But this vital question was again presented in 1821, in the 
great case of Cohens v. Virginia.2 On that occasion the opinion of the 
Supreme Court was delivered by the Chief-Justice. His fame might well 
rest on that magnificent argument alone. 
The case was a simple one. The Cohens were indicted in the 
Sessions Court of Norfolk for selling lottery tickets in Virginia, contrary to 
a State statute. Their defence was, that the lottery was established and 
the tickets issued by the city of Washington, under authority of its charter 
granted by Congress; but it was overruled, and a fine of $100 imposed. 
The Sessions court being the highest State court having jurisdiction of the 
case, they sued out a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United 
States under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. The counsel for Virginia 
                                                 
1 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, I Wheaton, 304, 323, 362. 
2 6 Wheaton, 264. 
 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
83
moved to dismiss the writ, for want of jurisdiction, on three grounds: that 
a State was made a defendant contrary to the Eleventh Amendment; that 
no writ of error lay in any case from the Supreme Court to a State court; 
and that neither the Constitution nor any law of the United States had 
been violated by the judgment complained of: in support of which a most 
elaborate and ingenious argument was made. 
The opinion of the court fills nearly sixty printed pages. Its 
opening paragraph is a most impressive example of Marshall’s 
extraordinary power of terse and luminous statement, and his method of 
exposing and destroying fallacies by reducing them to their simplest terms 
and then inexorably deducing from them fatal conclusions.1 
Those brief and solemn sentences also reveal his profound 
conviction, not only that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land, 
but that its provisions were designed and are ample to maintain its 
supremacy. Said the Chief-Justice: 2 
“The questions presented to the court by the first two points 
made at the bar are of great magnitude, and may be truly said vitally to 
affect the Union. They exclude the inquiry whether the Constitution and 
laws of the United States have been violated by the judgment which the 
plaintiffs in error seek to review; and maintain that, admitting such 
violation, it is not in the power of the government to apply a corrective. 
They maintain that the nation does not possess a department capable of 
restraining peaceably, and by authority of law, any attempts which may 
be made by a part against the legitimate powers of the whole; and that 
the government is reduced to the alternative of submitting to such 
attempts, or of resisting them by force. They maintain that the 
                                                 
1 Mr. Webster once said to Justice Story: —” When Judge Marshall says, “ It is 
admitted,”—Sir, I am preparing for a bomb to burst over my head and demolish all my 
points.” (Story’s Life and Letters, Vol. II., p. 505.) 
 
2 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 377. 
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Constitution of the United States has provided no tribunal for the final 
construction of itself, or of the laws or treaties of the nation; but that this 
power may be exercised in the last resort by the courts of every State in 
the Union. That the Constitution, laws, and treaties, may receive as many 
constructions as there are States; and that this is not a mischief, or, if a 
mischief, is irremediable. These abstract propositions are to be 
determined; for he who demands decision without permitting inquiry, 
affirms that the decision he asks does not depend on inquiry. 
“If such be the constitution, it is the duty of the court to bow 
with respectful submission to its provisions. If such be not the 
constitution, it is equally the duty of this court to say so; and to perform 
that task which the American people have assigned to the judicial 
department.” 
Step by step he proceeds, with perfect courtesy, but with 
remorseless logic, to rend asunder the network of technical argument with 
which it was sought to fetter the judicial power. Distinguishing the two 
great classes of jurisdiction under the Constitution, one arising from the 
character of the parties, regardless of the controversy, while the other 
depends on the nature of the controversy without regard to the parties, 
and comprehends, without exception, “all cases in law and equity arising 
under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States”; and 
quoting the express provision that— 
“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall 
be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding” —he continues— 
“This is the authoritative language of the American people; 
and, if gentlemen please, of the American States. It marks with lines too 
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strong to be mistaken, the characteristic distinction between the 
government of the Union and those of the States. The general 
government, though limited as to its objects, is supreme with respect to 
those objects. This principle is a part of the Constitution; and if there be 
any who deny its necessity, none can deny its authority.” 
Thus, in a single phrase, he laid bare the pith and kernel of the 
controversy, or rather, of a question no longer open to judicial 
controversy. That flash of grave and delicate irony, —“and, if gentlemen 
please, of the American States,”—was it a reminiscence of the great 
debate in the Virginia Convention, thirty-three years before? —when 
Patrick Henry, speaking of the framers of the Constitution, passionately 
demanded, — 
“Who authorized them to speak the language of We, the 
people, instead of We, the Stalest States are the characteristics and the 
soul of a confederacy. If the States be not the agents of this compact, it 
must be one great consolidated, national government of the people of all 
the States.” 
The counsel for Virginia relied much on the Eleventh 
Amendment.1 But the Chief-Justice replied that this was not a suit against 
the State, but a prosecution by the State, to which a defence under the 
laws of the United States was set up; and that the writ of error merely 
removed the record into the supervising tribunal, in pursuance of Cohens’ 
constitutional right to have their defence re-examined there.2 
But, it was argued, the supervisory jurisdiction claimed for the 
Supreme Court is not needed, and could not have been intended. Are not 
the State legislatures and the State courts bound by solemn oath to 
support the Constitution? It would be most “unjust and injurious” to 
                                                 
1 See Mr. Barbour’s argument, 6 Wheaton, pp. 305-8; also Mr. Smyth’s argument, ib., p. 
315. 
2 6 Wheaton, p. 411. 
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suppose them capable of perjury. Even if that supposition could be 
entertained, such a jurisdiction would be altogether inadequate. Whenever 
the States shall be determined to destroy the Federal Government, they 
can quietly and effectually accomplish the purpose by not acting. The 
legislatures need only to refuse to appoint senators and presidential 
electors, and then, said the counsel for Virginia, “the executive 
department, and part of the legislative, ceases to exist, and the Federal 
Government thus perishes by a sin of omission, not of commission.”1 
Thus boldly were foreshadowed the revolutionary tactics of the 
secessionist leaders in February, 1861. In the fierce light of those later 
days, the reply of the Chief-Justice reads like a prophecy. Admitting that 
such extreme cases might occur, — 
“We cannot help believing,” he said, “ that a general conviction 
of the total incapacity of the government to protect itself and its laws in 
such cases would contribute in no inconsiderable degree to their 
occurrence.” 
How that warning recalls to us President Buchanan’s 
despairing message of December 3, 1860! On one page a laborious 
argument for the perpetuity of the Union under the Constitution, on the 
next the humiliating conclusion that although “ its framers never intended 
to plant in its bosom the seeds of its own dissolution,” yet they had failed 
to delegate to the Executive or to Congress the power to coerce a single 
seceding or rebellious State! Compare with this the noble and inspiring 
words of the great Chief-Justice.2 
“A constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed to 
approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it. Its 
course cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed to storms and tempests, 
                                                 
1 Mr. Barbour’s argument, 6 Wheaton, pp. 309-312. 
2 6 Wheaton, 387-9. 
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and its framers must be unwise statesmen, indeed, if they have not 
provided it, as far as its nature will permit, with the means of self-
preservation from the perils it may be destined to encounter. …It is very 
true that whenever hostility to the existing system shall become universal, 
it will also be irresistible. The people made the Constitution, and the 
people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives only by 
their will. But this! Supreme and irresistible power to make or to unmake 
resides only in the whole body of the people; not in any subdivision of 
them. The attempt of any of the parts to exercise it is usurpation, and 
aught to be repelled by those to whom the people have delegated their 
power of repelling it. … The framers of the Constitution were indeed 
unable to make any provisions which should protect that instrument 
against a general combination of the States, or of the people, for its 
destruction; and, conscious of this inability, they have not made the 
attempt. But they were able to provide against the operation of measures 
adopted in any one State, whose tendency might be to arrest the 
execution of the laws; and this it was the part of true wisdom to attempt. 
We think they have attempted it.” 
So thought the people of the United States in 1861. Upon the 
very lines laid down by Marshall, their supreme and irresistible power 
repelled, for the preservation of the whole, the usurpation attempted by a 
part. Once for all, the pernicious heresies of secession and State 
sovereignty were rejected and cast out. But the successors of Marshall still 
firmly maintain that sound and wholesome theory of State rights, by 
which the supremacy of the nation and the autonomy of the States, each 
in its own sphere, are alike recognized as essential to our complex system 
of government.1 
                                                 
1 See Mr. Justice Miller’s address on “ The Supreme Court,” delivered at Ann Arbor, June 
29, 1887, and his opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wallace, 82; also Chief-
Justice Waite’s opinion in Texas v. While, 7 Wallace, 725. 
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I shall briefly refer to other decisions in which the restrictions 
upon the States were considered from a different point of view. But no 
other, I think, affords a more splendid example of Marshall’s intellectual 
power, his profound political insight, or his unalterable devotion to the 
Union. His usually simple and earnest style here rises to an uncommon 
dignity and strength. The stately calm of judicial reasoning scarcely veils 
the patriotic emotion whose powerful current was swelled, we may well 
believe, by thronging memories of the long and anxious struggle for 
national existence in which, as soldier, legislator, statesman, he had borne 
his part against oppression from without and the more threatening 
dangers of anarchy from within. 
Intimately connected with the question of the reserved powers 
of the States was that as to the extent of the powers granted to Congress 
by the Constitution, —a question which (as Marshall said)1 “is perpetually 
arising, and will probably continue to arise as long our system shall exist.” 
In the case of The United States v. Fisher,2 decided in 1804, 
the inquiry was, whether under an Act of Congress providing for the 
settlement of accounts of receivers of public money, the preference given 
to the United States over other creditors of an insolvent debtor was valid; 
in other words, whether Congress had power so to provide. The United 
States Circuit Court (Pennsylvania District) held that it had not. Whether 
this was correct depended upon the proper construction of that brief but 
comprehensive enumeration of the powers of Congress in Article I., 
Section 8, of the Constitution. In reversing that judgment the Chief-
Justice laid down a general rule of construction of the highest importance, 
best stated in his own brief words: 
“It has been truly said that under a constitution conferring 
specific powers, the power contended for must be granted, or it cannot be 
                                                 
1 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 405. 
 
2 2 Cranch, 358.  
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exercised. It is claimed under the authority to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the 
Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department 
or officer thereof.1 
“In construing this clause it would be incorrect, and would 
produce endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law 
was authorized which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a 
specified power. Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, 
it might be said with respect to each, that it was not necessary, because the 
end might be obtained by other means. Congress must possess the choice of 
means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact 
conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution.” 2 
In the very important case of McCulloch v. Maryland, decided 
in 1819, the question arose as to the constitutional power of Congress to 
charter the United States Bank. This power the Chief-Justice affirmed in 
one of his most elaborate and celebrated opinions, admiringly referred to 
by Chancellor Kent in the text of his Commentaries.3 He there stated the 
rule in these words: 
“We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the 
government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But 
we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the 
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which 
the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable 
that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most 
                                                 
1 U. S. Constitution, Art. I., Sec. 8. 
 
2 2 Cranch, 396. 
 
3 Chancellor Kent says: “ A case could not be selected from the decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, superior to this one of McCulloch v. Maryland, lot the clear 
and satisfactory manner in which the supremacy of the laws of the Union have been 
maintained by the court, and an undue assertion of State power overruled and 
defeated.”—I Kent’s Commentaries (12 th ed.), p. 428.  
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beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are 
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.” 1 
But while sustaining the power, the court expressly declined to 
pass upon the expediency of its exercise, further saying: 
“Where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to 
effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here 
to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which 
circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. 
This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.”2 
This vital distinction Marshall constantly maintained.3 
In a later case Marshall applied the same general rule of 
construction in a very striking and characteristic way. It is matter of 
history that when Mr. Jefferson, in 1803, purchased the Louisiana territory 
from France, his own belief was that he had (in his own words) “ done an 
act beyond the Constitution”; and he was not only anxious that the 
acquisition of Louisiana should be sanctioned, and the future annexation 
of Florida authorized, by an amendment to the Constitution, but privately 
submitted to his party friends the draft of such an amendment;4 though in 
his message to Congress, submitting the treaty for ratification, he did not 
                                                 
1 4 Wheaton, 421. 
 
2 4 Wheaton, 423. 
 
3 It is of interest to observe that in the highly important case of Fuilliard v. Greenman (no 
U. S. Rep., 421, Mr. Justice Field dissenting), by which, in March, 1884, was finally 
confirmed the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act, the conclusions reached by the 
court are in great part based upon the reasoning of Chief-Justice Marshall in these cases 
of The United Stales v, Fisher and McCullock v. Maryland, both as to the extent of the 
implied powers of Congress and as to the absence of judicial control over legislative 
discretion. 
 
4 See Randall’s Life of Jefferson, Vol. III., pp. 69-81. 
 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
91
mention the constitutional difficulty. But the popularity of the measure 
secured the ratification of the treaty and all necessary legislation to 
enforce it, without further question. Twenty-five years later, the question 
was presented in the Supreme Court, in The American Insurance 
Company v. Canter1 with reference to the validity and effect of the treaty 
of 1819, by which Spain had ceded Florida to the United States. Marshall 
answered it in these brief words: 
“ The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of the 
Union the powers of making war and of making treaties; consequently 
that government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by 
conquest or by treaty.” 
I shall again refer to the general principles of construction 
adopted by Marshall; but something remains to be said upon the closely 
allied subjects already mentioned, — the powers granted to Congress by 
the Constitution, and the restrictions which that instrument imposes upon 
the States. 
These restrictions are of two kinds, —those implied in the 
grant of power to Congress by Section 8, and those expressly declared in 
Section 10 of Article I. of the Constitution. 
Nearly one half, and some of the most famous, of Marshall’s 
constitutional decisions relate to these subjects. The controversies they 
determined were few, though important; but they established 
fundamental principles, to which, in a vast number and variety of 
subsequent cases, scattered through ninety-four volumes of Reports, the 
court has steadily adhered.2 
                                                 
1 I Peters, 511, 542. 
 
2 See Mr. Justice Lamar’s remarks in Kidd v. Pearson, decided October 23, 1888, 
affirming the constitutionality of the Iowa Prohibitory Act, in 128 U. S. Reports, pp. I, 16. 
The valuable treatise by C. Stuart Patterson, Esq., of the Philadelphia bar, on Federal 
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In McCulloch v. Maryland, decided in 1819, Osborn v. Bank of 
United States, in 1824, and Weston v. Charleston, in 1829,1 the general 
principle was established that the States have no power, by taxation or 
otherwise, to impede, burden, or in any manner control any means or 
measures adopted by the government for the execution of its powers. In the 
case first mentioned, the State of Maryland had imposed a stamp duty upon 
the circulating notes of a bank chartered by the United States to assist in 
carrying on its fiscal operations. In the second, the State of Ohio had 
imposed an annual tax of $50,000 upon each office of discount and deposit 
maintained by that bank in the State. In the third, a municipal tax was 
imposed upon stock of the United States owned by citizens of Charleston, 
South Carolina. In the first two cases, the counsel for the States attacked 
the constitutionality of the bank charter as vigorously as they defended the 
State law; but it was sustained upon the fullest consideration, as within the 
implied power of Congress to select whatever means, consistent with the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution, it might deem necessary and proper for 
the purposes of the government. This being established, the tax was in each 
case held unconstitutional on the ground,3 — “that the power to tax involves 
the power to destroy ; that the power to destroy may defeat and render 
useless the power to create. ... If the States may tax one instrument 
employed by the government in the execution of its powers, they may tax 
any and every other instrument. They may tax the mail; they may tax the 
mint; they may tax patent rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-
house; they may tax judicial process; they may tax all the means employed 
by the government to an excess which would defeat all the ends of 
government. This was not intended by the American people. They did not 
design to make the government dependent on the States. …The question is, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Restraints on State Action, recently published, gives a summary of such decisions up to 
1888. 
 
1 Reported in 4 Wheaton, 316; 9 Wheaton, 738; and 2 Peters, 449. 
 
3 4 Wheaton, 431-3. 
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in truth,” (said the Chief-Justice) “a question of supremacy; and if the right 
of the States to tax the means employed by the general government be 
conceded, the declaration that the constitution, and the laws made in 
pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, is empty and 
unmeaning declamation.” 
Perhaps none of Marshall’s opinions more strikingly illustrates, 
not only what Wirt called his “ almost supernatural faculty “ of detecting at 
once the very point of a controversy, but his instinctive grasp of the 
general principles and remoter consequences which it involved. This is 
that power of generalization which has achieved the most splendid 
triumphs of modern science; which revealed to Newton, in the falling 
apple, the secret of the harmonious movements of the spheres; and 
which, from Faraday’s discovery that an electrical disturbance is excited 
by waving a magnet near a coil of wire, has deduced the laws of that 
mysterious electro-magnetic force whose ministry to human wants is 
among the marvels of our time. 
In Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, the Eleventh 
Amendment was again fully considered. It was again held1 that the 
criterion of a suit against a State was, whether the State was a party to 
the record; on the ground, in part, that if the jurisdiction were held to 
depend, not upon that plain fact, but upon the supposed or actual interest 
of the State in the result of the controversy, no rule was given by the 
Constitution by which that interest could be measured. This controversy is 
perhaps not yet finally determined; but it is beyond my province to 
discuss the recent cases in which delicate and difficult questions have 
arisen as to how far a suit against individual defendants, who are made 
such solely because of alleged duties incumbent upon them, or wrongs 
committed by them, exclusively in the character of State officers, is to be 
considered a suit against the State. This distinction was recognized by 
                                                 
1 9 Wheaton, 852, 853. 
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Marshall himself, in the case of The Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 
decided in 1828,1 and in various forms has been the turning-point of 
recent cases of great importance.2 
The case of Gibbons v. Ogden, decided in 1824,3 followed by 
Brown v. Maryland, in 1827,4 and Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh 
Company, in 1829,5 presented questions whose importance, great even 
then, has been immensely increased by the unparalleled development of 
the internal commerce of this country. 
They involved the construction of that clause of Section 8 of 
Article I of the Constitution which confers on Congress power “to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with the 
Indian tribes.” 
The grant of this power to Congress, in exchange for the 
concessions made in respect of slavery, was one of the three great 
compromises between northern and southern interests, in the Convention 
of 1787, but for which its labors would have come to naught.6 Long 
afterwards, Mr. Madison, in his Introduction to its Debates, referring to 
the “dissatisfaction and discord” growing out of the commercial relations 
of the States, said,1— 
                                                 
1 I Peters, 110. 
 
2 Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531; United 
States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711; Antoni v. Greenhow, 
107 U. S. 769; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269-340; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. 
S. 52. 
 
3 9 Wheaton, I. 
4 12 Wheaton, 419.  
5 2 Peters, 245. 
 
6 See Fiske’s Critical Period, etc., pp. 262-8: Bancroft’s History of the Constitution, Vol. 
II., pp. 151. 157. 161, 162.  
 
1 The Madison Papers (Vol. V. of Elliot’s Debates), ed. 1845, p. 112. 
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“New Jersey, placed between Philadelphia and New York, was 
likened to a cask tapped at both ends, and North Carolina, between 
Virginia and South Carolina, to a patient bleeding at both arms.” 
In terms, this power is perfectly explicit. The question was, —
Is it exclusive in the general government, or concurrent with the States? 
In Gibbons v. Ogden, an injunction, granted by Chancellor 
Kent, was sustained by the highest appellate court of New York, 
restraining Gibbons from navigating the Hudson River with steamboats, 
duly licensed for the coasting trade under the Act of Congress, on the 
ground that he was thereby infringing the exclusive right, granted by the 
State of New York to Robert Fulton and Livingston and by them assigned 
to Ogden, to navigate all the waters of that State with vessels moved by 
steam. The argument excited universal interest, for it was a battle of 
giants. Webster and William Wirt, then Attorney-General, attacked, and 
Emmett and Oakley defended, before Chief-Justice Marshall and his 
associates, a State law which Chancellor Kent and his associates had 
upheld as constitutional.2 I can but briefly summarize the grounds on 
which the State law was held void. 
Commerce, said the Chief-Justice,3 (in substance) is not merely 
traffic; it includes commercial intercourse between nations and parts of 
nations, in all its branches. It must include navigation, not only because from 
the beginning, all have understood it, and Congress has legislated, in that 
sense, but because other provisions of the Constitution imply that intent; and 
it includes all vessels, whether carrying passengers or freight, whether 
propelled by wind or steam. The power to regulate commerce is the power to 
                                                 
2 An interesting account of this case is given in Van Santvoord’s Lives of the Chief-
Justices, pp. 412-18; see also Kennedy’s Life of Wirt, Vol. II, p. 142. Chancellor Kent in 
his Commentaries (Lect. XIX., Vol. I, pp. 433, 438), gives the reasons for the decision of 
the State court; from which it appears that they did not differ from the Supreme Court as 
to the powers of Congress, but as to whether the Act of Congress under which the 
coasting license was issued, was a regulation of commerce. 
 
3 9 Wheaton, 189-198. 
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prescribe the rule by which it is to be governed, whether it be carried on 
between the United States and foreign nations or among the several States; 
and this power, as vested in Congress, is complete in itself, acknowledging no 
limitations other than those prescribed in the Constitution. Whether, if 
Congress has not exercised this power, and until it should do so, any State 
might have exercised it, is needless now to inquire; because Congress has 
exercised it by laws now in operation. This power of Congress must be 
exclusive, for such a power cannot be exercised at the same time by Congress 
and by a State. In this, it differs from the power of taxation, which may at the 
same time be exercised over the same persons, by different authorities, for 
different purposes. So, inspection laws, quarantine laws, and the like, may be 
enforced by the States, consistently with this power of Congress; for their 
purpose is not to regulate commerce, but to protect the public health and 
comfort; and though such laws may remotely affect commerce among the 
States, and the means of executing them may nearly resemble commercial 
regulations, this does not prove that they flow from the same power. 
Moreover, the power of Congress to regulate commerce, either with foreign 
nations or among the States, does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the 
States, but must necessarily be exercised within their territorial jurisdiction, 
and must include every case of commercial intercourse which is not a part of 
the purely internal commerce of a single State. 
Upon these general lines the decision rests; but no summary 
can do justice to its exact definitions or its accurate criticism of 
constitutional and statute provisions. He alone can realize how vast is the 
reach, how great the beneficence, of these principles, who has formed 
some adequate conception of the enormous commerce now peacefully 
conducted among these States, and also of the local jealousies, the 
commercial rivalries, the mutually destructive and retaliatory legislation,1 
the bitter “discord and dissatisfaction,” which all but rent asunder those 
                                                 
1 For a striking statement of these, see Fiske’s Critical Period, etc., pp. 62, 142-147. 
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infant commonwealths of a hundred years ago.2 The Inter-State 
Commerce Act is the most recent legislative application of those 
principles. In the latest judicial construction of that Act, Mr. Justice Lamar, 
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, quotes largely from “that 
great opinion” of Chief-Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.3 
In Brown v. Maryland, the question was of the validity of a 
State law requiring an importer to pay a State license tax on foreign 
imported goods before being permitted to sell them. It was held void,4 
both as in conflict with the powers of Congress under the decision in 
Gibbons v. Ogden, and as a duty upon imports such as prohibited by the 
Constitution. The principles then established have been adhered to under 
a variety of forms in many and important cases subsequently arising. 
But in 1829, in Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., a State 
law was held valid which authorized a dam across a creek navigable from 
the sea within the ebb and flow of the tide, on the ground that it was not 
in conflict with any Act passed by Congress. This would seem to imply that 
the power of Congress to regulate commerce is exclusive only when 
exercised—a question not decided in Gibbons v. Ogden. A like construction 
had already been placed upon the power of Congress to pass uniform 
bankrupt laws in the important case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, decided 
                                                 
2 On this subject Mr. Justice Miller says, in his address on the Supreme Court (Ann Arbor, 
June, 1887): “ Scarcely a session of the Supreme Court of the United States has passed 
within the last twenty-five years in which some case has not been brought before it 
wherein the validity of laws passed by the States of the Union, or ordinances of 
municipalities made under the authority of some State law affecting commerce, has not 
been brought up and controverted, and become the subject of serious consideration. 
…And the cases to which I have referred as coming before the Supreme Court of the 
United States are ample evidence of what the States would now do, if they had the 
power, in crippling the inter-state commerce of this country by imposing burdens upon 
its exercise; and the efforts of the States, endeavoring to shift the burden of taxation 
from their own shoulders and impose it on the property, rights, and interests of others, 
would only end in the destruction of the Union and the total suppression of the free and 
valuable commerce now carried on between the States.” 
 
3 See Mr. Justice Lamar’s opinion in Kidd v. Pearson, (decided October 32, 1888), 128 U. 
S. Rep.pp. 16, 17. 
 
4 12 Wheaton, 419.  
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in 1819, when it was held1 that until Congress exercised that power the 
States were not forbidden to pass a bankrupt law, provided such law 
contained no principle in violation of the express prohibitions imposed 
upon them by the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution—for 
example, that concerning the obligation of contracts, which was the great 
question in that case. This proposition has never since been questioned. 
But Mr. Justice Miller, in his address already referred to, speaks of the 
proposition, that in the absence of the exercise of that power by Congress 
the States may enact regulations affecting inter-state commerce in a class 
of cases local in character, as one upon which the court was long divided, 
until a substantial unanimity was reached in recent decisions.2 , 
Under the same general head fall the cases of Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, decided in 1831, and Worcester v. Georgia, in 1832—cases of 
great interest, but to which I can barely allude. In the former, the 
Cherokee nation, in the latter a missionary, residing among them, sought 
the protection of the Supreme Court against penal laws by which Georgia 
asserted her jurisdiction over the territory and the tribe. My limits forbid 
even the statement of this remarkable controversy, which fills a curious 
page in our political history. It must suffice here to say that in the former 
the complainant’s bill for an injunction was dismissed on the ground that 
the Cherokee nation, though a separate tribe or nation, was not “a foreign 
State” within the meaning of the Constitution, and the court had therefore 
no jurisdiction of such a suit, whatever might be the merits of the case. 
Said the Chief-Justice:1 
“If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not 
the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that 
                                                 
1 4 Wheaton, 196. 
 
2 The recent decisions referred to are those in Wabash R’y Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. Rep. 
557; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230; Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 
U. S. 326, in which various State laws were held void as imposing taxes upon inter-state 
commerce. 
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wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, 
this is not the tribunal which can redress the past or prevent the future.” 
But in Worcester v. Georgia, when a citizen of the United States 
appealed from a sentence of imprisonment under those penal laws of 
Georgia, no doubt was left either as to the jurisdiction or as to the views of 
the court. In an opinion which is a masterpiece of historical criticism as well 
as of constitutional exposition, Marshall2 held that the Cherokee nation was 
a distinct community, occupying its own territory, in which the laws of 
Georgia could have no force—the whole intercourse between the United 
States and that nation being vested, by our Constitution and laws, in the 
government of the United States; and that the law of Georgia under which 
Worcester had been imprisoned was a nullity.3 
Under the second general head of express restrictions upon the 
States are found some of Marshall’s most celebrated decisions, especially 
those which involved the sanctity of contracts.  
To this class belong the cases of Fletcher v. Peck, New Jersey 
v. Wilson, Sturges v. Crowninshield, Ogden v. Saunders, Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, and the later case of The Providence 
Bank v. Billings, in which last the just powers of the States were as 
carefully guarded as their abuse was restrained in the former. 
Conspicuous among the evils which led to the framing of the 
Constitution were laws passed by the various States, enabling debtors to 
                                                 
2 6 Peters, 543, 561. 
3 The result of this controversy is a matter of political history. The executive took no 
steps to enforce this decision, and Worcester was released only after making terms with 
the State. See Kennedy’s Life of Wirt, Vol. II., Chaps. XV. and XIX.; also Bryce’s 
American Commonwealth, Vol. I., pp. 262. 
 
The question of the Indian title to lands on the continent, the nature of the right of 
conquest, and the ownership of the soil by the United States, were discussed by Marshall 
in the case of Johnson v. Mcintosh, 8 Wheaton, $43, which, though not involving a 
constitutional question, ranks among his most important decisions. See Kent’s 
Commentaries, Vol. I., pp. 257-9 i ib.. Vol. III., p. 379. 
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disregard their contracts with impunity. Madison 1 says that in the internal 
administration of the States the violation of contracts had become familiar. 
Hamilton, in an early number of The Federalist2 dwelt upon it as not only 
mischievous to individuals, but as a source of hostility between the States 
themselves, and Marshall,3 in several important decisions, refers to the great 
and notorious evils and dangers which it had caused. A bitter experience had 
taught the framers of the Constitution that such laws, in undermining private 
and public faith, were sapping the foundations of society. 
The terms of the prohibition are brief and explicit: “No State 
shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.” 
But how was it to be interpreted? Does the term “contract” 
include an agreement already executed, or only an agreement for the 
future? What is meant by “ the obligation of a contract?”  Is it impaired by 
an insolvent or bankrupt law which discharges the debtor, or by any and 
what changes in the remedies provided for the collection of debts? 
These and other grave questions were answered as they arose 
by laying down broad principles, since applied by the courts in an 
immense number and variety of important cases. 
In Fletcher v. Peck, decided in 1810,1 it was held that the term 
contract includes equally those agreements which have been and those 
                                                 
1 Introduction to the Debates in the Convention, Elliot’s Debates, Vol. V., p. 120. 3 No. 
VII., The Federalist (J. C. Hamilton’s ed. 1864), p. 89. 
 
2 No. VII., The Federalist ( J.C. Hamilton’s ed. 1864), p.89.  
 
3 See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheaton, 202; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 
Wheaton, 628, 629. In Ogden v. Saunders (12 Wheaton, 354, 355), Marshall said: “ The 
power of interfering with contracts had been used to such an excess by the State 
legislatures as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of society and destroy all 
confidence between man and man. The mischief had become so great, so alarming, as 
not only to impair commercial intercourse and to threaten the existence of credit, but to 
sap the morals of the people and destroy the sanctity of private faith.” 
 
 
 
1 6 Cranch, 87, 135-40. 
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which are yet to be executed; that a grant or conveyance is simply an 
executed contract, the obligation of which still continues, binding the 
grantor not to reassert the right which he has himself extinguished. “It 
would be strange,” said the Chief-Justice, going, as usual, to the root of the 
matter, “if a contract to convey was secured by the Constitution, while an 
absolute conveyance remained unprotected.”2 It was further held that the 
clause in question made no distinction between States and individuals. 
From these premises it followed that the rights acquired under a law of the 
State of Georgia, granting certain lands absolutely to an individual, could 
not be divested by a subsequent law, which was accordingly held void. 
In New Jersey v. Wilson, decided 1812, the facts were these. 
In 1758 the Delaware Indian tribe released to the State of New Jersey 
their claim to certain lands, in consideration of which the State passed an 
Act authorizing the purchase of another tract on which the Indians should 
reside, and expressly providing that this tract should never be taxed. In 
1801 the Indians sold and conveyed this tract to individuals, in pursuance 
of another Act, authorizing them to do so, but which said nothing about 
taxing the lands thereafter. In 1804 a third Act was passed, imposing a 
tax on these lands against the new owners. This Act the Supreme Court 
held void, as impairing the obligation of the original contract with the 
Indians in the Act of 1758, to the benefit of which the purchasers from 
them were held entitled. 
In the Dartmouth College case,1 decided in 1819, the same 
principles were applied to the grant of franchises contained in the charter 
of a private corporation; a law of New Hampshire being held void, by 
which the governing power of Dartmouth College was in effect taken from 
the corporation and assumed by the State. 
                                                 
2 6 Cranch, 136,137. 
 
1  Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton, 518 
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This is one of Marshall’s most celebrated decisions. It is often 
cited as the one which established the inviolability of contracts under the 
Constitution. But the actual controversy, as the Chief-Justice remarked,2 
turned, not so much upon the true construction of the Constitution, in the 
abstract, as upon its application to the case, and upon the true 
construction of the charter of Dartmouth College; whether that was a 
grant of political power which the State could resume or modify at 
pleasure, or a contract for the security and disposition of property 
bestowed in trust for charitable purposes. It was held the latter,3 and for 
that reason inviolable; a question which called forth the noblest eloquence 
of Webster and of Wirt,4 as well as the great powers of Marshall, while 
Story’s concurring opinion exhausted the learning of the subject.5 
But in the case of The Providence Bank v. Billings, decided in 
1830,6 it was held that a law of Rhode Island, imposing a tax upon a bank 
chartered by that State, was valid. Being a State bank, it could not claim 
immunity under the doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland; and since the 
charter contained no provision exempting it from taxation, no contract 
could be implied from the mere grant of corporate franchises that the 
bank should not be required to bear its portion of the public burden, 
equally with individual citizens. The power of taxation being vital to the 
existence of the State government, its abandonment cannot be presumed 
in any case where no such purpose appears.1 
                                                 
2 4 Wheaton, 629. 
 
3 4 Wheaton, 644. 
4 See an interesting account of this argument, quoted from Mr. Choate’s eulogy upon 
Webster, in Van Santvoord’s Lives of the Chief-Justices, pp. 394-398.  
 
5 4 Wheaton, pp. 667-714 
 
6 4 Peters, 514. 
 
1 But such a contract, expressly contained in a charter of a private charitable corporation, 
has been upheld, though not without dissent, in comparatively recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court. Home of the Friendless v. Rowse: Washington University v. Rowse, 8 
Wallace, 430,439. 
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Another phase of the question was presented in Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, decided in 1819,2 in which the question was of the validity 
of a State insolvent law. In an admirably reasoned and conclusive opinion 
by the Chief-Justice, all the judges concurring, it was held that until the 
power to pass uniform bankrupt laws was exercised by Congress, the 
States were not forbidden to pass a bankrupt law, provided it violated no 
restriction contained in the tenth section of the first article of the 
Constitution; but that the New York law under consideration, which, upon 
surrender of his property as prescribed, released the debtor from all liability 
for any prior debt, was, so far as such debts were concerned, a law 
impairing the obligation of contracts, and was void. Said the Chief-Justice: 
“A contract is an agreement in which a party undertakes to do 
or not to do a particular thing. The law binds him to perform his 
undertaking, and this is, of course, the obligation of his contract. In the 
case at bar, the defendant has given his promissory note to pay the 
plaintiff a sum of money on or before a certain day. The contract binds 
him to pay that sum on that day; and this is its obligation. Any law which 
releases a part of this obligation must, in the literal sense of the word, 
impair it. Much more must a law impair it which makes it totally invalid 
and entirely discharges it.” 3  
At the same time, the substantial distinction between the 
obligation of a contract and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce 
that obligation, was clearly recognized; and it was held that so long as the 
obligation of a contract be not impaired, the remedy may be modified as 
the wisdom of the nation shall direct. The principle which the framers of 
the Constitution intended to establish was the inviolability of contracts, 
and this was to be protected in whatever form it might be assailed; but it 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
 
2 4 Wheaton, 122. 
 
3 4 Wheaton, 197 
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would be impossible to enumerate beforehand every case to which that 
principle might apply. The general principle thus laid down has never been 
departed from, though, in many subsequent cases, its application to new 
and varying circumstances has often been difficult and doubtful. 
The question took another shape in Ogden v. Saunders, decided in 
1827.1 This case involved the only constitutional question upon which the 
majority of the court ever differed from the Chief-Justice. The difference, in 
brief, was this. The majority of the court held2 that the municipal law in force 
when a contract is made is part of the contract itself: and that if such law 
provides for a discharge of the contract upon prescribed conditions, its 
enforcement upon those conditions does not impair the obligation of the 
contract, of which that law itself was a part. In other words, while affirming the 
decision in Sturges v. Crowninshield that a retrospective insolvent law was void, 
they upheld an insolvent law operating upon contracts made after its passage. 
Marshall, on the other hand, Duval and Story concurring, maintained in an 
elaborate and powerful opinion 3 that, however an existing law may act upon 
contracts when they come to be enforced, it does not enter into them as part of 
the original agreement; and that an insolvent law which released the debtor 
upon conditions not, in fact, agreed to by the parties themselves, whether 
operating on past or future contracts, impaired their obligation. This argument 
he characteristically enforced by pointing1 out that upon the opposite view the 
legislature need only pass a general law declaring all contracts subject to 
legislative control, and to be discharged as the legislature might prescribe, to 
enable the State thenceforward to completely nullify and evade the clause of 
the Constitution under consideration. 
                                                 
1 12 Wheaton, 213. 
 
2 Per Washington, J., 12 Wheaton, 259-262. 
 
3 12 Wheaton, 332-357. 
1 12 Wheaton, 339. 
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But it was also held by a divided court, Marshall concurring2 
that the State law, if a part of the contract, was such only as between 
citizens of that State; and since the creditor in this case was a citizen of 
Louisiana, he was not bound by the New York insolvent law, and it did not 
discharge the debt. 
The doctrines announced in Ogden v. Saunders have ever 
since been recognized as established law.3 But eminent lawyers have 
considered that the weight of the argument, on the point first mentioned, 
was with Marshall. 
This noble series of decisions may well inspire in every 
American a just, a patriotic pride; for it is by means of the principles 
which, with unsurpassed power of argument, they established, that the 
Constitution stands today, in the words of Mr. Justice Miller,4 “a great 
bulwark against popular effort, through State legislation, to evade the 
payment of just debts, the performance of obligatory contracts, and the 
general repudiation of the rights of creditors.” 
I can allude to but one other decision by Marshall, construing 
an express restriction upon the States. This was the case of Craig v. 
Missouri, decided in 1830;1 in which certain loan certificates, issued by the 
State of Missouri, and intended for general circulation, were held “bills of 
credit” emitted by a State, contrary to the prohibition of the Constitution; 
and that a note given in consideration thereof was therefore void.2 
                                                 
2 12 Wheaton, 358, 369. 
 
3 In Beyle v. Zacharie, at the January term, 1832, the Chief-Justice announced that the 
principles established by Ogden v. Sounders must be considered the settled law of the 
court. 6 Peters, 348. 
 
4 Address on the Supreme Court, June, 1887.  
1 4 Peters, 410. 
 
2 This decision was affirmed by Marshall, in 1834, in Byrne v. Missouri, 8 Peters, 40. In 
Briscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, II Peters, 257, decided in 1837, after 
Marshall’s death (Chief-Justice Taney having succeeded him), a majority of the court held 
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In perfect consistency, though in apparent contrast, with these 
decisions, he held in Barron v. The Mayor, etc., of Baltimore,3 in 1833, 
that the provision in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, that private 
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, was 
a restriction upon the power of Congress alone, and not upon the States. 
This he demonstrated in a simple but conclusive argument, which asserts 
the independence of each State, within its own sphere, as strongly as he 
had before maintained the supremacy of Congress in national affairs. 
The trial of Aaron Burr, for treason, in the United States Circuit 
Court at Richmond, Virginia, in 1807, was a political event of the highest 
interest, and its conduct by Marshall strikingly illustrates his personal and 
intellectual traits; but its dramatic incidents are beyond the purpose of 
this paper.4 
Burr was indicted for treason, but the only overt act charged 
was that of levying war against the United States on Blennerhassett’s 
Island, in the District of Virginia. The Constitution itself 1 forbids conviction 
for treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act. 
The prosecution admitted that Burr was not in the District of Virginia when 
the overt act was committed, but offered proof to connect him with those 
who committed it; which Burr’s counsel moved to exclude as irrelevant. In 
an elaborate and acutely reasoned opinion, Marshall sustained the motion; 
holding that Burr, being neither actually nor legally present, could not be 
                                                                                                                                                        
that the charter of the bank was constitutional, and the notes issued by it valid, although 
the State was the only stockholder; and that this was consistent with the decision in 
Craig v. Missouri. From this, Mr. Justice Story strongly dissented (IIPeters, 328); stating 
that on a former argument of the same case, a majority of the court, among whom was 
Chief-Justice Marshall, were of opinion that the Act was unconstitutional and void, within 
the decision in Craig v.Missouri.  
 
3 7 Peters, 243. 
 
4 Besides the complete report of “Burr’s Trial,” published by David Robertson, in 1808, an 
interesting account is given of it in Kennedy’s Life of Wirt, Vol. I., pp. 161-206; also a 
brief summary in Van Santvoord’s Lives of the Chief-Justices, pp. 364-79. Marshall’s 
opinion is printed in the appendix to 4 Cranch, Note B, p. 473.  
 
1 Article III., Section 3. 
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convicted of the overt act charged in the indictment; and that if, being at 
some place without the district of Virginia, he procured the commitment of 
that act by others, and even if such procurement was an overt act of 
treason under the Constitution, yet that was not the overt act for which he 
was indicted. This ended the case; and Wirt, who made one of his most 
celebrated speeches during that trial, wrote to a friend 2: “Marshall has 
stepped in between Burr and death.” This ruling was severely censured by 
some who held it inconsistent with certain dicta in the case of Bollman and 
Swartwout, decided not long before by Marshall in the Supreme Court; but 
this the opinion itself disproves.3 How deeply Marshall felt, with what 
undaunted courage he met, the responsibility of that decision, its closing 
paragraphs plainly reveal: 
“Much has been said in the course of the argument on points 
on which the court feels no inclination to comment particularly, but which 
may, perhaps, not improperly receive some notice. 
“That this court dares not usurp power is most true. That this 
court dares not shrink from its duty is not less true. 
“No man is desirous of placing himself in a disagreeable 
situation. No man is desirous of becoming the peculiar subject of calumny. 
No man, might he let the bitter cup pass from him without self-reproach, 
would drain it to the bottom. But if he has no choice in the case; if there is 
no alternative presented to him but a dereliction of duty or the opprobrium 
of those who are denominated the world, he merits the contempt as well as 
the indignation of his country who can hesitate which to embrace.” 
It is not surprising that Marshall was bitterly assailed1 for a 
decision which permitted a man so dangerous and so detested as Burr to 
                                                 
2 To Dabney Carr; see Kennedy’s Life of Wirt, Vol. I., p. 221. 
 
3 4 Cranch, pp. 525_7. 
 
1 See Van Santvoord’s Lives of the Chief-Justices, p. 378. 
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escape. Ten or fifteen years before Washington was charged by angry partisans 
with plotting to make himself a king. But when the passions and prejudices of 
men had cooled down, the nation honored all the more the inflexible judge who 
thus calmly dared without fear or favor to administer the law. 
The decisions thus briefly summarized give no adequate 
conception of Marshall’s immense contributions to other departments of 
jurisprudence. I cannot even allude to his masterly judgments in cases 
involving questions of international law, treaty rights and obligations, 
neutral and belligerent rights, prize and admiralty law, titles under the 
land laws of various States, insurance and other mercantile questions, the 
law of trusts, of charities, of powers, —for in more than five hundred 
opinions he dealt with almost every head of modern jurisprudence. But his 
fame chiefly rests, as it ought, upon those great opinions by which were 
expounded the brief and pregnant phrases of the Constitution, revealing 
alike its purpose and its power. 
“Other judges,” said Story, in dedicating to Marshall his 
Commentaries on the Constitution, — 
“Other judges have attained an elevated reputation by similar 
labors in a single department of jurisprudence. But in one department (it 
need scarcely be said that I allude to that of constitutional law) the 
common consent of your countrymen has admitted you to stand without a 
rival. Posterity will surely confirm by its deliberate award what the present 
age has approved as an act of undisputed justice.” 
In this his opportunity was not less exceptional than his great 
powers and his unprecedented task. That he felt it to be so is shown by 
the nature and methods, as well as the magnitude of the work he did. 
Never dealing in abstract theories, never going beyond the case in hand, 
nor failing clearly to discern and steadfastly to insist upon the strict limits 
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of the judicial power, he never neglected an opportunity for developing 
and presenting in all its aspects the great and novel political conception 
embodied in the Constitution, —a political conception at once profoundly 
simple and singularly complex; one people and many States, the 
government of each supreme in its own sphere; the strength and safety of 
each, and the prosperity of all, dependent upon and assured by the 
absolute supremacy of the fundamental law. A single phrase, in one of his 
latest decisions, struck the key-note of all, —when he spoke of the 
exercise of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as “indispensable to the 
preservation of the Union, and consequently of the independence and 
liberty of these States.”1 Thus, in fulfilling the highest duties of the judge, 
he exercised the noblest functions of the statesman. 
In doing this, he sought neither to enlarge nor to restrict the 
meaning, but to ascertain and enforce the true intent, of the Constitution 
and the law, to the sole end that its purposes might be fulfilled. As 
between a so-called strict or liberal construction, he advocated neither. In 
U. S. Bank v. Deveaux,2 he said: 
“The Constitution and the law are to be expounded, without a 
leaning the one way or the other, according to those general principles 
which usually govern in the construction of fundamental or other laws.” 
In Ogden v. Saunders1 he stated thus the true rule of 
construction: 
...” that the intention of the instrument must prevail; that this 
intention must be collected from its words; that its words are to be 
understood in that sense in which they are generally used by those for 
whom the instrument was in-tended; that its provisions are neither to be 
                                                 
1 Craig v. Missouri, 438. 
 
2 5 Cranch, 87. 
1 12 Wheaton, 332.  
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restricted into insignificance, nor extended to objects not comprehended 
in them, nor contemplated by its framers.” 
In Gibbons v. Ogden 2 he said: 
“The enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution, and the 
people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in 
their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the 
imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting 
the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule that the objects for 
which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the 
instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. …We 
know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is 
given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in 
connection with the purposes for which they were conferred.” 
In the same case, in reply to the contention of Ogden’s 
counsel 3 for a strict construction of the powers expressly delegated to  
Congress by the Constitution, the Chief-Justice said:1  
“What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they 
contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words 
beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the 
application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they 
contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not 
to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the government those 
powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and 
which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; 
for that narrow construction which would cripple the government, and 
                                                 
2 9 Wheaton, 188,189. 
3 See Mr. Oakley’s argument, 9 Wheaton, 34. 
 
 
 
1 9 Wheaton, 188. 
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render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, 
and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent; 
then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt 
it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded.” 
It was in applying these principles to each case as it arose that 
his great powers were displayed: the extraordinary penetration which 
seized upon its vital issues, the acuteness which distinguished, and the 
patience which disentangled, truth from fallacy; the breadth of view which 
overlooked no remote consequence, and the power of luminous statement 
which not only justified the conclusions reached in the particular case, but 
made plain their application to cases yet to arise. And so, as Professor 
Bryce has felicitously said: 2 
“The Constitution seemed not so much to rise under his hands 
to its full stature, as to be gradually unveiled by him till it stood revealed 
in the harmonious perfection of the form which its framers had designed.” 
But nothing is more impressive or more characteristic in his 
opinions, to whatever subject they relate, than the serenely impartial 
spirit in which he expounds the law, seeking truth and justice for their 
own sake, not merely unheeding but apparently unconscious of any other 
end in view. The course of his thought, the sweep of his argument, is like 
the stately flight of an eagle through the upper air; whose keen and 
powerful vision takes in every object in the broad landscape, but from a 
height at which the sounds of bustle and turmoil beneath have died away. 
Some of the constitutional questions decided by him were also subjects of 
fierce and prolonged political controversy. The supporters and opponents 
of a bank charter,1 like those who advocated and those who denounced 
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-9, asserted with equal 
                                                 
2 The American Commonwealth, Vol. I., p. 375. 
 
1 See Carl Schurz’ Life of Henry Clay (American Statesmen Series), Vol. L, pp. 63, 66, 
375. 
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vehemence their scrupulous fidelity) to the Constitution and the 
sacrilegious disregard of its provisions by the opposite party. Marshall, as 
we have seen, while in political life, was a Federalist leader. No man’s 
convictions were stronger, or could have been more fearlessly avowed or 
supported. But his opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland, in Osborn v. Bank of 
the United States, in Cohens v. Virginia, do not contain a word or a phrase 
from which it could be discerned that political parties had ever divided 
upon any question discussed in them, —still less with what party their 
author had ever been identified. 
It has been remarked that Marshall rarely invoked the authority of 
adjudged cases, especially in his constitutional decisions. He does not cite a 
single decision in Marbury v. Madison2 or in Cohens v. Virginia, or in either of 
his great opinions in Sturges v. Crowninshield, McCulloch v. Maryland, and 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, all decided3 at the February Term, 1819, in 
the last of which Story’s very able concurring opinion fairly bristles with them. 
In deciding such questions Marshall was laying foundations, and erected no 
scaffolding. Or, as Judge Story himself said: 
“When I examine a question I go from headland to headland, 
from case to case; Marshall has a compass, puts out to sea, and goes 
directly to his result.” 1 
But when learned precedents were needed, he was at no loss 
for them. Many other decisions show his wide research and familiarity with 
the best learning of the time. At the same February Term, 1819, in The 
Trustees of Baptist Association v. Hart’s Executors 2 a leading case upon 
                                                 
2 That is, on the constitutional question; and only one, a decision of Lord Mansfield, on 
the proper functions of the writ of mandamus. 
 
3 4 Wheaton, 191; 400; 624. 
 
1 See an interesting article on John Marshall in the American Lata Review (April, 1867), 
Vol. I., p. 432, by Theophilus Parsons. 
 
2 4 Wheaton, I. 
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the law of trusts and charities, his opinion was fortified by weighty English 
authorities. Other important decisions, involving the doctrines of equitable 
liens, of powers, of relief in equity against mistake, of the illegality of 
contracts, the powers of corporations at common law, and other general 
topics, show equal learning.3 
The great influence which Marshall’s intellectual power 
commanded was enhanced by his singularly winning personal traits. It is 
said that he never had a quarrel or an enemy. Friends and political 
opponents alike bear witness to the perfect purity of his life, his absolute 
integrity, his simple and genial manners, the gentle dignity of his bearing, 
and the sweetness and serenity of his temper. His demeanor on the bench 
was a model of judicial dignity, courtesy, and patience; and the popularity 
which was remarkable even in his youth, became in later years an exalted 
and affectionate veneration, which his associates shared with the bar and 
the people at large.1 This was touchingly exhibited in the Virginia 
Convention which met in 1829 to frame a new State Constitution; of which 
Marshall, Madison, and Monroe were members. Marshall was then in his 
seventy-fifth year, but a contemporary describes him as having “a face of 
genius and an eye of fire.” His speeches, infrequent and brief, but always 
clear and powerful, were listened to with the most eager and respectful 
attention, and any dissent from his opinions was almost invariably 
accompanied by some expression of veneration for his character and 
affectionate attachment for his person.2 Still later, an English traveller of 
note, who met him in Washington, dwells with enthusiasm upon the 
simple dignity of “the tall, majestic, bright-eyed old man”; while another 
describes his countenance as indicating that simplicity of mind and 
                                                 
3 See, among other cases, Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheaton, 46; Hunt v. Rousmanier, 8 
Wheaton, 174; Armstrong v. Toler, II Wheaton, 258; Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 
12 Wheaton, 64. 
 
1 See Story’s Discourse, Miscell., pp. 648, 679-81 ; Van Santvoord’s Lives, etc., pp. 312, 
363, 384; Magruder’s Life of Marshall (American Statesmen Series), pp. 270-78. 
 
2 Flanders’ Lives, etc., Vol. II., pp. 501, 513. 
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benignity which so eminently distinguished his character, and the 
venerable dignity of his appearance as comparing favorably with that of 
the most distinguished-looking peer in the British House of Lords.3 
Upon his death, in July, 1835, fitting expression was given to 
the veneration in which the great jurist was held by the bench and bar of 
the Union. Among such tributes, perhaps none was more impressive than 
the resolutions unanimously adopted by the bar of Charleston, South 
Carolina, upon the motion of one its most eminent members,4 and from 
which I quote a single felicitous sentence: 
“Even the spirit of party respected the unsullied purity of the Judge, 
and the fame of the Chief Justice has justified the wisdom of the Constitution, 
and reconciled the jealousy of freedom to the independence of the judiciary.” 
Marshall was still Chief-Justice in 1831, when De Tocqueville, after a 
profound study of American institutions, wrote thus of the Supreme Court: 
“When we have successively examined in detail the 
organization of the Supreme Court, and the entire prerogatives which it 
exercises, we shall readily admit that a more imposing judicial power was 
never constituted by any people. The Supreme Court is placed at the head 
of all known tribunals, both by the nature of its rights and the class of 
justiciable parries which it controls.”1 
Another half century has passed, memorable for the 
unparalleled growth of the nation, in numbers, in wealth, in territorial 
extent; still more memorable for the deadly perils which threatened its 
life, but which, at a fearful cost, were overcome. That august tribunal still 
                                                 
3 Miss Martineau’s Western Travel, VoL I., p. 247; and Travels in North America, by the 
Hon. Charles Augustus Murray, Vol. I., p. 158. 
 
4 James L. Petigru, Esq. These proceedings were entered in full upon the minutes of the 
Supreme Court at the January Term, 1836, and are given in 10 Peters, page ix. 
 
1 Democracy in America (Reeve’s translation), Vol. I., p. 148. 
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maintains, from ocean to ocean, among a reunited people, its peaceful 
and unquestioned sway under a constitution purified as by fire. Yet still, in 
the recent words of one of its most eminent members 2: 
“It is, so far as the ordinary forms of power are concerned, by 
far the feeblest branch or department of the government. It must rely upon 
the confidence and respect of the public for its just weight and influence, 
and it may be confidently asserted that neither with the people, nor with 
the country at large, nor with the other branches of the government, has 
there ever been found wanting that respect and confidence.” 
How that court has fulfilled its great trust this universal 
respect and confidence affords the highest proof. But such a sentiment 
could not be affirmed of any people which was not also, by instinct and by 
habit both, imbued with a legal spirit, and trained to reverence the law. 
And pre-eminent among the influences which cultivated that spirit, and to 
which that training is due, must be reckoned the lucid and irresistible 
reasoning, the profound political insight, the splendid courage tempered 
by judicial caution, the exalted patriotism and the majestic character of 
John Marshall, the Expounder of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Address of Mr. Justice Miller on “ The Supreme Court of the United States,” at the Semi-
Centennial Celebration of the University of Michigan, June 39, 1887. 
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SUMMARY. 
Total number of constitutional decisions…………………………..61 
Opinions rendered by Marshall (one dissenting)……………….36 
“              “            “         “    on Circuit, 3. 
“              “            “         “   Story……………………………………II  
“              “            “         “    Jonhson………………………………6 
“              “            “         “    Washington………………………5 
“           “        “     “    Paterson, Cushing, Baldiwin, 
Thompson, one each……………………………………………………………………………4-61  
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The above cases are all indexed in Curtis’s Digest of United States     
Supreme Court Decisions, under the head of “Constitutional Law”, except 
those above indicated by “a” which are placed under other heads; and 
except, also, decisions on the Circuit. 
The cases above indicated by “b” are found in the collection of 
Marshall’s opinions, published in 1839 (Jas. Monroe & Co., Boston), under 
the title of “Marshall on the Constitution” 
The cases above indicated by “c”, though indexed by Curtis 
under “Constitutional Law”, do not seem to involve any constitutional 
questions, and are not counted as such in the above summary.  
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LECTURE III 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AS 
INFLUENCED BY CHIEF-JUSTICE TANEY. 
By George W. BIDDLE, OF PHILEDELPHIA.  
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For nearly two thirds of the present century the Federal 
Supreme Court has been presided over by two judges who, differing in 
many sides of their judicial character, had, nevertheless, strong points of 
resemblance in their high moral attributes, firmness of intellectual grasp, 
simplicity and directness of purpose, and equanimity and calmness of 
temperament. They have both left the impress of their great powers upon 
the government of their country through the judgments rendered by them 
in the court of which they were the successive heads. Perhaps, to a large 
degree, the formation and tendency of their judicial opinions were the 
outcome of the condition in which their country was found at the different 
periods in which they were respectively called upon to shape and give 
direction to the forces—passive rather than active—with which they were 
obliged to deal. Nor is it any disparagement of them to speak in this way, 
since all men are largely controlled by the environments within which they 
are placed and expected to act. Separated in years by scarcely a 
generation, both the children of the period which witnessed the 
introduction of the United States into the family of nations, there were 
very marked and distinctive changes in the condition of the country at the 
times they were successively engaged in the discharge of the duties of 
their high office. MARSHALL, himself an actor in the conflict which ended 
in the achievement of American independence, knew the weakness of the 
original government, and witnessed the throes and pangs in which the 
present Constitution was ushered into being. Coming to the Supreme 
Court in its infancy, himself hardly past middle age—he was but forty-
six,—he had seen the dangers and difficulties—almost the disasters—
which the feeble government that had just passed away had been 
compelled to encounter, and had marked the gloomy passages which 
accompanied the issuing into life of the new government. It was in its 
infancy, and needed strength and encouragement. It was untried and 
required support and assistance. TANEY, on the other hand, although 
cradled in the midst of revolutionary strife, was a child at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution, and scarcely old enough to remember the 
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gloom which hung over the country from the time the war of 
independence closed, until the period when the Constitution was doing its 
work with comparative smoothness and efficiency. When he was called to 
the Supreme Court, the country had passed a second time through a war 
with Great Britain with honor and success, and was immerging into that 
broad day of wonderful physical advance, the like of which the world has 
never seen. Its mighty rivers and great lakes were being daily traversed 
by leviathans propelled by steam, railroads were being laid out in all 
directions over the surface of the land, and time and space seemed no 
longer able to confine the energies and destinies of the teeming millions of 
its inhabitants. The strength of the General Government had been 
demonstrated, the ability of the States to deal with all questions of 
internal polity was confirmed. If the country was to proceed in its career 
of prosperity and progress, it was to be by strict adherence to the 
provisions of the compact by which not only the original thirteen States 
were bound together, but under which the occupants of the whole 
continent would, sooner or later, be united in the closest ties of amity and 
brotherhood; In our examination of the work performed by Chief-Justice 
TANEY in the exposition of the charter of our rights, we must, therefore, 
keep in view the period at which he was called to the discharge of his 
judicial duties, and during which he was continuing to act as the head of 
the judicial department of the country, and we must give due effect to the 
marvellous changes that during this entire period were taking place, not 
only in the United States, but over the whole world. From 1837 to 1864 he 
sat as the presiding genius of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
earnest, active, watching with untiring industry over its deliberations, 
dealing promptly and successfully with the vast and varied mass of 
litigation which came before him and his associates, and disposing of it 
with a learning and ability that gave entire satisfaction to the body of 
suitors and to the people at large, and extorted the admiration of many of 
his old political opponents. The judgments delivered by him as the organ 
of this tribunal, as well as the occasional dissents pronounced by him 
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have, with rare exceptions, been finally received as correct expositions or 
the law of the land. The exceptions, rare as they were, will be hereafter 
adverted to; but in several instances where, at the time, he was doubted, 
and even animadverted upon, subsequent examination and reflection have 
shown the accuracy of his reasoning and the wisdom of his conclusions. Of 
course, the business of the court had vastly increased, and continued to 
increase, during the whole time of his incumbency in office. During the 
thirty-four years in which Chief-Justice MARSHALL sat as the head of the 
court he delivered over four hundred opinions. Chief-Justice TANEY, sitting 
several years less, pronounced fewer judgments; but his colleagues were, 
at the same time, delivering opinions in many cases. His opinions, 
contained in thirty-two volumes of Reports, beginning with 11 Peters, and 
ending with 2 Black, are distinguished by their clearness, learning, 
directness, and firm grasp of the points discussed, and when dealing with 
constitutional subjects, for sound and weighty reasoning, thorough 
acquaintance with the political history of the country, and for the close 
bearing of all contained in them upon the question under examination. 
This will be apparent as we consider such of them as it is possible to 
notice somewhat at length in the examination about to be made. 
The first case which shall be noticed, almost the first case in 
which he gave an opinion, is a case found in the early pages of 11 Peters,1 
in which the construction of the Act of Congress of 20th April, 1818, 
relating to the bringing into the United States, or holding or selling 
persons as slaves (Rev. Stat. U. States, section 5377) came up for 
consideration. The CHIEF-JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court, 
holding that the act in question being intended to put an end to the slave 
trade and to prevent the introduction of slaves into the United States from 
other countries, had no application to a case where the owner of slaves 
had taken them out of this country and brought them back into it. The 
case is noticed, not from its intrinsic importance, or for any elaboration in 
                                                 
1 United States vs. Ship “ Garonne,” 11 Peters, 73 (1837). 
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the argument of the principles supposed to be involved in it; but from its 
being a case in which an aspect of this peculiar domestic relation was 
presented, and from the fact that the decision was apparently unanimous, 
four of the seven judges who then composed the court being citizens of 
non-slaveholding States (Story, McLean, Thompson, and Baldwin). 
Postmaster General vs. Trigg1 in the same volume, decides 
what might have been supposed to be sufficiently obvious, that a 
mandamus would not be directed to a judicial officer of the United States 
to show cause why execution should not issue upon a judgment, where 
the record did not show mistake, misconduct, or omission of duty upon 
the part of the court. The case is noticed merely as an introduction to an 
important series of decisions, in which the power of this court to deal with 
the subject, either originally, or in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, 
was elaborately discussed. 
But the crowning case of importance in this volume of Reports 
is now about to be noticed, namely, that of Charles River Bridge vs. 
Warren Bridge,2 in which there were dissents from the opinion of the 
court. An outline of the facts of this important cause is now given. 
In 1650 the legislature of the Province of Massachusetts 
granted to Harvard College liberty and power to dispose of the ferry from 
Charlestown to Boston over Charles River. The college held the ferry, 
receiving its profits until 1785, when a company was incorporated by the 
legislature of the State to build a bridge at the place where the ferry was, 
and to receive the tolls paid for traffic over it; the company paying to the 
college stipulated sums of money which were ultimately to cease, and the 
bridge to become the property of the State. The bridge was built, the tolls 
for traffic over it received, and all things enjoined upon the company were 
performed, when, in the year 1828, at which time the right to receive tolls 
                                                 
1 II Peters, 173. 
 
2 II Peters, 420. 
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and the payment to the college had still a considerable period to run—over 
twenty-seven years, —the legislature incorporated another company, the 
defendant in error, to erect another bridge over the same river from 
Charlestown to Boston, beginning and ending near the termini of the 
original bridge, with power to take tolls, and ultimately to become free, 
the bridge having in point of fact actually become free at the time the 
decision in the cause was pronounced. The proprietors of the Charles 
River Bridge Company, asserting that the erection of the Warren Bridge 
under its act of incorporation was done under a law passed by a State 
impairing the obligation of contracts, contrary to section 10 of Article I. of 
the Federal Constitution, sought relief against it in the State courts of 
Massachusetts, which was refused,1 and brought the case to the Supreme 
Court of the United States under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary 
Act. 
The case was argued by the highest legal talent in the 
country: Messrs. Dutton and Webster appearing for the plaintiff in error, 
and Messrs. Green leaf and Davis for the defendant in error. 
Chief-Justice TANEY, in delivering the opinion of the court,2 
stated in its outset that the gravity of the questions involved required, and 
had received, the most anxious and deliberate consideration, and that the 
court, sensible of its duty to deal with the utmost caution with the 
interests involved, had guarded, so far as it had the power, the rights of 
property, and carefully abstained from encroaching upon the rights 
reserved under the Constitution to the States. After stating the facts, he 
began by showing that the plaintiffs in error could not support themselves 
under the principle that the law complained of divested vested rights, for 
the Constitution of the United States was not violated by so doing.  
                                                 
1 See the case reported in 7 Pickering, 344. 
 
2 II Peters. 536-553.  
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In this connection the cases of Satterlee vs. Matthewson1 and Watson vs. 
Mercer2  (both Pennsylvania cases) were referred to; and it was then 
judicially asserted that the exclusive jurisdiction of the court was to 
ascertain and decide whether the obligation of a contract had been 
impaired by the law in question. 
The ferry rights referred to had ceased to exist since the 
erection of the bridge, but these rights were never transferred by Harvard 
College to the Charles River Bridge Company. They appear to have been 
extinguished because public convenience was thereby promoted, and 
compensation was made to the college, in which it had acquiesced, for the 
extinction of their franchise. Of course, the Charles River Bridge Company 
obtained no equitable assignment of such rights by the payment of the 
annuity to the college. Nor could the extent of this pre-existing ferry right 
have any influence upon the construction of the written charter for the 
bridge. The two rights could not be associated, since the charter of the 
company was the instrument which was to be interpreted by its own 
terms. In the two acts, of 1785 and 1792, we must look for the nature 
and extent of the franchise conferred upon the plaintiffs. 
All ambiguity in the terms of the contract under which the 
plaintiffs claimed must operate against them, as they could claim nothing 
which was not clearly given to them; for which proposition a number of 
Federal decisions were cited., A State was not to be presumed to have 
surrendered a power analogous to the taxing power, namely, the right to 
open new channels of communication essential to the comfort, 
convenience, and prosperity of its people, which should be preserved 
undiminished. The community itself had rights which must be protected, 
and its government could not be disarmed, by implications and 
presumptions, of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends for which it 
                                                 
1 2 Peters, 380.  
2 8 Peters, 88. 
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had been created. An analysis of the charter of the elder company was 
then given, and a comparison of its terms made with those of the charter 
of the Warren Bridge Company, from which it was shown that nothing was 
taken from the former by the latter. Its income, it was true, was 
interfered with, perhaps destroyed; but there was no stipulation against 
this in the original charter. Nor could such an agreement be implied. 
The case was, however, even stronger against the plaintiffs, 
for by the supplementary act of 1792 its privileges had been extended for 
thirty years longer. This last act passed only seven years after the original 
charter providing for the incorporation of another bridge company, the 
erection of which, it was supposed, might diminish the emoluments of the 
older bridge, and the extension of privileges of the Charles River Bridge 
Company was given as a reward for the hazard incurred, not for taking 
away a right already given. It would indeed be a strong exertion of judicial 
power, acting upon its own views of what justice required, to raise by a 
sort of judicial coercion, an implied contract between the State and the 
company from the nature of the very instrument in which the legislature 
appears to have taken pains to use words which disavow any intention on 
the part of the State to make such a contract. 
After alluding to the practice of other States, and stating the 
results of the doctrine of implied contracts, and the arbitrariness of the 
rule attempted to be set up, the opinion closed with an affirmance of the 
judgment pf the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 
Justice MCLEAN,1 concurring in the affirmance of the 
judgment, dilated in his opinion upon the immorality of destroying the 
value of the elder franchise by indirect means; but it is respectfully 
submitted that such a line of remark, while justifying an appeal to the 
sense of right and to the integrity of the State government, is inapplicable 
to the action of a court of justice, or to the train of reasoning by which 
                                                 
1 His opinion is to be found in pages 554-583 of the Report. 
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judicial action should be controlled. The learned judge, then conceding 
that the taking of private property for public use, with or without making 
compensation cannot be said to be impairing the obligation of a contract, 
believing that the court had no jurisdiction of the cause, although he was 
“clear that the merits were on the side of the complainants,” was in favor 
of dismissing their bill for want of jurisdiction. 
Justice STORY, in an elaborate dissent (in which Justice 
THOMPSON entirely concurred),1 after referring to the fact that the case 
had been twice argued, and at considerable intervals, by reason of a 
difference of opinion among the judges, began by saying that with all the 
lights which the researches of the years intervening between the first and 
last argument had enabled him to obtain, the opinion which he originally 
formed after the first argument was that which now had his firm and 
unhesitating conviction. He then proceeded, with much fulness of 
illustration, and with a display of great and varied learning, to show why it 
was that the granting of the charter of the Warren Bridge Company was 
an impairment, by the legislature, of the contract made by it with the 
former bridge company. He controverted with warmth—perhaps with 
excessive warmth—most of the positions taken in the opinion of the court; 
sustained himself largely by copious citations from the opinions of 
Chancellor KENT and other eminent judges; impugned the rules of 
construction of legislative grants laid down by the CHIEF-JUSTICE in his 
opinion, concluding what he had to say on that head by quoting a remark 
made judicially by the late Chief-Justice PARSONS, that “in England 
prerogative is the cause of one against the WHOLE. Here it is the cause of 
all against one. In the first case, the feelings and vices, as well as the 
virtues, are enlisted against it; in the last in favor of it. And, therefore, 
here, it is of more importance that the judicial court should take care that 
the claim of prerogative should be more strictly watched.” While he 
                                                 
1 This dissenting opinion is contained in pages 583-650 of the Report. 
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admitted that much of what he was contending for rested upon 
implication, and not upon the words of the charter, he asserted that the 
implication was natural and necessary, and indispensable to the proper 
effect of the grant. The franchise could not subsist without it, at least for 
any valuable or practical purpose. His argument upon what was 
necessary, and what was merely inferential implication, was ingenious and 
persuasive, although not convincing. He insisted, moreover, that the 
Legislature of Massachusetts was, in no just sense, the sovereign of the 
State. He also attempted to answer the argument that by the grant of a 
particular franchise, the State does not surrender its power to grant 
similar franchises; and contended that it could do no act to destroy or 
essentially impair the franchise granted to the Charles River Bridge 
Company; the State impliedly contracting, neither to resume its grant nor 
to do any act to the prejudice or destruction of its grant. Finally, referring 
to Judge Washington’s opinion in the Dartmouth College case, he quoted 
from it a passage to the effect that after the grant of a charter by the king 
it amounted to the extinguishment of his prerogative to bestow the same 
identical franchise on another corporate body. 
It must not be supposed that this meagre outline of Judge STORY’S 
dissenting opinion in this celebrated case, does justice to the ability by 
which it is marked throughout. It is a wonderful combination of great 
learning, and, if the phrase may be permitted, of judicial oratory in 
defense of a cause in which he thought the principles of morality and 
public integrity were involved and about to be successfully overthrown in 
the person of a valuable corporation which had been a pioneer in the 
cause of internal improvements. It was lighted up with the fires not yet 
cooled of the rulings in the Dartmouth College case, and was something 
like a protest against an assault supposed to be about to be committed 
upon the doctrine solemnly announced by that important decision. It 
undoubtedly received a portion of its coloring from this belief, and, as a 
consequence, it did not always keep strictly in view the lines of 
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demarcation between the State and the Federal Constitutions, and the 
difference of the judicial reasoning which was applicable to each. For 
instance, there might well have been a divesting of vested rights by 
reason of the charter granted to the Warren Bridge Company, and yet the 
Federal Supreme Court was powerless, as Judge MCLEAN regrettingly 
admitted, to deal with it. 
In truth the principle of the Dartmouth College case, perhaps correct 
enough when limited as it was applied to a private grant, had been 
pushed by its advocates to an extreme that would have left our State 
governments in possession of little more than the shell of legislative 
power. If the liberality of construction contended for had been permitted, 
all its essential attributes would have been parcelled out, without the 
possibility of reclamation, through recklessness, or something worse, 
among the greedy applicants for monopolistic privileges. It was necessary 
therefore to restrain the effects of this decision within proper limitations, 
and to demand, when a claim of exclusive right was preferred, that it 
should be shown either by express terms, or by necessary implication 
from the words employed. Any other rule of construction would have been 
inadmissible; and the cause of efficient State government, and of equal 
justice to all, gained largely by the vigorous treatment which the claim of 
the elder company received in this case in the opinion of the court. Unless 
the luxuriant growth, the result of the decision in 4 Wheaton, had been 
lopped and cut away by the somewhat trenchant reasoning of the CHIEF-
JUSTICE, the whole field of legislation would have been choked and 
rendered useless in time to come, for the production of any laws that 
would have met the needs of the increasing and highly developed energies 
of a steadily advancing community. The country owes a debt of gratitude 
to Judge TANEY and his coadjutors for the manner in which this question 
was dealt with in the outset of his judicial career; and the profession, 
which, I think I may say, has regarded with entire approval the 
restrictions imposed upon the claims of exclusive right set up under color 
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of legislative grant, must continue to admire the quiet strength of the 
reasoning upon which the conclusions reached in the opinion of the 
majority of the court repose. It is to be hoped that the space given to a 
discussion of this case has not been unduly large, as the principles 
involved in it seem to lie at the foundation of representative government 
in the United States. 
In the volume of 12, Peters’ Reports, several interesting points 
of practice were cited, and one or two cases of considerable political 
importance came before the court. 
Thus, in Garcia vs. Lee,1 the principle by which it was declared 
that the boundary line determined as the true one by the political 
departments of the government must be recognized as the true one by 
the judicial departments was again affirmed, the CHIEF-JUSTICE declaring 
the opinion of the court. But the case immediately following this case2 
aroused the public attention in a high degree, and was marked by the 
dissent of the CHIEF-JUSTICE, and Justices BARBOUR and CATRON. AS it 
involved an important political question, as well as a legal and con-
situational one, it deserves to be considered. The following outline of the 
facts will show how the case arose: 
The Postmaster-General had been directed by an Act of 
Congress to credit certain mail contractors, S. & S., with the amount of a 
sum of money awarded by the Solicitor of the Treasury as due to them 
under certain contracts with the government. The Solicitor having made 
his award, the Postmaster-General declined to allow it in full, on the 
ground that the Solicitor had exceeded his authority. The mail contractors, 
thus refused the full credit awarded them, applied to the Circuit Court of 
the District of Columbia for a mandamus to compel the Postmaster to pay 
them the full amount of the award. This official having declined to obey 
                                                 
1 12 Peters, 511 
2 Kendall vs. U. Stales, 12 Peters, 524. 
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the writ nisi, upon grounds set forth in his answer thereto, the Circuit 
Court ordered a peremptory writ of mandamus to be issued, and the 
Postmaster prosecuted a writ of error to this judgment of the Circuit 
Court. This judgment was affirmed, Justice THOMPSON delivering the 
opinion of the court, in which two inquiries were made and answered 
affirmatively: I. Did the record present a proper case for the issuing of the 
writ? 2. If it did, had the Circuit Court of the District authority to issue the 
writ? 
The court, in answering the first inquiry, ruled that the act 
directed to be performed by the Postmaster-General was simply 
ministerial, as it would be absurd to suppose that Congress could not 
impose upon any executive officer any duty which it thought proper. The 
remedy by mandamus was, therefore, proper and appropriate. To the 
second question the learned judge, in a labored effort to show that, either 
by the adoption of the laws of Maryland in the District, or under the terms 
of the Act of Congress of 13th February, 1801, giving jurisdiction to the 
Circuit Courts of the United States, which had been repealed, and by the 
Act of 27th, February, 1801, concerning the District of Columbia, 
answered that the Circuit Court of the District had authority to issue the 
writ. 
The CHIEF-JUSTICE, in his dissenting opinion, conceded that, 
as the office of Postmaster-General is not created by the Constitution, this 
officer is subject to any supervision or control which the wisdom of 
Congress might deem right. That it was, therefore, his duty to credit the 
relators in the manner provided, and that, upon his failure to do so, a 
proper case for the issuance of the writ of mandamus was presented. But 
he denied the authority of the Circuit Court of the District to issue this 
writ. His reasoning was as follows: 
1. The Circuit Courts of the United States for the States had, 
admittedly, no power to issue this writ. 
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2. No reason of policy or public convenience could be assigned 
for giving to the Circuit Court of the District a power denied to the Circuit 
Courts of the States. 
3. It follows that those who maintain that the Circuit Court of 
the District possessed the power, must show distinctly the language under 
which it was conferred, and they failed to do this. 
A. For the first section of the Act of 27th February, 1801, 
which enacted that the laws of Maryland, as they then existed, should be 
in force in that part of the District, etc., did not do it for two reasons: (a) 
In Maryland, at that time, this writ issued only from its highest court, the 
General Court. Therefore the adoption of the law of this State could not 
give the Circuit Court for the District the power to issue this writ as an 
incident to its general jurisdiction over cases at common law. (b) Besides, 
the notion of a State court having the power to issue this writ to a Federal 
officer was untenable. 
B. If it be said that the authority may be found in the! third 
section of this Act of 27th of February, 1801, giving all the powers then 
vested in the Circuit Courts, which at that time possessed the right to 
issue this writ under the Act of 13th February, 1801, since repealed, two 
answers are given to this contention: 
1. As the Act of the 27th February did not refer by words to 
the powers given by the Act of the 13th February, its obvious meaning 
was that the powers of the Circuit Court of the District should be 
measured by the existing powers of the Circuit Courts as generally 
established; what was intended was uniformity of jurisdiction. 
2.Even if the powers of the Circuit Court of the District are to 
be regulated by the repealed Act of 13th February, 1801, the result will 
not be different. The third section of the Act of 27th February, 1801, gives 
the Circuit Court of the District “all the powers vested by law in the Circuit 
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Courts”; while the fifth section enumerates the matters of which it shall 
have cognizance. Powers and cognizance have here a different meaning, 
the word powers being employed to denote the process, the modes of 
proceeding, which the courts are authorized to use in the exercise of their 
jurisdiction in the cases committed to their cognizance. But these powers 
are given by reference to preceding laws, so that we are carried back to 
the Act of 1789 to learn what they were. And on turning to this Act, we 
find the power given to the Supreme Court to issue the writ of mandamus 
“to persons holding office under the authority of the United States,” but 
no such power is given to the Circuit Courts. 
Moreover, as the fifth section of the Act of 27th February, 
1801, specified the cases of which the Circuit Court of this District should 
have cognizance, if there be found any substantial difference in the 
jurisdictions defined in the two laws under consideration, the just 
inference is that the legislature intended them to be different, and that the 
Circuit Court of the District was not intended to have the same jurisdiction 
given to the others. 
This inference would be legitimate in comparing laws 
establishing different courts, and becomes almost irresistible when we 
reflect that the laws were passed within a few days of each other, and 
probably were under consideration at the same time. 
Nor are there any reasons of policy which should induce the 
court to infer an intention to confer this authority when the words of the 
law do not require it. Officers of the General Government are found, in all 
the States, required by law to do acts which are merely ministerial, and in 
which the private rights of individuals are concerned. And there would be 
at least as much reason for conferring the power to issue this writ on the 
Circuit Courts of the several States as on the Circuit Court of the District 
of Columbia. 
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This dissenting opinion exhibits in a high degree the ability of 
the CHIEF-JUSTICE to present an argument upon a technical point, with 
the nicest precision of reasoning, the closest application of the rules for 
the exposition of statutes, and the fullest and fairest examination of the 
grounds upon which the opposing argument is based. It is difficult to 
escape from the conclusion arrived at, that the Circuit Court of the District 
had no authority to issue the writ of mandamus; but when we come to 
examine a point referred to by Justice CATRON 1 in his dissenting opinion, 
the argument against this authority almost possesses the value of 
certainty. The reference is as follows: The case of Marbury vs. Madison2 
was brought before the Supreme Court in 1803, at a time when the 
warmth of party feeling was so great as to induce an application for the 
issuance of this writ against Mr. Madison, at that time Secretary of State. 
And yet Chief-Justice MARSHALL having ruled, that although the case was 
a proper one for the issue of the writ, and spoke of the act of withholding 
the commission of the justice who applied for the writ as violative of a 
vested legal right, he decided against the power of the Supreme Court to 
issue the writ. But he said, in speaking of the necessity of a remedy: “The 
Government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws and not of men; it will certainly cease to deserve this 
appellation if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal 
right.”3 And yet no department of the government—to use Judge 
CATRON’S words—judicial tribunal, or law officer of the United States 
apprehended at that time, or for more than thirty years afterwards, that 
an appropriate remedy then existed in the Circuit Court of the District of 
Columbia, although the legislation of 1801 was recent and fresh in every 
one’s memory. 
                                                 
1 See his dissenting opinion in the Appendix to 13 Peters, 607. 
2 I Cranch, 49 
3 Marbury vs. Madison, I Cranch, 59. 
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A suit between two sovereign States upon a question of 
boundary came up at the same term1, in which a majority of the court 
held, that as this was a civil controversy between the parties in regard to 
the locality of a topographical point, and as questions of boundary had 
been frequently made the subject of bills in equity, the case was plainly 
comprehended by the language of the Constitution giving power to the 
Federal courts to entertain jurisdiction of controversies between States. 
The objection that the decree of the court could not be executed without 
an Act of Congress, was without force, for the reasons given. 
The CHIEE-JUSTICE dissented upon the ground that the 
question was not a judicial one, as Rhode Island claimed no right of 
property in the soil of the territory in controversy; it was, therefore, a 
political question. The cause was presented in various shapes, from time 
to time, and finally decided in favor of the State of Massachusetts.2 
While in my judgment the objection to the jurisdiction made 
by the CHIEF-JUSTICE was, perhaps, not well taken, undoubtedly Justice 
BALDWIN, in delivering the opinion of the court, said many things 
unnecessary for its support and that might have been questioned, and so 
thought Justice BARBOUR.3 Justice STORY did not sit. 
And almost immediately afterwards,4 in another branch of the 
cause, the court said that it did not put its decision, sustaining its 
jurisdiction, upon the ground of the State of Massachusetts having 
appeared in the cause; and that it was not to be understood as being 
ruled by the court that that State had concluded herself by voluntarily 
appearing, or that if she had not appeared the court would not have 
assumed jurisdiction. In fact, the State of Massachusetts was allowed to 
                                                 
1 State of Rhode Island vs. State of Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657. 
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withdraw her appearance. From this last opinion Justice BALDWIN 
dissented. 
A short but instructive case,1 turning upon the construction of 
the Act of Assemby of the State of Maryland of 1791, by which that State 
ceded to the United States that part of the District of Columbia lying 
within its territorial limits, may be briefly adverted to. It was held, the 
CHIEF-JUSTICE giving the opinion, that as the government had accepted 
the cession made by this State law, the conditions Contained in it made 
part of the contract between the parties; and consequently the laws of 
Maryland and the jurisdiction of its courts continued in force until 
Congress took upon itself the government of the District. And as it was 
uncertain when the United States would assume jurisdiction, it must have 
been foreseen that whenever that event should happen, many suits would 
be found pending in the State courts, it could not have been the intention 
that such suits should abate, and that suitors who had rightfully instituted 
proceedings in the State courts should, immediately upon assumption of 
jurisdiction by the Federal Government, be compelled to abandon the 
State tribunals and begin anew in the courts of the District. 
The following cases2 are mentioned, because they settle an 
interesting principle in regard to the tenure of certain) offices held under 
the General Government. It was ruled that it was not the intention of the 
Constitution that those offices which are denominated inferior should be 
held for life, and that in the absence of constitutional or statutory 
provision, the power of removal is incident to the power of appointment; 
and that as clerks of the District Courts of the United States fell within this 
category, and were removable by the judges of those courts, the Supreme 
Court could not entertain any inquiry into the grounds of removal. 
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We must now notice a question of considerable importance, 
which both early and late engaged the attention of this court, involving 
not only the right of corporations to make contracts outside the territorial 
limits of the country from the laws of which they derived their being, with 
the consequent power of suing in foreign countries, but their right to sue 
at all, by reason of citizenship, in the Federal courts. The Constitution, as 
we know, in the article vesting the judicial power of the United States in 
the Federal courts, extended it to controversies between citizens of 
different States.1 The question arose very early, whether a corporation 
created under the laws of one State could sue a citizen of another State 2; 
and it was held that in such a question the court might look to the 
character of the persons composing the corporation, and if it appeared 
that they were citizens of another State, and the fact was set forth by 
proper averments, the corporation might sue in its corporate name in the 
courts of the United States. This decision, made at first with hesitating 
diffidence, was affirmed in the case in 13 Peters, acquired greater 
strength each time it was presented, and finally, while Chief-Justice 
TANEY still presided in the court, attained to a robustness of vitality that 
enabled it to defy all assaults upon it, even when made under averments 
which might have been founded in fact. In the cases now to be noticed 3 
certain principles were asserted in a compact, well-reasoned opinion 
delivered by Chief-Justice TANEY,4 which is remarkable in its statement of 
the law, as well in what it denies as in what it affirms of the arguments of 
the very eminent counsel—Messieurs Ogden, Sergeant, and Webster—who 
represented the different plaintiffs in error. Thus, in particular, while it 
concedes that the citizenship of the corporators will be considered so far 
as it concerns the question of jurisdiction, it dismisses with unanswerable 
                                                 
1 Constitution. Article III., section 2. 
2 U. States vs. Deveaux, 5 Cranch, 61. 
 
3 Bank vs. Earle, Bank vs. Primrose, Railroad Co. vs. Earle, 13 Peters, 
519.  
4 13 Peters, 584-597. 
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force of reasoning the pretention that not the corporate powers of the 
company contracting, but the powers and rights of its individual 
corporators will be regarded. These principles are as follows: A 
corporation may sue in the Federal courts, where the citizenship of its 
members justifies it, and the fact is set forth by proper averments. While 
it is true that it can have no legal existence outside of the boundaries of 
the sovereignty by which it is created, and must dwell in the place of its 
creation, still its existence may be recognized in other places, and it may 
deal outside of the country of its creation, where it is so recognized by the 
law of the nation where the dealing takes place. Courts of justice have 
always expounded and executed contracts thus made, according to the 
laws of the places in which they were made; provided those laws were not 
repugnant to the laws or policy of their own country. This is the usual 
comity of nations. The States of the Union are sovereign; and both history 
and the events of daily occurrence show that they have adopted towards 
each other the laws of comity in their fullest extent, and) we find proof in 
the legislation of Congress of the general understanding that by the law of 
comity between the) States corporations chartered by one State are 
permitted to make contracts in other States. As a part of this) comity 
includes the right to sue in the courts of a foreign nation, the same law of 
comity prevails among the several sovereignties of the Union. When the 
policy of a State is manifest, the courts of the United States are bound to 
notice it as a part of its code of laws, and to declare all contracts, in the 
State repugnant to it illegal and void. 
These principles of practical political wisdom of which this 
outline has been made, although commanding universal assent at present, 
were by no means received with easy acquiescence half a century ago. In 
the Supreme Court itself there was not unanimity of opinion, for Justice 
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MCKINLEY dissented in part. The decision itself was reviewed and 
confirmed a few years later.1 
Pursuing the subject of the citizenship of the members of a 
corporation, and the proper mode of averring it, we finally reach a point in 
which the court decided2 that a naked averment that a certain company 
was a citizen of a State was sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Circuit 
Court of the United States, because the company was incorporated by a 
public statute of the State which the court was judicially bound to notice. 
And we find the CHIEF-JUSTICE,3 towards the close of his long career, his 
judicial light still burning brightly, reviewing all the cases showing the 
progress of the doctrine, and deciding that a suit by or against a 
corporation in its corporate name must be presumed to be a suit by or 
against citizens of the State which created it; and no averment or 
evidence to the contrary is admissible for the purpose of withdrawing the 
suit from the jurisdiction of a court of the United States. 
The growth and development of this doctrine have been 
interesting to trace and consider, and afford an excellent illustration of the 
time-honored maxim, in fictione juris semper exist it aequitas; since it 
might in many cases have been difficult, if not impossible, to establish the 
citizenship of the different corporators in such manner as to be free from 
all technical objection to the jurisdiction. 
Many cases in which the subject attempted to be treated in 
this address is more or less touched upon must necessarily be laid aside, 
by reason of the paramount importance of others, which should receive a 
full, and occasionally a somewhat elaborate, discussion. Several such are 
to be found in the fourteenth volume of Peters’ Reports, and I extract one 
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2 Covington Drawbridge Co. vs. Shepherd, 20 Howard, 227. 
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which, from its peculiarity deserves a passing notice, and in which Chief-
Justice TANEY lays down, tersely and compactly, the rules by which it was 
decided. In Bank of Alexandria vs. Dyer1 it was held that the county of 
Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, cannot be regarded as standing in 
the same relation to the county of Washington in the same district that 
the States of the Union occupy to each other. These counties constitute 
together the territory of Columbia, united under one territorial 
government; and residents of the county of Alexandria are not beyond 
seas in relation to the county of Washington, although, on a proper 
construction of the Maryland statute of limitations, the words beyond seas 
are equivalent to the words without the jurisdiction of the State. 
The case of United States vs. Morris2 involved the construction 
of an act of Congress prohibiting the slave trade, and for several reasons 
deserves consideration here. Chief-justice TANEY, in delivering the opinion 
of the court, said that while, in expounding a penal statute, the court 
certainly would not extend it beyond the plain meaning of its words, yet 
the evident intention of the legislature ought not to be defeated by a 
forced and overstrained construction. The question was whether a vessel 
was “employed or made use of,” within the meaning of the act of Ioth 
May, 1800, in the transportation or carrying of slaves, etc., while she was 
on her outward voyage for the purpose of taking on board a cargo of) 
slaves, but before any slaves were received on board. He held that the 
vessel was so employed, because she was engaged for the purpose, being 
under contract or orders to do this particular work. And his reasoning was 
illustrated by analogies drawn from other Acts of Congress. It is hardly 
necessary to add that this decision was unanimous. 
An interesting phase of the controversy between the States of 
Rhode Island and Massachusetts, which has been before mentioned, is 
presented and ruled in an opinion of the CHIEF-JUSTICE, to the effect that 
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the same rules of limitation which are applied to suits between private 
individuals cannot be enforced in controversies between political 
communities. Accordingly a demurrer to the bill, setting up a prescriptive 
title by possession, was overruled, and the defendant ordered to answer.1 
The case of Groves vs. Slaughter2 presents an interesting 
question growing out of the relation of slavery. By the Constitution of 
Mississippi, adopted in 1832, the introduction of slaves into that State, as 
merchandise or for sale, was prohibited after May I, 1833. No law on the 
subject of this prohibition was passed until 1837. Certain slaves had been 
imported in 1835, as merchandise or for sale by a non-resident of the 
State, and a note given by the purchaser in payment. Upon suit in the 
Circuit Court of Louisiana upon the note, it was defended on the ground 
that it was void, as being in violation of the constitutional provision. It was 
held, however, by the court, that the Constitution required an act of the 
legislature to carry it into effect, and that no law having been passed for 
the purpose before 1837, the sale was valid and recovery could be had 
upon the note. The judgment was affirmed, the opinion of the Supreme 
Court being delivered by Justice THOMPSON, from which Justices STORY 
and MCKINLEY dissented. 
The case deserves notice, not only from the nature of the 
points contended for and decided, but from the ability with which they 
were presented by the distinguished counsel engaged in the cause. On 
behalf of the defendant in error were found Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster, 
styled by their colleague Mr. Jones, the Ajax and Achilles of the bar; and 
Mr. Webster contended very earnestly that under the provisions of the 
Federal Constitution giving to Congress the power to regulate commerce 
the Act of the Mississippi Legislature was unconstitutional. It was held: 
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1. That the decisions of the Mississippi courts upon the 
construction of the clause of their own Constitution, were not so fixed and 
settled as to preclude the court from regarding it an open question. 
2. That the Constitution of Mississippi did not, proprio vigore, 
execute itself, but required legislation for the purpose; and that, 
consequently, the sale and purchase of the slave was valid. 
3. That this view of the case made it unnecessary to inquire 
whether the article of the State Constitution was repugnant to the clause 
of the Federal Constitution referred to. 
Chief-Justice TANEY, concurring in the conclusion reached by 
the court, said he had not intended to express an opinion upon a question 
raised in the argument in relation to the power of Congress to regulate the 
traffic in slaves between the different States, because the court had 
thought that the point was not involved in the case before it. But as one of 
the judges had expressed an opinion upon it, he was not willing, by 
remaining silent, to leave any doubt as to his own.1 In his judgment the 
power over this subject was exclusively with the States; and each of them 
had a right to decide for itself whether it would or would not allow persons 
of that description to be brought within its limits from another State, 
either for sale or for any other purpose; and he thought that the action of 
the several States upon the subject could not be controlled by Congress, 
either by virtue of its power to regulate commerce, or by virtue of any 
other power conferred by the Federal Constitution. He declined expressing 
any opinion upon another question of constitutional law brought into 
discussion, but which was one step further out of the case before the 
court. This was whether the grant of power to the General Government to 
regulate commerce carried with it an implied prohibition to the States to 
make any regulations upon the subject, even although they should be 
consistent with those made by Congress. 
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Justice BALDWIN, whose opinion should be carefully 
considered,1 was of opinion that the power of Congress “to regulate 
commerce among the several States,” was exclusive of any interference 
by the States, and had been conclusively settled by the solemn decisions 
of the court in Gibbons vs. Ogden,2 and in Brown vs. Maryland3 
In the opinion of the writer of these remarks, while the CHIEF-
JUSTICE was probably correct so far as the question of sale and purchase 
was concerned, he went perhaps too far when, in his desire to uphold the 
rights of the States, he undertook to say that each of them had a right to 
decide for itself whether it would or would not allow persons of this 
description to be brought within its limits either for sale, or for any other 
purpose. This would have prohibited the transit of slaves from one State 
where slavery was permitted to another such State, if accident or distress 
should have compelled the owner to touch at any place within a State 
where slavery did not exist, -which is well put by Judge BALDWIN in his 
opinion. The CHIEF-JUSTICE’S remarks show, however, his anxiety to 
leave the whole subject of this peculiar domestic relation to the exclusive 
control of the States themselves. We shall have occasion, further on in our 
remarks, again to consider and call attention to his views in this respect. 
The case of Martin vs. Waddell4 involves a question of public 
law of so much interest, and was presented with so much force, both in 
the arguments of the distinguished counsel in the cause as well as in the 
opinion of the court delivered by Chief-Justice TANEY, and in the 
dissenting opinion of Justice THOMPSON, that I do not feel justified in 
passing it by. It arose under a conflict between two alleged grantees from 
the State of New Jersey, of certain mud-flats covered by the waters of the 
Bay of Amboy. From several propositions asserted in the judgment of the 
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court, the following may be selected as sufficiently indicating the nature of 
the controversy, and the line of judicial reasoning adopted and leading to 
the conclusions reached: 
1. The right of the king of Great Britain to make a grant of the 
soil beneath the navigable waters of Raritan River and Bay, where the tide 
ebbs and flows, included in the territory of the colony granted to the Duke 
of York, cannot, at this day, be questioned. 
2. When the Revolution took place, the people of each State 
became sovereign, and held an absolute right to their navigable waters 
and the soil under them, subject only to the rights since surrendered to 
the General Government. Grants, therefore, made by the States must be 
tried and determined by different principles from those which apply to 
grants of the British Crown, which are construed strictly. 
3. While rivers, bays, and arms of the sea undoubtedly passed 
to the Crown’s grantee, yet the public and common rights of fishery in 
navigable waters required very plain language to be included in the grant 
under the charter to the Duke of York. 
4. The land under the navigable waters within the limit of the 
charter passed to the grantee as a royalty incident to the powers of 
government; and when a surrender was made by the proprietors, in 1702, 
to the Crown of all powers, authorities, and privileges of and concerning 
the government of the province, the rights in dispute were included. They 
were restored in the same condition in which they came to the Duke of 
York. 
5. When the people of New Jersey took the sovereignty into 
their hands, the prerogatives and royalties, including the rights in 
question, which had belonged either to the Crown or to the Parliament, 
vested immediately in this State. 
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6. The effect of the judgment of the highest court of New 
Jersey upon these questions is very great, and in a case free from 
reasonable doubt should be conclusive. 
The CHIEF-JUSTICE, after giving the history of the discovery 
of the country, the rules which applied to the ownership of the discovered 
country, and the grant by the Crown to the Duke of York, laid down the 
rules by which such grants were to be construed, which have been stated 
above. The great question was whether the dominion and property in the 
navigable waters of the province, and the soil under them, passed as part 
of the prerogative rights annexed to the political powers conferred upon 
the proprietary, or whether they were granted as private property to be 
parcelled out and sold to individuals for the benefit of the grantee. From a 
consideration of the laws and institutions of England, the history of the 
times, the object of the charter, the contemporaneous construction given 
to it, the usages under it for more than a century, it would seem that the 
title to the soil under the navigable rivers did not pass as private property, 
even under words apt for the purpose of the conveyance of such rights in 
ordinary grants. These rights remained in the dominion and ownership of 
the State, as part of the prerogative rights annexed to the political powers 
conferred upon the original proprietary grantee of the Crown to which the 
State had succeeded. 
Much, doubtless, may be urged in favor of this judgment of 
the Supreme Court, which came to the same conclusion that had been 
reached by the highest court of the State of New Jersey. Nevertheless, it 
may be said that the dissenting opinion of Justice THOMPSON,1 concurred 
in by Justice BALDWIN, puts the argument very powerfully against the 
pretensions of the State of New Jersey whose claim in the present case 
appeared to be inconsistent with its own course of practice. It is believed 
that the practice of the land offices of several of the States is in 
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accordance with the views expressed in the opinion of Justice THOMPSON, 
and that the title to the soil lying under the bed of navigable rivers has not 
infrequently been granted to private individuals. This case coming up 
again, the same judgment was pronounced, Martin vs. Waddell being 
affirmed.1 
In the famous case of Prigg vs. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania,2 in which all the judges appear to have agreed that the Act 
of Assembly of Pennsylvania of the 25th March, 1826, under which the 
plaintiff in error was convicted of kidnapping, was unconstitutional, the 
CHIEF-JUSTICE dissented from the view taken in the opinion of a majority 
of the court, delivered by Justice STORY, that the power of legislation in 
relation to fugitives from labor was exclusive in the Congress of the United 
States. With much force of reasoning he endeavored3 to show that as it 
was a duty injoined upon the individual States to protect and inforce the 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and as the right 
in question, of reclaiming fugitive slaves, stood on the same grounds and 
was given by similar words, it should be governed by the same principles. 
Justices THOMPSON and DANIEL concurred in the dissent upon this point. 
As this case is by many constitutional lawyers looked upon 
with disfavor, it may not be amiss to give an analysis of the opinions of 
the judges who sat in the cause, and to refer to the legislation which took 
place not very long afterwards. First, although the doctrine of the case is 
sometimes said to have made an unjustifiable assault upon the integrity of 
State legislation in the exercise of an undoubted right of providing proper 
police regulations for the protection of its citizens, it is worthy of note that 
ALL THE JUDGES CONCURRED in opinion that the law under which the 
plaintiff in error was indicted, was unconstitutional. A majority of the court 
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held that the power was exclusive in Congress to legislate upon the clause 
of the Constitution in question. Three of the judges, including Justice 
THOMPSON, of New York, thought that the States might legislate in aid of 
the objects intended to be secured by the constitutional provision; and 
one judge, BALDWIN, believed that legislation from any source was 
unnecessary, since the Constitution conferred upon the owners of fugitive 
slaves all the rights of seizure and removal which legislation could 
give.1On the other hand, Judge MCLEAN held, with much show of reason, 
that it was inadmissible to contend that the fugitive from labor could be 
removed by the person claiming him except in the manner pointed out by 
the Act of Congress, which the master was bound to pursue. He 
endeavored to show that there was no conflict between the Act of 
Congress and the State law in this respect, and remarked that the latter 
contained an important police regulation, the provisions of which were 
most valuable for the protection of its citizens. 
It might be rather inferred from this eminent judge’s remarks, 
notwithstanding the statement of Justice WAYNE already referred to, that 
although he did not dissent in terms from the judgment of the court, yet 
he thought there was no conflict between the State law and the Federal 
Constitution; and that had it not been that the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania was pro forma, and the case made up merely to 
bring the question before the Supreme Court of the United States, he 
might have expressed a more formal difference of opinion upon this point. 
By the Act of Congress of 18th September, 1850, commonly 
called the Fugitive Slave Law,2 it was attempted to meet some of the 
objections made to the decision just noticed, and to strengthen the rights 
and facilitate the remedies for the recovery of these fugitives from labor. 
It gave concurrent jurisdiction with the judges of the Federal courts to 
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commissions appointed to decide upon the claim of the owner of the 
alleged fugitive upon a warrant issued for his apprehension. It made it the 
duty of the owner, or his agent apprehending the fugitive, to take him 
forthwith before the judge or commissioner, whose duty it became to hear 
and determine the case in a summary manner, and to give a certificate of 
his judgment to the claimant. It forbade the testimony of the alleged 
fugitive to be admitted in evidence, and made the certificate of the person 
in whose favor it was granted authority for the purpose of removing the 
fugitive to the State from which he had escaped. It created stringent 
penalties for attempting to molest the claimant or rescue the fugitive from 
his custody, and it authorized such claimant, when he apprehended a 
rescue, to compel the officer making the arrest to retain the fugitive in his 
custody, for the purpose of removing him to the State whence he had 
fled. Notwithstanding that this law was obviously in the strict line of the 
constitutional provision upon the subject, and avoided the most obnoxious 
part of the decision just noticed, relating to the right of the claimant to 
seize and remove the alleged fugitive, wheresoever found, without judicial 
process at all, it met with strong opposition in its passage through the two 
branches of the Federal legislature, and after its passage, in its execution 
in many of the Northern States. In the State of Pennsylvania, in particular, 
it gave rise to a trial for high treason in a case where it was contended 
that there was a concerted plan to prevent its execution. 
In truth, the subject lay beyond the domain of legislative or 
judicial action. The feeling is so deep-seated in the hearts of men to 
comment upon unfavorably, and to prevent if possible the exercise of all 
authority distasteful to their passions or their prejudices, that it is 
impossible to reason with it, or even to contend against it, except by the 
exercise of physical force. Especially is this so in free countries, and 
particularly in one where the general level of intelligence is high, and the 
means for concerted action abundant by reason of the ability for the 
almost instantaneous propagation of the thoughts and opinions of the 
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general mass. In vain shall you attempt to appeal to the reason or 
patriotism of men thus aroused. You may demonstrate with unerring truth 
that the Constitution is incapable of more than one construction upon the 
point in question, and you may show with the clearness of the noonday 
sun that this construction favors the obnoxious practice. You may further 
prove from the history of the times, with an accuracy which admits of no 
challenge, that the compact by which the several States were fused into 
one united body would never have taken place without the concession 
which is found enacted into words in the instrument of union. You may 
talk of duty, justice, fairness, submission to the laws; but you talk against 
the wind in doing so. When men’s passions are aroused they no longer 
reason. Passion is at one end of the line, reason at the other, and the 
latter is always outweighed by the former. Men simply rely upon their 
feelings as their principle of action; and especially do they do this when 
they can indulge in the luxury of gratifying these feelings without expense 
to their pockets. Adam Smith wrote, nearly a hundred years ago, that the 
resolution by which our ancestors in Pennsylvania set at liberty their negro 
slaves, must satisfy us that their number then could not have been very 
great in that State, and before making this statement he had 
demonstrated “that the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost 
only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any kind of labor.” 
The principle to which the great philosopher of modern times 
attempted to reduce all the motives and actions of human conduct, that of 
UTILITY, is always the safest, and indeed the only guide to appeal to in 
the resolution of questions of this kind. If the slaveholding States had 
believed that in the long run the Union was more advantageous to them, 
even without the practical carrying into effect of the provision of the 
Constitution in question, they should not have attempted the enforcement 
of a provision so unpopular in the North. Had the people of the non-
slaveholding States regarded the value of the Union as superior to the 
enforcement of an unpopular provision, they would readily have 
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acquiesced in submission to its requirements. The fault on both sides was 
a blunder of proportion in their moral and mental vision. The inestimable 
advantages of the Union not being brought instantly to their 
apprehension, were relegated to distant consideration, or rather were 
placed out of view altogether. The immediate inconveniences—on the one 
side, of loss of service of a few runaway slaves, and on the other, of 
restoring to bondage those who had successfully escaped from it—were 
magnified with an intensity out of all importance to their value. And the ill-
feeling thus created led to the conflict, from which we have, it is to be 
hoped, emerged, with wiser resolves for the future, and with more 
permanent strength of devotion to a government which alone can unite 
and harmonize all the energies of the people of this continent. 
Let us continue in the path of our progress. 
It seems a little odd that the very next case1 in the Reports is 
one accidentally omitted by the former reporter, in which the CHIEF-
JUSTICE, delivering the unanimous opinion of the court, pronounced 
judgment in favor of the freedom of a slave. The case was this: A testatrix 
bequeathed certain slaves to a legatee, with a proviso that he should not 
carry them out of the state of M., or sell them to any one; in either of 
which events the testatrix willed that the said negroes should be free for 
life. The legatee sold one of them, and on a petition being filed by him for 
freedom in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, it was held he 
became free. This judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court, which 
ruled that the bequest of freedom to a slave stood, under the laws of 
Maryland, on the same principles with a bequest over to a third person, 
and was a specific legacy. The proviso was not a restraint upon alienation 
inconsistent with the right to the property bequeathed, but was a 
conditional limitation of freedom, and took effect the moment the slave 
was sold. It is interesting to look at the line both of statute laws and 
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decisions in States in which this institution then prevailed, given in the 
argument of the counsel for the petitioner, the pervading spirit of which is 
in favor of the claim for freedom. 
Where the extent and nature of existing remedies are so 
materially changed by statute as to impair the rights and interests of the 
parties to a contract, the Supreme Court has steadily adhered to the 
ruling that this is as much a violation of the compact as if directly 
overturned. In Bronson vs. Kinzie1 the CHIEF-JUSTICE applied this 
principle, while conceding the difficulty of drawing the line between an 
immaterial modication of the remedy, and the case of the remedy being 
so incumbered with conditions as to render it impracticable to pursue. In 
the case in hand, it was held that a State law passed subsequently to the 
execution of a mortgage declaring that the mortgagor’s equitable estate 
should not be extinguished for twelve months after a sale under a decree, 
and preventing any sale unless two-thirds of the amount of an appraised 
value should be bid therefore, is within the clause of the Federal 
Constitution prohibiting a State from passing a law impairing the 
obligation of a contract. Justice MCLEAN dissented, thinking these stay 
laws capricious, but not violative of the obligation of the contract. 
A somewhat extraordinary attempt to deplete the public 
treasury made in a case about to be mentioned,2 which was, however, 
only temporarily successful, arose under the following circumstances: The 
French Government, had agreed by treaty to pay certain sums of money 
to our government, and after conference between the Secretary of the 
Treasury and the officers of the Bank of the United States, then a 
government institution, it was thought that the best mode of collecting the 
amount would be through the drawing of a bill, for the instalment then 
due, by the Secretary upon the Minister of Finance of the kingdom of 
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France, the bank to become the purchaser thereof and present it for 
payment through its foreign correspondent. This was accordingly done, 
and the bill not having been paid upon presentation, it was protested, and 
taken up for the honor of the bank by its French correspondents. In an 
account afterwards stated between the bank and our government, the 
bank claimed by way of offset the amount of fifteen per cent, allowed as 
damages to the holder of a bill under the Maryland statute against the 
drawer, upon non-payment thereof. This claim was refused in the Circuit 
Court, but allowed by the judgment of the Supreme Court, upon error to 
the lower court, the opinion being delivered by Justice MCLEAN.1 AS the 
CHIEF-JUSTICE when Attorney-General had given an opinion adverse to 
the bank’s claim, he did not sit during the argument; but thinking it due to 
him-self to state at length the reasons which still caused him’ to believe 
that the claim was illegal and unjust, he then presented them, and they 
are to be found in the appendix to this volume of Reports.2 
In this elaborate presentation of the views of the CHIEF-
JUSTICE it was shown at considerable length, and with much clearness of 
statement, that the bank’s claim for damages was not based upon a bill of 
exchange in the usual and ordinary sense, since our government had no 
right to require the French Government to pay in this way any instalment 
of moneys due under the treaty. And so conscious was our government of 
this at the time, that, in addition to the bill, it gave to the cashier of the 
bank a special power of attorney to receive the amount of the bill from the 
French Government. It was equally clear that that government was not 
bound to repay these damages to the United States. Nor was the 
intervention of the bank that of the purchaser of a bill at all, but as the 
fiscal agent for our government, as was abundantly shown from the 
correspondence between its officers and the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Nor had the Maryland statute imposing the fifteen per cent, damages as a 
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penalty upon the drawer of the bill for its non-payment upon presentation, 
any application to the United States as the drawer of this alleged bill. It 
would be the first instance in the history of nations in which a sovereignty 
had imposed upon itself a penalty in order to compel it to be honest in its 
dealings. In England the king is not included in an act of Parliament, and 
the State of Maryland would not have been liable to this demand. 
Moreover, as the bill was drawn upon a particular fund, the individual 
drawer would not have been liable, as the draft for this reason was not 
technically a bill of exchange. Both the Secretary of the Treasury and the 
bank knew at the time of the drawing that France, being a constitutional 
government, could not apply any money to this or any particular purpose 
without a legislative appropriation. Finally, the bank was not the owner or 
holder of the bill in the sense in which damages are given to a holder of a 
draft for non-payment upon its presentation, since it had not been put to 
the inconvenience which the holder of a draft in a foreign country suffers 
from its non-payment, and for which the damages are imposed by way of 
penalty. 
No apology is needed for calling attention to this case, as the 
views of the CHIEF-JUSTICE give a remarkably lucid summary of the law 
upon a question which entered the domain of the law of nations, and 
involved many interesting points of public law. It is proper to add that 
these views were subsequently sustained when the case again came 
before the court.1 
I now desire to draw attention, briefly, to a case which arose 
under the Tariff Compromise Act,2 for the sound views expressed in it by 
Chief-Justice TANEY, as to the difference between the functions of the 
law-maker and the law-expounder. It was held that in construing Acts of 
Congress the court will not consider the motives, opinions, or reasons 
expressed by individual members in debate, but, if necessary, will look to 
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the public history of the times in which the law was passed. Nor should 
the judiciary give an over-technical construction to doubtful words, which 
would make the legislature inconsistent with itself. 
In the case of Searight vs. Stokes1 the construction of the Acts 
of Congress ceding to Pennsylvania that part of the Cumberland road 
within that State, and the Acts of Pennsylvania accepting the surrender, 
came up for construction, and the Supreme Court held, through the 
CHIEF-JUSTICE, that in interpreting these acts, the character of the high 
contracting parties, the relation in which they stood to one another, and 
the objects they had in view, must all be considered. From this point of 
view it could not have been supposed that it was the intention that our 
General Government was to pay tolls upon the mail matter carried over 
the road. But upon all other property, although contained in the same 
vehicles, and upon all persons, except those engaged in transporting the 
mails, traveling in the same, the State might lawfully impose the same 
charges imposed upon other persons and vehicles of the same kind. There 
were dissents from this ruling, expressed by Justices MCLEAN and 
DANIEL. 
In a case arising out of the cession of that part of the road 
lying within the limits of Ohio, and the State legislation accepting the 
same,2 upon the presentation of the same substantial question, the court 
adhered to the views already expressed, and decided that tolls charged 
upon passengers travelling in the mail coaches not charged against 
passengers travelling in other coaches, were against the contract, and 
void, and that while the frequency of the departure of coaches carrying 
the mails was not an abuse of the privilege of the United States, yet an 
unnecessary division of the mail matter among a number of coaches, was. 
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A check was again given to extreme views of construction in 
regard to the impairment of the obligation of contracts by State 
legislation, in a case now to be noticed.1 The facts were as follows: The 
State of Maryland passed an act directing a large money subscription to 
the capital stock of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, provided 
“that if the company shall not locate its road in the manner provided in 
the act, it should forfeit $1,000,000 to the use of W. County.” By a 
subsequent act, so much of the first act as made it the duty of the 
company to construct the road by the route prescribed was repealed, and 
the penalty was remitted and released. Suit was brought for the penalty, 
and the Supreme Court held, through the CHIEF-JUSTICE, that the second 
Act of Assembly did not impair the obligation of a contract, as the clause 
of the first act was simply the imposition of a penalty by the State, which 
it had the right to remit, even after suit for its recovery had been begun.  
The reasoning of the CHIEF-JUSTICE is marked by breadth of 
view, intelligent discrimination, and the application of sound principles of 
law to the case. 
The decision of the court in United States vs. Rogers2 gives a 
compendium of the principles asserted by our government in regard to the 
territory included within the limits of the United States, and the aboriginal 
inhabitants thereof. These principles, set forth by Chief-Justice TANEY, in 
a brief, lucid, and forcible opinion, may be stated as follows: I. The 
territory was divided and parcelled out, as if it had been vacant land at 
the time of its discovery. This question is no longer an open one, but, if it 
were— 2. It would be one for the law-making and political departments of 
the government, not for the judiciary. 3. The Indian tribes residing within 
the territorial limits of the United States are subject to their authority. 4. 
The Act of 30th June, 1834, section 25, extends the United States laws 
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over the Indian country, with a proviso that they shall not include 
punishment for crimes committed by one Indian against the person or 
property of another. 5. But this proviso does not embrace the case of a 
white man adopted into an Indian tribe at mature age. 6. The treaty with 
the Cherokees made in 1835, is explained and controlled by the Act of 
30th June, 1834. 7. Hence, a plea set up by a white man adopted in the 
manner stated, that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit Court, is invalid. 
The case of United States vs. King1 contains so excellent a 
statement of the principles by which our courts should be controlled in 
dealing with titles derived under foreign governments, that I do not feel 
disposed to pass it over, even at the risk of adding unduly to these 
remarks. It arose under an alleged grant from French officials before the 
purchase of Louisiana by our government. After the court had decided that 
a certificate! of survey alleged to have been given by Trudeau on the 14th 
June, 1797, was antedated and fraudulent, Chief-Justice TANEY remarked, 
that while it was undoubtedly true in a general sense that where spurious 
instruments are delivered by a government to persons dealing with it on 
their faith, they cannot afterwards be impeached by such government, 
and that fraud should not be imputed to the officials of a foreign 
government where their conduct has not been questioned by the authority 
under which they were acting and to which they were responsible, yet this 
proposition must not be limited to the case where no other interest is 
concerned, except that of such government and its own citizens. There is, 
moreover, a prima facies in favor of the honesty and good faith of the 
official acts of an officer acting in the line of his duty. But the doctrine of 
comity usually extended to tribunals and officers of foreign governments, 
cannot be pushed to the extent of claiming for them a total exemption 
from inquiry, when their acts affect the rights of another nation and its 
citizens. The United States have never acknowledged this immunity from 
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inquiry; and in every law | establishing American tribunals to examine into 
the validity of titles to land in Louisiana and Florida derived from the 
Government of Spain, they are expressly injoined to inquire whether the 
documents produced in support of the claim are antedated or fraudulent. 
It is the duty of the court to hear and determine whether the certificate in 
question, although recognized and sanctioned by the colonial authorities 
of Spain, is antedated and made out either with or without their privity, in 
order to defraud the United States, and deprive them of land which 
rightfully belonged to them under the treaty. 
It cannot be seriously questioned that the rule laid down by 
the CHIEF-JUSTICE, although doubtless bearing hard occasionally upon 
innocent purchasers for value, contains the only true solution of the 
difficulties surrounding such grants; or, that to have sanctioned the course 
so earnestly contended for by the parties claiming under these spurious 
titles would not have been fraught with the gravest injustice to the rights 
of our own government and its grantees. 
The case came up again on a writ of error taken by the other 
side,1 and was very hotly contested; but the principles above enunciated 
were again affirmed by a closely divided court. 
I hope I may be pardoned for very briefly noticing the case of 
Hunt vs. Palao2 which presents an interesting point of practice, ruling that 
a writ of error will not lie to review the judgment of a defunct Territorial 
Court of Appeals, its proceedings being no longer in the possession of any 
court authorized to exercise judicial power over them. 
Nor may it be amiss to notice, in the same manner, the case 
of Barry vs. Mercein,3 in which it was decided that the Supreme Court has 
no appellate jurisdiction, where the Circuit Court of the Southern District 
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of New York refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus to bring up the body 
of an infant child, as the matter in dispute necessary to give jurisdiction 
must exceed in value $2,000, and such a controversy relates to a matter 
incapable of reduction to a pecuniary standard of value. 
Notice should here be taken of a subject frequently before the 
court, and upon which its different members seem to have entertained 
conflicting opinions: I mean the subject of State bankrupt or excise laws, 
and their operation beyond their territorial limits. In Cook vs. Moffat,1 it 
was held that a contract made in New York was not affected by the 
discharge of the debtor under the insolvent laws of Maryland, in which 
State the debtor resided, although the law was passed antecedently to the 
making of the contract. The opinion of the court was pronounced by 
Justice GRIER, who reviewed the prior decisions, and asserted that the 
doctrine to be extracted from them was as follows: 1. The States had 
authority to pass bankrupt laws; Provided, no system of bankruptcy was 
in force under Federal legislation; 2. Provided, such laws did not impair 
the obligation of contracts. 3. Hence, State bankrupt laws could not act 
upon contracts previously made; 4. or beyond their own territory. 
Several of the other judges gave opinions, expressing views 
more or less in conformance with those expressed in this opinion; and 
TANEY, C. J.,2 concurring in thinking that the States could pass bankrupt 
laws in the absence of Federal legislation, thought also that such laws 
when passed could not be regarded as violative of the Constitution 
because they might operate extra-territorially. Such operation was 
exclusively a matter of comity. He referred to the opinion of Judge 
JOHNSON, in Ogden vs. Saunders, and to that delivered by Judge STORY, 
in Boyle vs. Zacharie,3 as giving the correct history of the former opinion. 
The CHIEF-JUSTICE’S views upon this interesting question seem to be so 
                                                 
1 5 Howard, 295.  
2 5 Howard, 309-11. 
3 6 Peters, 641. 
 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
160
obviously correct that it is a matter of surprise that they did not receive 
the concurrence of the entire court. 
The great case of Waring vs. Clarke,1 in which it was held that 
the grant in the Constitution extending the judicial power “to all cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” is neither to be limited to, nor 
interpreted by, what were cases of admiralty jurisdiction in England at the 
time of the adoption of the Constitution, must be here chronologically 
referred to (1847), although the CHIEF-JUSTICE gave no opinion, simply 
concurring with the majority of the court, whose opinion was delivered by 
Justice WAYNE; which judgment, it may be said, has received the cordial 
approval of the profession, notwithstanding the learned and elaborate 
dissents from it at that time, and was the precursor of the extension of 
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of these courts over the waters of 
the great lakes. 
In the cases now about to be referred to, the first of a long 
series running in the same general direction, the constitutionality of State 
license laws imposing penalties upon the unlicensed retail sale of vinous or 
spirituous liquors, was considered, and to the extent of the legislation 
adopted by the States in question, established. Three cases, coming up 
from three several States, were considered together, and after a second 
argument, the judgments of the State courts were all affirmed. The cases 
will now be stated.2 
It was held that the license laws of these States providing 
under penalties that no person shall retail or sell vinous or spirituous 
liquors in a less quantity than (a certain number of gallons), unless they 
are first licensed, and that licenses shall not be granted when, in the 
opinion of the parties selected to grant them, the public good does not 
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require their granting, are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Federal Constitution, or of any Act of Congress under it. And that although 
in one case the purchase and sale was of liquors duly imported from a 
foreign country, and purchased from the original importer by the party 
indicted, and in another case the article sold was a barrel of American gin 
purchased in Massachusetts and carried coastwise to New Hampshire and 
there sold in the same barrel. 
Chief-Justice TANEY announced the decision of the court 
affirming the judgments of the respective State courts, saying that as the 
justices did not altogether agree in the principles upon which the cases 
were decided, he would proceed to state the grounds upon which he 
concluded in affirming the judgments. 
The two cases depended upon the same principles; the last 
case differed somewhat, but there were important principles common to 
all, which made it convenient to consider them together. His reasons were 
that the power of Congress to regulate commerce did not extend further 
than its regulation with foreign nations and among the States. Every State 
might regulate its own internal traffic according to its views of the interest 
and well-being of its citizens. He then reviewed Brown vs. Maryland, 12 
Wheaton, 419. In that case it was held that when a package sold by an 
importer passed into hands of a purchaser, it ceased to be an import, and 
might be taxed by the State; although so long as it remained in the hands 
of the importer, no State could either directly or indirectly impose any tax 
or burthen upon it. That decision he was then convinced was right. 
Applying this rule to the case before the court, no State has 
the right to prohibit the importation of spirits or distilled liquors, but it 
may act upon them after they are offered for sale by restraining the traffic 
in them. 
As to the State of New Hampshire, the question was whether a 
State is prohibited from making regulations of foreign commerce, or of 
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commerce with another State, although such regulations are confined to 
its own territory, and do not conflict with any law of Congress. The mere 
grant of power to the General Government cannot be construed to prohibit 
the exercise of power over the subject by the States. A State may, for 
protection of the health of its citizens, make just regulations, etc., unless 
in conflict with Federal legislation. The State Quarantine and Laws relating 
to pilotage were referred to in this connection. Former decisions of the 
Supreme Court were then considered, particularly the decision in Gibbons 
vs. Ogden. Cases of bankruptcy, militia, and naturalization were also 
considered. 
This opinion of Chief-Justice TANEY is a calm, judicial, and (in 
my opinion) convincing presentation of the entire subject. 
Justice MCLEAN, in the case against the State of 
Massachusetts, thought the case clear for affirmance. In the case against 
New Hampshire he was also for affirmance, and in the case against Rhode 
Island he was also for affirmance, although in his opinion he was 
somewhat inconsistent with the views expressed by him in Prigg vs. 
Pennsylvania, in 16 Peters, and perhaps in other cases. 
Justice CATRON was for affirmance of the judgments in all 
three cases, for reasons given by him. Justice DANIEL concurred in the 
decision of the court so far as it established the validity of the license laws 
of all three States; but he differed as to some points which he thought 
unnecessary for the decision. Justice NELSON concurred in the opinions 
delivered by the CHIEF-JUSTICE and Justice CATRON. Justice WOODBURY 
concurred in the conclusion reached as to the judgments in all the cases, 
but differed as to some of the views expressed. He seemed to concur in 
general, however, with the views of the CHIEF-JUSTICE, and of Justice 
CATRON. Justice GRIER concurred in the judgment in all the cases and 
generally with the views of Justice MCLEAN in the first case against 
Massachusetts. 
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In the celebrated case of Luther vs. Borden,1 in which was 
involved the right of the freemen of a State to change their form of 
government, a majority of the court, its opinion being delivered by the 
CHIEF-JUSTICE, held that this was a political question, and not the subject 
of judicial cognizance, and that the powers that be must be regarded as 
the lawful State government. After asserting the gravity of the case, the 
CHIEF-JUSTICE went on to say that it was in its nature of necessity a 
political and not a judicial one. If a State Court should enter upon such an 
inquiry, and come to the conclusion that the government under which it 
acted had been displaced, it would cease to be a court of justice, and 
incapable of pronouncing a decision upon the question. A court constituted 
under a State government admitted on all hands to be lawful, has 
established this principle, and the United States courts are bound to follow 
it. The old (charter) government must therefore be regarded as the lawful 
government of Rhode Island. Moreover, the President of the United States 
recognized the governor under the charter government as the executive 
power of the State. A question very similar arose in Martin vs. Mott, 12 
Wheaton, 29. The grounds of that decision were conclusive. 
It is difficult to see how any other view than the one presented 
in this opinion could be taken, without involving the subject in inextricable 
difficulties. There seems to be no escape from the conclusion reached by 
the majority of the court, although it may perhaps be conceded that from 
its adoption great hardships and some injustice might ensue. 
Nevertheless, it appears to us that the balance of convenience is very 
clearly on the side of the judgment of the Supreme Court. It is to be 
noticed, however, that Justice WOODBURY dissented in a very elaborate 
opinion, and that Justices CATRON, DANIEL, and McKINLEY were all 
absent. 
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I now recur to the judgment pronounced in the cases known 
as the Passenger Cases,1 in which four of the judges, including Chief-
Justice TANEY, dissented from the judgment of the Supreme Court which 
declared that the statutes of the States of New York and Massachusetts 
imposing taxes upon alien passengers arriving in the ports of those States 
were contrary to the laws and the Constitution of the United States. The 
opinion of the court was given by Judge MCLEAN, in which Judges WAYNE, 
CATRON, MCKINLEY, and GRIER, who all gave opinions, concurred. 
This case is so important, that a pretty full examination of it 
will probably not be deemed out of place. The dissent of four of the nine 
judges deserves close consideration not only from their individual 
eminence, but from the importance of the grounds upon which the 
dissenting opinion rests. The CHIEF-JUSTICE begins by considering the 
Massachusetts case and attempting to show the legality of the first two 
sections of its statute which require a State officer to board a vessel 
arriving within its limits, examine into the condition of its passengers, and 
if any lunatic, idiot, maimed, aged, or infirm person incompetent to 
maintain themselves be found on board, forbidding such passenger to land 
until the master, owner, or agent of the vessel shall give bond that no 
such person shall within ten years become a charge upon the State. The 
third section enacts that no alien passenger (other than those just 
mentioned) shall be permitted to land, until the master, owner, or agent 
shall pay to the boarding officer the sum of two dollars for each passenger 
so landing, the money so collected to be appropriated to the support of 
foreign paupers. This law, the CHIEF-JUSTICE asserts, is part of the 
pauper laws of the State and compels no one to pay the sum mentioned. 
The passenger can remain on board if he will. Nor is the money demanded 
of him. It is the captain or owner, etc., who is to pay it. First, can the 
Federal Government compel the several States to receive every person, or 
class of persons, whom it may he its policy or pleasure to admit? This 
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question lies at the foundation of the controversy; it is discussed fully, and 
it is shown that the Federal Government has never asserted this power, 
and that no clause of the Constitution justifies such an assertion. I. There 
is no treaty or Act of Congress requiring this. 2. As the right of every 
State to remove from its midst dangerous or objectionable persons cannot 
be questioned, it follows necessarily that the power to exclude them in 
advance exists. 3. If it can exclude them altogether, it may admit them on 
certain conditions; there is nothing which requires absolute admission or 
absolute exclusion. 4. It had: been supposed that this question had been 
settled by the decisions of this court in Holmer vs. Jennison, Groves vs. 
Slaughter, Prigg vs. Penna., 14 Peters, 540; 15 Peters, 449; and 16 
Peters, 539. 
If it be objected, however, to the law in question, that it 
interferes with the regulation of commerce by Congress, the opinion in the 
License Cases answers this objection. A review of the Act of Congress of 
March 2, 1799, chapter 23, section 106, is then made, and it is shown 
that this law refers to exemption from duties of certain articles of 
passengers, and is obviously inapplicable. So the first article of the 
Convention of July 3, 1815, with Great Britain. So the Act of Congress of 
1819, regulating the number of passengers which may be taken on board 
ships, etc. This last act fairly denotes the line of division between the two 
sovereignties. The law of Massachusetts attempts no regulation of trade or 
commerce. No tonnage duty, or tax upon passengers for entering the 
waters of the country is prescribed. It is simply to protect against the evils 
of pauperism. The clause in the Constitution (Article I., section 9) as to 
the non-prohibition before a certain date of the migration or importation 
of persons which the States may think proper to admit, applied solely to 
the introduction of slaves. A discussion of this, from the historical and 
political sides, is made, showing that the present view is an attempt to 
pervert and invert its meaning. And the question of the tax being a duty 
or impost on imports is also discussed. In this connection Miln vs. New 
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York, 11 Peters, 102, is quoted as an authority that passengers are NOT 
imports. But supposing passengers are imports, a State may examine, 
inspect, and lay a duty to pay for the necessary expense of inspection. 
Any surplus over such expense goes directly into the Federal Treasury. 
It is said, however, that the charge imposed is a tax on the 
captain of the vessel, and is therefore a regulation of commerce. The 
Chief-Justice assented to the doctrine of Gibbons vs. Ogden, but the 
power to regulate commerce does not give to Congress the power to tax 
commerce, and does not prohibit the States from taxing it in their own 
ports and within their own jurisdiction. He then cited the thirty-second 
number of The Federalist, and quoted from Chief-Justice MARSHALL in 
Gibbons vs. Ogden, page 201 of the Report. As passengers are not 
imports, the tax on passengers (if a tax at all) is not a tax on the captain 
of the vessel, and consequently not a tax upon (an instrument of) 
commerce. The naturalization laws have nothing to do with the question. 
As to the New York case, their law requires every passenger from a 
foreign port to pay tax. All such passengers are treated alike. This is an 
equal burthen on all. It is nothing but a quarantine, or police regulation. It 
is said, however, that COMMERCE means INTERCOURSE. If this means 
more than Commerce, then the word should not be interpolated into the 
Constitution. If it means the same, the word has been judicially 
interpreted. 
Full as the outline here given is of the dissenting opinion of 
Chief-Justice TANEY in these cases involving the rights of the individual 
States to protect themselves from the importation of disease and 
pauperism into their midst, it cannot be considered as too full in an 
attempt made to exhibit the proper construction of the Constitution of our 
common country through a presentation of the opinions of a judge who 
presided so long over its highest court. Although the judgment then 
pronounced was hostile to the legislation of the States upon this subject, 
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it undoubtedly resulted in an effort to remedy the evils complained of by 
means of Federal legislation. 
We pass from the subject to notice a doctrine of the Supreme 
Court which, with the modifications which have been made upon it, may 
be considered as the established doctrine of this court. The following cases 
fully illustrate it1; and from them we may conclude that the Federal) 
courts will follow the decisions of the State courts in the construction of 
their own statutes, where that construction has been settled by the 
decisions of their highest judicial tribunal, with the remarkable 
qualification about to be noticed; namely, that the Federal Supreme Court 
will not recognize as binding upon it the decision of the highest State court 
upon a private act, such decision being no part of the local law of real 
property. The highest court of the State of New York had decided that 
certain sales made in a certain way under the alleged authority of a 
private act of the legislature passed a valid title to the purchaser. The 
Supreme Court of the United States examined into the facts of this case 
and declared that the sales in question were irregular and void and passed 
no title to the vendee. From this judgment Chief-Justice TANEY dissented 
with Judges CATRON and NELSON, the last-named judge delivering an 
elaborate dissenting opinion. 
This case deserves notice from the extraordinary position 
taken in the opinion of the court as to its right to discriminate between 
private and public statutes of a State, and the decisions of the courts of 
the same State thereon upon a question involving title to real estate; and 
has the appearance rather of a rescript intended to meet some supposed 
hardship or want of equity believed to be found in some part of the case 
than as a judgment based upon precedents, and following the accustomed 
line of reasoning adopted in similar branches of jurisprudence. It can 
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hardly be doubted at the present day that the reasons given by Judge 
NELSON, and concurred in by the CHIEF-JUSTICE, and Judge CATRON for 
their dissent, must receive the approval of every constitutional lawyer, 
and leave the law in the condition in which it was before the judgments in 
the cases in 8 Howard. 
In Strader vs. Graham1 it was ruled, apparently unanimously, 
the CHIEF-JUSTICE delivering the opinion, that as the Constitution of the 
United States cannot control the laws of a State upon the domestic and 
social condition of persons domiciled within its territory, ft follows that the 
Federal Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the question “whether 
slaves permitted to pass occasionally from Kentucky to Ohio acquired 
thereby the right of freedom after their return to Kentucky.” It was also 
held that the ordinance of 1787 conferred no jurisdiction upon the court, 
as it was superseded by the Constitution. The decision was apparently 
unanimous. 
The rights of neutrals were touched upon in the case of United 
Stales vs. Guillem,2 in which it was held by the CHIEF-JUSTICE, that a 
neutral leaving a belligerent country in which he was domiciled at the 
commencement of war is entitled to the rights of a neutral both in person 
and property as soon as he sails from a hostile port. Nor it the property 
taken with him liable to condemnation for breach of blockade by the 
vessel in which he embarks when entering or departing from port, unless 
he knew of the intention of the vessel to break the blockade in going out. 
I notice the case of Reeside vs. Walker,3 because of its 
foreshadowing the doctrine that no judgment in set-off can be entered 
against the United States, as it occurred during the presidency of the 
CHIEF-JUSTICE, although the opinion of the court was not delivered by 
him. 
                                                 
1 10 Howard, 82 
2 II Howard, 47. 
3 II Howard, 272. 
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In Dinsman vs. Wilkes,1Chief-Justice TANEY, delivering the 
opinion of the court laid down some very sound principles by which the 
conduct of the commander of a squadron must be governed, holding that 
he has the power to detain a marine after the expiration of his term of 
enlistment, if, in his opinion, the public interests require it; and that his 
opinion must be final and conclusive. He must be the judge of the degree 
of punishment necessary to suppress disobedience and insubordination; 
nor is he liable for an error of judgment, although he must not inflict a 
severer punishment than is necessary for the maintenance of discipline. 
His motives are to be considered by the jury. 
In heretofore mentioning the case of Waring vs. Clarke, it was 
spoken of as containing an adumbration of the important doctrine by 
which the jurisdiction of the Fed-oral courts in admiralty and maritime 
cases arising upon the great lakes was sustained as constitutional. In the 
year 18512 this doctrine was asserted in an able and elaborate view of the 
subject presented in the opinion of the CHIEF-JUSTICE, which was 
adopted by all the members of the court except Judge DANIEL, who 
adhered to his original opinion. The following principles exhibit a 
summarization of the judgment of the court, The Act of Congress of the 
26th of February, 1845, extending the jurisdiction of the District Courts of 
the United States to certain cases upon the lakes, and the navigable 
waters connecting the same, is consistent with the Constitution, It does 
not rest upon the power granted to Congress to regulate commerce, but 
upon the ground that the lakes and navigable waters connecting them are 
within the scope of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction as known and 
understood in this country when the Constitution was adopted. This 
jurisdiction is not limited to tidewaters, but extends to all public navigable 
                                                 
1 12 Howard, 390. 
 
2 Genesee Chief vs. Fitzhugh, 12 Howard, 443. 
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lakes and rivers where commerce is carried on between different States, 
or with a foreign nation. 
The opinion of the court presents the arguments in favor of 
this jurisdiction so strongly that the task of the commentator is rendered 
easy, becoming that of the transcriber of particular passages contained in 
it as illustrating the force of its conclusions, rather than of the advocate 
and defender of its correctness. Take, for instance, the following 
paragraphs: 
“If the meaning of these terms was now for the first time 
brought before this court for consideration, there could, we think, be no 
hesitation in saying that the lakes and their connecting waters were 
embraced in them. These lakes are in truth inland seas. Different States 
border on them on one side, and a foreign nation on the other. A great 
and growing commerce is carried on upon them between different States 
and a foreign nation, which is subject to all the incidents and hazards that 
attend commerce on the ocean. Hostile fleets have encountered on them 
and prizes been made; and every reason which existed for the grant of 
admiralty jurisdiction to the general government on the Atlantic seas, 
applies with equal force to the lakes. There is an equal necessity for the 
instance and for the prize power of the admiralty court to administer 
international law, and if the one cannot be established neither can the 
other. 
“Again, the Union is formed upon the basis of equal rights 
among all the States. Courts of admiralty have been found necessary in all 
commercial countries, not only for the safety and convenience of 
commerce, and the speedy decision of controversies, where delay would 
often be ruin, but also to administer the laws of nations in a season of 
war, and to determine the validity of captures and questions of prize or no 
prize in a judicial proceeding. And it would be contrary to the first 
principles on which the Union was formed, to confine these rights to the 
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States bordering on the Atlantic, and to the tide-water rivers connected 
with it, and to deny them to the citizens who border on the lakes, and the 
great navigable streams which flow through the Western States. Certainly 
such was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution; and if such 
be the construction finally given to it by this court, it must necessarily 
produce great public inconvenience, and at the same time fail to 
accomplish one of the great objects of the framers of the Constitution: 
that is, a perfect equality in the rights and the privileges of the citizens of 
the different States; not only in the laws of the general government, but 
in the mode of administering them. That equality does not exist if the 
commerce on the lakes and on the navigable waters of the West are 
denied the benefits of the same courts and the same jurisdiction for its 
protection which the Constitution secures to the States bordering on the 
Atlantic. 
“The only objection made to this jurisdiction is that there is no 
tide in the lakes or the waters connecting them; and it is said that the 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, as known and understood in England 
and this country at the time the Constitution was adopted, was confined to 
the ebb and flow of the tide. 
“Now there is certainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide 
that makes the waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor 
any thing in the absence of a tide that renders it unfit. If it is a public 
navigable water, on which commerce is carried on between different 
States or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same.” 
In the sentences thus abstracted from the opinion, the 
reasoning upon which the doctrine is supported is set forth so clearly, so 
convincingly, may I not say in a manner so incapable of being confuted, 
that I feel I am best fulfilling the duty that has been assigned to me, by 
letting the great JUDGE whose relations to the exposition of the 
Constitution we have been considering, be heard in his own language, in 
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the consideration of a question so momentous. As already said, the view 
thus presented has received the suffrages of all impartial inquirers into the 
true meaning of the fundamental instrument upon which our government 
rests. 
Three cases found in the thirteenth volume of Howard’s 
Reports, present, in the opinions of the CHIEF-Jus-TICE, views of public 
law, so correct and so tersely expressed, of the rights of parties who have 
suffered injury to their property in the conflict of contending military 
forces, that they cannot be omitted, and yet want of space forbids more 
than a brief reference to them.1 The opinions contain admirable 
presentations of the law upon the subjects embraced in them, laid down in 
a calm and temperate spirit, and, as we believe, asserting the soundest 
views of the law of nations on somewhat difficult points. 
We turn to a case which may be termed a controversy 
between two of the States of the Union, which, from its general 
importance, justifies consideration, and in which we find the CHIEF-
JUSTICE dissenting from the judgment of the court.2 The points which 
arose and were decided in it will be stated. The opinion, delivered by 
Justice MCLEAN, somewhat at length, sustained the following 
propositions: 
The State of Pennsylvania has sufficient interest from its 
position and the lines of improvement in its borders to sustain an 
application to the Supreme Court for the exercise of its original jurisdiction 
by way of injunction, in regard to an alleged obstruction over the Ohio 
River, the remedy at law being incomplete. 
An indictment by the United States against the bridge for a 
nuisance could not be sustained. 
                                                 
1 United States vs. Ferreira, 13 Howard, 40; Mitchell vs. Harmony, id., 115; Jecker vs. 
Montgomery, id., 498. 
2 Pennsylvania vs. Wheeling Bridge Company, 13 Howard, 518. 
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If the bridge obstructed the navigation of the river, its 
authorization by the laws of Virginia would be no justification. The 
compact between Virginia and Kentucky, as to the use and navigation of 
the Ohio, is obligatory, and can be carried out by the Supreme Court. 
Chief-Justice TANEY dissented on the following ground, in 
which Justice DANIEL generally concurred: 
Assuming that the bridge does obstruct a public, navigable 
river, such as the Ohio, which at common law would be a nuisance, is this 
court authorized to declare it such, and to abate it? Congress may prohibit 
obstructions in or upon the river, and to declare what are obstructions; 
but it has not done so. The only common law applicable would be that of 
Virginia; but she has passed a statute on this very subject. It is not an 
indictable offense against the law of the United States, there being no 
statute upon the subject. The law of Virginia sanctioning the bridge is not 
contrary to the Constitution. 
It seems, however, that there is an insufferable objection to 
the removal of the bridge by injunction, even if it be a nuisance, public or 
private. The evidence is conflicting and the injury doubtful; nor is it 
immediate or irreparable. The bridge was built without any previous 
injunction to restrain the respondents from proceeding in the work. 
Finally, it is by no means clear that the bridge is a public nuisance at 
common law; and the jurisdiction is new and unprecedented. 
While the objections urged in the dissent of the CHIEF-
JUSTICE are ingenious, and ably presented, yet an opinion pronounced by 
Justice MCLEAN, and concurred in by judges so eminent as CATRON, 
MCKINLEY, NELSON, GRIER, and CURTIS, is entitled to the very highest 
respect. 
Two cases, in which public law was administered, are to be 
found in the next volume of reports, in one of which the CHIEF-JUSTICE 
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gave the opinion of the court—in the latter case he dissented. The first 
case arose out of the separation of Texas from Mexico.1 The CHIEF-
JUSTICE opinion seems eminently wise and correct, in holding that as it 
belongs exclusively to the political part of the government to recognize a 
new power in a foreign country claiming to have displaced the old one, 
and to have established a new one, no citizen of the United States could 
lawfully furnish supplies to Texas to enable it to carry on war against 
Mexico, while our government acknowledged its treaty of limits and of 
amity with Mexico as still subsisting. 
In re Thomas Kaine,2 it was held that under the tenth article of 
the Treaty of 1842 with Great Britain, a person might be arrested under a 
warrant issued by a commissioner at the instance of the British Consul, 
charged with the offence of committing an assault with attempt to 
murder, in Ireland; and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, addressed 
to the justices of the Supreme Court, was dismissed and the writ denied. 
From that ruling the CHIEF-JUSTICE and Justices DANIEL and NELSON 
dissented, Justice NELSON giving a most able, elaborate, and, in my 
judgment, convincing opinion against refusing the writ of habeas corpus. 
The great case of O’Reilly vs. Morse3 deserves a passing 
notice, from its importance to the whole world. The CHIEF-JUSTICE 
delivered the opinion of the court in favor of Mr. Morse, both as to priority 
of invention and the substantial identity of the interfering process of 
O’Reilly, affirming the judgment of the court below, without costs, each 
party to pay his own. Justices WAYNE, NELSON, and GRIER dissented 
from the judgment on the question of costs, thinking the judgment should 
be affirmed with costs. 
                                                 
1 Kennett vs. Chambers, 14 Howard, 38. 
 
2 14 Howard, 103. 
3 15 Howard, 62 
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The case of Ohio Life Insurance Company vs. Dcbolt,1 
presented another phase of a supposed violation of the constitutional 
provision prohibiting the passage of any law impairing the obligation of 
contracts, a majority of the court holding that it is not to be presumed 
that a State legislature has given up its right to tax corporations unless 
the language used in chartering such corporations is clear and 
unambiguous. The CHIEF-JUSTICE, in an excellent opinion, discussed the 
general polity of our State governments, acting, as they all do, through 
representatives, the powers of the legislatures under this system, the 
rules by which their action should be construed, and the duty of the court 
in applying these rules. It was conceded that no legislature could by its 
action disarm their successors of any of the rights of sovereignty confided 
by the people to the legislature, unless expressly authorized to do so by 
the constitution under which they were elected; and it was also admitted 
that the Federal Supreme Court always followed the decision of the State 
courts in the construction of their own constitution and laws; but with the 
necessary qualification, asserted with great emphasis, that where these 
decisions are in conflict the Supreme Court must of necessity determine 
between them. And it was also shown that the rule of interpretation by 
which the construction of a State court of a statute of its own State was to 
be regarded as conclusive, must be limited to ordinary acts of legislation, 
and does not extend to contracts of the State, although they should be 
made in the form of a law. For it would be impossible for the Supreme 
Court to exercise any appellate power in a case of this kind, unless it was 
at liberty to interpret for itself the instrument relied upon as the contract 
between the parties, Following these rules the learned judge proceeded to 
an examination of the statutes in question; and relying upon the rules of 
construction in cases of this kind well presented by the court, that the 
grant of privileges to a corporation is to be strictly, construed against the 
corporation and in favor of the public, that nothing passes but what is 
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granted in clear and explicit terms, and that neither the right of the nation 
nor any other power of sovereignty which the community has an interest 
in preserving undiminished will be held to be surrendered, unless the 
intention is plainly manifested, he reached the conclusion that no such 
exemption from taxation as was claimed by the company had been 
granted to it by way of contract by the State of Ohio. 
The opinion of the Chief-Justice in this case deserves 
consideration, not only for the intrinsic importance and gravity of the 
principles involved in it, but also for the clear statement of the rules by 
which the claim set up by the company, is to be settled, and the review of 
the decisions of the court upon the subject exhibited in it. 
 He who endeavors to deal with the subject attempted to be 
handled by the present writer, will find himself op-pressed with the wealth 
of material supplied in the latter volumes of Howard’s Reports. And unless 
he resolutely confines himself to the task of rigid exclusion of every thing 
which does not come within a strict definition of the subject-matter of this 
address, and even then exercise a very stringent right of selection of what 
he may deem the most likely to interest when presented in this manner, 
will find himself swamped by the largeness of the matter which is laid 
before him. I omit, therefore, of necessity much that is interesting, and 
proceed at once to the consideration of a case which it is no figure of 
speech to say convulsed the whole country from one end to the other, and 
is still spoken of and discussed with heat, and frequently with a degree of 
ignorance as to the real points ruled in it, equal to the warmth of feeling 
exhibited. I refer to the Dred Scott case,1 decided at the December Term, 
of the year 1856. The following propositions were asserted in the opinion 
of the CHIEF-JUSTICE, and some or all of them, and the most important 
as to the status of Scott, in the opinions of the judges who formed the 
majority of the court: 
                                                 
1 Dred Scott vs. Sanford, 19 Howard, 393. 
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1. A free negro of the African race, whose ancestors were 
brought to this country and sold as slaves, is not a citizen within the 
meaning of the Constitution. 
2. The judgment of the Circuit Court was therefore erroneous, 
as it had no jurisdiction of the controversy between the parties. 
3. SCOTT remained a slave. The law making the Territory of 
Wisconsin free territory is unconstitutional and void. 
4. The Missouri Compromise Act of March, 1820, is 
unconstitutional and void. 
This is a synopsis of the propositions laid down in this 
celebrated opinion, in which great ingenuity and knowledge of the political 
history of this country are shown. 
But it seems to me that the CHIEF-JUSTICE, in an anxious 
endeavor to carry out the views so often expressed by him as to the right 
of the individual States to deal exclusively with the subject of this 
domestic relation, has been carried beyond the proper limitations within 
which it should have been confined. The reason for this will now be given. 
A. The plea in abatement simply raised the question whether a 
free person of African descent, whose ancestors were slaves, was a citizen 
entitled to sue. It raised no question of the servile, or slave status of the 
plaintiff. If, therefore, free negroes whose ancestors were slaves had 
acquired citizenship, the plea was bad, and the judgment on the demurrer 
should have been sustained. Now it was shown by CURTIS, J., in his 
opinion, that in several States—notably in North Carolina—at the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution free negroes were citizens, etc. Therefore 
the plea was bad. 
B. The legislation by Congress—including the celebrated Act of 
6th March, 1820—was justified by the Constitution. The article in question 
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which the CHIEF-JUSTICE said applied only to the territory ceded by 
Virginia and some other States (Northwest territory) had no such 
restricted meaning. This is clear: I. By the history of the times. 2. By the 
inherent force of the words of the article (article IV., section 3, paragraph 
2). 3. By all fair and reasonable rules of construction, including 
contemporaneous construction. 
C. Lastly, the courts of Missouri had no right to disregard the 
law, and to reverse their original decisions, nor was the Federal Supreme 
Court bound to follow the last decision of the highest court of this State 
under the circumstances presented. 
While Chief-Justice TANEY has always in the public estimation 
borne the brunt of this decision, it is nevertheless to be considered that of 
the NINE judges of the court SIX concurred with him in holding that the 
plaintiff was a slave, and that the judgment of the court should be 
affirmed. Of these six (Catron, Daniel, Wayne, Campbell, Nelson, and 
Grier), TWO—not the two least strong—were respectively from the States 
of New York and Pennsylvania, and had both held important judicial 
positions in those States before reaching the bench of the Federal 
Supreme Court. They must all share—and doubtless had none of them any 
desire to avoid it—the responsibility of this judgment of the court. The 
opinion in dissent of Justice CURTIS, an abstract of which is given below, 
is profound in its examination of the sources of the law upon the subject; 
luminous and learned in its consideration of the political and judicial 
history of the country; and convincing in the conclusions to which it 
arrives. Hardly too much can be said in praise of this masterly effort. 
WAYNE, J., concurred absolutely with Taney, C.-J. 
NELSON, J., doubting whether the accuracy of the judgment 
upon the demurrer to the plea in abatement was not admitted by the 
defendant pleading in bar, concurred in the judgment that the Circuit 
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Court had no jurisdiction of the case, for the reason that the plaintiff was 
a slave. 
GRIER, J., concurred in opinion with NELSON, J., and also that 
Act of 6th March, 1820, was unconstitutional and void as stated by the 
CHIEF-JUSTICE. 
DANIEL, J., concurred generally with the CHIEF-JUSTICE. 
CAMPBELL, J., concurred in the judgment pronounced by the 
CHIEF-JUSTICE. 
CATRON, J., thought the judgment upon the plea in abatement 
not open to examination in this court, and, in an interesting opinion, 
concurred generally with the CHIEF-JUSTICE on the other points of the 
judgments of the court. 
MCLEAN, J., dissented cum irâ. He thought the judgment given 
by the Circuit Court upon the plea in abatement a finality. He was also 
against the opinion of the court on every question. A free negro was a 
citizen. The Constitution (article IV., section 3, par. 2), justified Congress 
in prohibiting slavery, &c; the Act of 6th March, 1820, was constitutional, 
and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri, pronouncing Scott to 
be a slave, was illegal, and no authority in the Federal Court. 
CURTIS, J., also dissented, and gave his reasons for so doing. 
I. He began his opinion by showing that the plea in abatement 
raised with sufficient distinctness the citizenship of the plaintiff; that the 
Supreme Court could and should review the judgment of the Circuit Court 
upon this plea. He then showed that the judgment of the Circuit Court 
upon the demurrer to the, plea was valid. His fundamental proposition 
was that at the adoption of the Constitution all persons who were 
immediately previous thereto citizens of any State were necessarily 
citizens of the United States, and as a rule citizens under the Constitution. 
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That free negroes were citizens, voting as such, notably in North Carolina, 
he proceeds to show. It follows that one of FOUR things must be true: 
1. Either the Constitution has described what native-born 
persons shall be citizens of the United States; 
2. Or it has empowered Congress to do so; 
3. Or all free persons born within the States are citizens of the 
United States. 
4. Or it is left to each State to determine what free persons, 
born within its limits, shall be citizens of such State, and thereby citizens 
of the United States. 
The first three categories are denied; the fourth then is true, 
and the conclusions reached are: 
1. The native-born citizens of each State are citizens of the 
United States. 
2. Free colored persons born within some of the States, being 
citizens of those States, are also citizens of the United States. 
3. Every such citizen residing in any State has the right to sue 
in Federal Courts as a citizen of the State in which he resides. 
4. Therefore the plea in abatement, showing no facts 
inconsistent with plaintiff’s citizenship, etc., is bad. 
II. Justice CURTIS dissented also from that part of the opinion 
of the court which assumed its authority to examine, constitutionally, the 
Act of Congress of 6th March, 1820. 
1. The question was not legitimately before the court after its 
decision upon the plea in abatement, and to examine it transcended the 
limits of its authority as repeatedly settled by its own decisions. But as the 
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judge thought the Circuit Court had jurisdiction, he felt bound to consider 
and review its judgment on the merits. 
2. What then was the law of the territory into which the 
plaintiff was taken by his master? If it was favorable to the plaintiff: 
3. Could the courts of Missouri refuse to recognize and allow 
the effect of that law upon the status of the plaintiff after his return within 
its jurisdiction, and, should it refuse, what was the legal effect of this 
refusal? 
A. The Acts of Congress prohibiting slavery in the territory of 
Wisconsin were constitutional and valid. 
(a) The clause in the Constitution, article IV., section 3, par. 2, 
applied to all territory then or thereafter to be ceded to or acquired by the 
United States. 
(b) The language is general and adequate for the purpose, and 
therefore, ex vi terminorum, includes the territory acquired in 1803 by the 
treaty with France. 
(c) When the Constitution was adopted, acquisitions of 
territory in addition to that already ceded were expected to be, and were 
afterwards actually, ceded. 
(d) It had been doubted whether foreign territory could be 
acquired by treaty, but it was solemnly decided that it could be. Some 
provision for its government was therefore essential, and it: 
1. Must be either under the constitutional provision in 
question;  
2. Or by the inherent right of Congress to govern such 
territory. Either source of power would be sufficient for the purpose. (e) It 
is said negro slavery was excepted: 
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1. By reason of the treaty with France; this is fully answered. 
2. By reason of the rights of slave-holding States. This is 
answered. 
(f) Contemporaneous construction, by: 
1. Acts of congress—legislation. 
2. Judicial decisions. 
The opposite views were then answered. 
The admissions of a majority of the court are in substantial 
accord with the views already presented. 
B. Slavery is the creature of municipal law. Is it conceivable 
that the Constitution (as asserted) has conferred on every citizen the right 
to become resident in any territory with his slaves? The assumption is 
inadmissible. An examination of the effect of the treaty with France is then 
made, and it is shown that there is no such stipulation. But if there were, 
it becomes a political question, and this court could not pronounce an Act 
of Congress void because France thought it violated the treaty with it. The 
Supreme Court of Missouri in its last decision had no right to disregard its 
previous decisions—it erred in doing so. The authority of their ruling has 
no weight, and is, of course, not binding upon this court, but should be 
disregarded. For these reasons, therefore, the judgment of the Circuit 
Court should be reversed. 
In the cases now about to be mentioned1 the court, through 
its official head, pursuing the line of reasoning already several times 
noticed, held that where a State legislature had passed a law allowing the 
State to be sued, and pending proceedings under it the legislature by 
                                                 
1 Beers vs. Arkansas, Platenius vs. Same, Bank of Washington vs. Same, 20 Howard, 
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another law required certain things to be done, under penalty of 
dismissing the suit, this is not an impairment of the obligation of a 
contract. Chief Justice TANEY gives a short, clear opinion, showing why 
the law attacked is not obnoxious to the charge made against it 
Taylor vs. Carryl presents a nice point of supposed conflict of 
jurisdiction between the State and Federal authorities, which divided the 
court very closely. A majority of the judges held that where a vessel is 
seized under process in rem (foreign attachment) from a State court, and 
pending a motion in it for an order of sale it is seized under process from 
a Federal court having jurisdiction for seamen’s wages, the authority of 
the State court over the vessel is not divested. Of two sales made in such 
case, one by the Sheriff, the other by the Marshal, that made by the 
Sheriff passes the legal title to the vessel. Admirality jurisdiction, while 
exclusive on some subjects is concurrent on others, and in such last cases 
priority of jurisdiction gives priority of right. 
Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court, from 
which the CHIEF-JUSTICE, with Justices WAYNE, GRIER, and CLIFFORD, 
dissented. In his dissenting opinion the CHIEF-JUSTICE, asserting that the 
lien of seamen for wages is paramount and cannot be displaced by 
another lien, and justifying his view by an array of authority— particularly 
by quotations from Chancellor KENT and Justice STORY, —presented so 
strong a case against the judgment of the court, as to leave the 
professional mind in a considerable state of incertitude, notwithstanding 
the practical convenience of the rule laid down of prior in tempore, prior in 
tempore, potior in jure. 
I cannot pass over a case which contains the germ of the 
principle developed with so much ability in some quite recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court, and deals with—what is often a difficult point to 
establish—the true line of division between State and Federal control over 
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the same subject. In the case in hand,1 it was ruled that a city ordinance 
prescribing certain regulations to be observed by vessels lying in harbor is 
not in conflict with the laws of the United States regulating commerce, or 
with the general admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal courts. The CHIEF-
JUSTICE handled the subject with his accustomed ability, and stated what 
appears to be the line of demarcation between the control of Congress 
over the subject and the right of State municipalities to protect 
themselves by proper regulations, and showed very clearly the necessity 
of the ordinance in question. A dissent was made by Judges NELSON, 
GRIER, and CLIFFORD. 
A case was now presented which grew out of the Fugitive 
Slave Law of September 18, 1850.2 With the heat of the decision in the 
Dred Scott case still glowing, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin undertook 
to pronounce this Act of Congress unconstitutional and void, and resisted, 
so far as it could, its administration by the Federal authorities. The opinion 
of the CHIEF-JUSTICE, apparently adopted by all the judges, reviews the 
whole subject at length, and upholding the constitutionality of the Act of 
Congress, lays down certain principles which should have received the 
assent of all law-abiding citizens. But the crisis was rapidly approaching. It 
was held by the court, that the process of a State court, or judge, had no 
authority beyond the limits of the sovereignty conferring the judicial 
power. Hence, a habeas corpus issued by a State court, or judge, had no 
authority within the limits of sovereignty assigned by the Constitution of 
the United States. When such writ of habeas corpus is served on a 
marshal or other person having one in custody under the authority of the 
United States, it is his duty, by a proper return, to make known the 
authority under which he holds the person detained; but he is bound to 
regard and execute the process of the United States, and not to obey the 
process of the State authorities. 
                                                 
1 Cushing vs. Owners of Ship “ John Fraser,” 21 Howard, 185. 
2 Ableman vs. Booth, United Stales vs. Same, 21 Howard, 506. 
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No one can well question the soundness of these propositions, 
but the voice of the law was no longer heard; and in this connection we 
shall notice another case occurring a little later, when the fires of war 
were already appearing upon the horizon. I refer to the case of 
Commonwealth of Kentucky vs. Denison,1 in which Chief-Justice TANEY 
delivered the opinion of the court, announcing the following propositions: 
In a suit between two States, the Supreme Court has original 
jurisdiction, without further Act of Congress regulating the mode in which 
it shall be exercised. Suit by, or against, the governor of a State in his 
official capacity, is a suit by or against the State. A writ of mandamus 
does not issue in virtue of any prerogative power, and is nothing more 
than an ordinary action at law in cases where it is the appropriate remedy. 
The words “treason, felony, or other crime,” in the second clause of the 
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution, include every 
offense forbidden and made punishable by the laws of the State where the 
offense is committed. It is the duty of the executive of Ohio, upon demand 
of the governor of Kentucky and the production of a certified copy of the 
indictment, to deliver up an alleged criminal to the governor of Kentucky. 
This duty is merely ministerial. But no law of Congress can compel a State 
officer to perform such duty. 
There is a tone of almost pathetic dignity in that portion of the 
opinion in which it is asserted that the performance of the duty in question 
was left to depend upon the fidelity of the State Executive to the compact 
entered into by the other States; when it was believed that a sense of 
justice and of mutual interest would insure the faithful execution of the 
clauses of the Constitution after it became the fundamental law of the 
land. 
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In the case of Almy vs. California,1 the CHIEF-JUSTICE, 
delivering the opinion of the court, held that a stamp duty imposed by the 
State legislature upon bills of lading for precious metals transported from 
that State to any place outside of it is a tax upon exports, and 
unconstitutional and void. No one, it is believed, will question the 
soundness of this decision. 
The case of Rice vs. Railroad Company,2 is a very interesting 
one, involving several constitutional questions, and chiefly the provision 
against the right to pass laws impairing the obligation of a contract. The 
question of legislative grants both by the States and the Federal 
Government, was largely considered, including the proper mode of 
construing State statutes; but as Chief-Justice TANEY simply concurred in 
the opinion of the court, without giving any opinion of his own, a 
discussion of the case is not regarded as coming within the scope of the 
present inquiry. 
In Gordon, ex parte3 it was ruled that a writ of prohibition 
cannot issue from the Supreme Court where no appellate jurisdiction is 
given by law, nor any special authority to issue writ. Neither writ of error, 
writ of prohibition, nor certiorari will lie from the Supreme Court to a 
Circuit Court of the United States in a criminal case. The only mode of 
bringing the case before the Supreme Court is by a certificate of division. 
No one has a right to ask for such certificate, nor can it be given, where 
the judges are agreed and do not think there is sufficient doubt upon the 
question to justify them in submitting it to the Supreme Court. After 
conviction and sentence in the Circuit Court for a criminal offense, and the 
warrant is placed in the hands of the Marshal, commanding him to 
execute the judgment of the court, the Circuit Court has no power to 
recall it. Nor can the Supreme Court, having no appellate jurisdiction, 
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prohibit a ministerial officer (the Marshal) from performing the duty legally 
imposed upon him.  
TANEY, C. -J., delivered the opinion of the court. 
A passing notice should be given to a case regarding the 
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Admiralty.1 In this case it was held by 
the CHIEF-JUSTICE that no State can enlarge, or Act of Congress make, 
this jurisdiction broader than the constitutional grant confers; it is to be 
ascertained and determined by the judicial power. A history of the 
constitutional legislation upon the subject is then given. 
In the Prize Cases2 Chief-Justice TANEY, with three other 
judges, dissented from the opinion of the court. The case was argued with 
marked ability upon both sides, the opinion of the court being delivered by 
Justice GRIER as follows: Neutrals may question the existence of a 
blockade and challenge the authority of the party undertaking to establish 
it. One belligerent engaged in actual war has the right to blockade ports of 
the other, and neutrals are bound to respect this right. The justification of 
the right of blockade must be found in an actual state of war, and neutrals 
must have notice of an intention to blockade hostile ports. The parties to 
civil war are in the same predicament as other belligerents. Nor is a 
formal declaration of war necessary. What is sufficient notice of blockade 
is to be determined by the circumstances. 
In the dissenting opinion it was asserted that the period of 
time at which the actual war between the government and the States in 
insurrection began, was not before the Act of Congress of 13th July, 1861. 
The supposed power of the President to declare war, or to recognize its 
existence within the meaning of the law of nations, was defied; 
consequently, all captures for alleged breach of blockade made before the 
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passage of the Act of Congress  were illegal and void. While the dissenting 
judges were, probably, technically correct as to the period when war 
began, perhaps the more practical rule seems to be the one laid down in 
the opinion of the court. 
Although the CHIEF-JUSTICE lived after the series of Wallace’s 
Reports began, yet ill-health kept him from his place, and he gave no 
more opinions. The period of his incumbency as CHIEF-JUSTICE may, 
therefore, be regarded as ending with the second volume of Black’s 
Reports, but many of his opinions whilst sitting in the Circuit Court for the 
District of Maryland were upon interesting questions of public and 
constitutional law, and it would be a grave omission not to refer to some 
of them. They are contained in a volume entitled “Taney’s Circuit Court 
Decisions, Campbell’s Reports.” The first case of this series contains a 
very interesting discussion of the law of nations in regard to the 
immunities of consuls. In pronouncing this opinion the CHIEF-JUSTICE, 
after reviewing the former decisions, specially noticing some of them as 
seemingly ruling the point in favor of the exclusive original jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, held that the act of 24th September, 1789, giving 
jurisdiction to the District Court of the United States in civil cases against 
consuls and vice-consuls was constitutional. 
But the only case which I desire to dwell upon among these 
decisions is the noted one of ex parte Merryman,1 which involved the right 
of the President or his delegate to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The 
facts were these: The petitioner, a citizen of Baltimore County, Maryland, 
was arrested on the 25th May, 1861, by a military force acting under 
orders of a major-general of the United States Army commanding in the 
State of Pennsylvania, and committed to the custody of the general 
commanding Fort McHenry within the district of Maryland. The day after 
his arrest a writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Chief-Justice sitting at 
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Chambers, directed to the commandant at the fort, commanding him to 
produce the body of the petitioner before the Chief-Justice in Baltimore on 
the next day. On the last-named day the writ was returned served, and 
the officer to whom it was directed declined to produce the body for the 
following reasons: 1. That the petitioner was arrested by order of the 
major-general commanding in Pennsylvania, upon the charge of treason, 
in being “publicly associated with and holding a commission as lieutenant 
in a company having in their possession arms belonging to the United 
States, and avowing his purpose of armed hostility against the 
government.” 2. That the officer having the petitioner in custody was duly 
authorized by the President of the United States, in such cases, to 
suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety. The CHIEF-
JUSTICE held these reasons to be insufficient, and that the petitioner was 
entitled to be set at liberty. 
In beginning his opinion the CHIEF-JUSTICE, after stating the 
facts of the case, remarks that he understands that the President not only 
claims to suspend the writ of habeas corpus himself, at his discretion, but 
to delegate that discretionary power to a military officer, and to leave it to 
him to determine whether he will or will not obey judicial process that 
may be served upon him; also that no official notice had been given to the 
courts of justice, or to the public, by proclamation or otherwise, that the 
President claimed this power, and had exercised it in the manner stated in 
the return. After further stating that the clause of the Constitution which 
referred to this subject had up to that time received an uniform 
construction by every jurist and statesman of the day, he proceeded to 
show that Congress alone had the right to determine when the exigency 
justified the right to suspend this writ, and to suspend it accordingly. 
The clause authorizing the suspension of the privilege of the 
writ is found in the ninth section of the first article  which is devoted to the 
legislative department of the government, as the opening section of the 
article shows. And after the specification in the eighth section of the 
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particular powers of Congress, and its right to make all laws necessary 
and proper for carrying into execution the powers enumerated, the ninth 
section begins by words of restriction prohibiting in terms the passage of 
certain acts by legislation. The collocation of the clause in question is to be 
noted, for it is found in this ninth section wedged in between two clauses, 
in the first of which there is a direction against the prohibition by the 
Congress of the importation of certain persons prior to a fixed period of 
time, and in the second it is asserted that “no bill of attainder or ex post 
facto law shall be passed” Moreover, the words of qualification annexed to 
the right to suspend the writ stand as an admonition to the legislative 
body of the danger of suspending it at all, and of the caution to be 
exercised in doing so. Furthermore, the powers and duties conferred upon 
and prescribed to the Executive are enumerated in a separate and distinct 
article of the Constitution, all of which are distinctly and specifically stated 
and carefully restricted. It is needless to say that no such power as that 
claimed is given to the President. 
Besides, the fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that 
no one “shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law.” So that even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus were 
suspended by act of Congress, and a party not subject to the rules and 
articles of war were afterwards arrested and imprisoned by regular judicial 
process, he could not be detained in prison or brought to trial before a 
military tribunal; for the sixth article of the amendments provides that “ in 
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial by an impartial jury, etc.” 
The CHIEF-JUSTICE then gives, at some length, a history of 
the long and successful struggle in the mother country for the attainment 
of the benefit of this writ, speaks of its inestimable value as a barrier 
against arbitrary or illegal imprisonment, and then quotes the impressive 
language of his great predecessor in ex parte Bollman and Swartwout in 4 
Cranch, 95, the concluding words of which are, that “until the legislative 
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will be expressed, this court can only see its duty and must obey the 
laws.” 
This admirable expression of the law upon a subject involving 
the right of a freeman of protection against arbitrary arrest and 
punishment is a fitting conclusion to the long and distinguished judicial life 
of the Chief-Justice. His official voice was not to be heard again upon the 
judgment-seat, and the days of his age, which had much exceeded even 
the fourscore years allotted by the psalmist to him that is strong, were 
soon to pass away. 
I am the more desirous that this opinion should be exhibited 
as a correct exposition of the law as it stood at the time of its delivery, 
because it was criticised unfavorably by a distinguished lawyer of the day 
who, in the year in which it was delivered, attempted in an elaborate 
printed argument to show that “the President being the properest and the 
safest depository of the power, and being the only power which can 
exercise it under real and effective responsibilities to the people, it is both 
constitutional and safe to argue that the Constitution has placed it with 
him.”1 
In this argument of Mr. BINNEY’S, the CHIEF-JUSTICE’S 
opinion in Merryman’s case is not only said not to be a judicial authority, “ 
but not even an argument in the full sense”; and is remarked upon as 
having (in the apprehensiveness of the writer of the pamphlet) a tone, not 
to say a ring, of disaffection to the President, and to a certain side of his 
House.1 Mr. Binney, besides, professing in the introduction of his pamphlet 
to present the “constitutional and natural” mode of treating the matter as 
opposed to the merely “legal and artificial,” makes an attempt to show—
unquestionably with much ingenuity— from the words of the Constitution, 
                                                 
1 Mr. Horace Binney’s Pamphlet on the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus under the 
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and from his conception of its spirit, that its framers really meant 
something entirely different’ from what they said, and that the opinions of 
every jurist who had referred to the subject, including Chief-Justice 
MARSHALL himself, were not entitled to weigh in the scale against the 
assumption made on behalf of the President, because there was nothing 
on any of the occasions in which they spoke to raise the distinction 
between Congress and the President. It seems somewhat singular, in a 
contention as to a claim set up for the first time some seventy years after 
the adoption of the Constitution, to put aside as entirely valueless the 
opinions of judges, statemen, and commentators, all speaking in one way 
with remarkable unanimity as to the sources of the power to authorize the 
suspension of the writ whenever the subject was presented in any of its 
aspects, and when the very point is presented judicially, and decided 
against the right thus claimed for the first time, to assert that the opinion 
thus given is not an authority. It certainly was the judgment of a 
competent court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and as such an 
authority for the proper execution of the judgment pronounced. That its 
mandate was not obeyed by reason of an overwhelming superior force 
does not lessen its value as an authoritative ruling of the question brought 
up for decision; nor was there, as seems to have been supposed, any 
want of fulness in the opinion, either in the discussion of the question 
from the language of the clause, or from its history, or from the principles 
of the Constitution which should affect its judicial value. It was a 
judgment dealing with the very point raised for decision, and as such not 
only an authoritative ruling of this very point, but also a precedent entitled 
to all the weight, which the importance of the question and its decision by 
an eminent judicial officer could give to any judgment made under 
analogous conditions. Nor need we stop here. We may go further, and say 
it has neither been judiciously overruled, nor when the question has come 
up in other cases has it been spoken of disrespectfully or doubtingly. 
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In the case of ex parte Milligan,1 decided in 1866, in the 
arguments of counsel and in the opinions of the judges, much was said as 
to where the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus lodged, yet the 
judge (Justice DAVIS) who delivered the opinion of the court said nothing 
in contravention of what had been ruled by Chief-Justice TANEY in 
Merryman’s case; and only the faintest show of approval, or to speak 
more precisely, of omission of disapproval of the course which Chief-
Justice TANEY had been called upon to pronounce illegal, is manifested in 
this opinion ; and many passages in it speak with much force of the 
advantages of the privilege of this great writ to the citizen at all times, 
and of the importance of strict adherence to the principles of the 
Constitution, equally in war and in peace. 
From the review of the decisions and opinions of Chief-Justice 
TANEY which has been given, we feel authorized to speak of his relation to 
the Constitution of the country as follows: First of all, his opinions are 
characterized by close adherence to the language of the instrument called 
upon to be expounded, no powers being construed by him to exist in it, 
which are not found in its words, or resulting there from by necessary 
implication. Extension of the meaning of the words of grant, upon the 
ground of convenience or desirableness, is strictly repressed; and while 
full force is always given to what is written in the instrument, under the 
well known rules of construction, nothing is left to the assistance of 
inference or implication, unless it becomes impossible to give effect to the 
operative language made use of without such aid. Among many 
illustrations of this important judicial characteristic, we may refer to the 
ruling in the well-known case of the Charles River Bridge Company, 
decided shortly after his advent to the Supreme Court. 
Again, anxious desire to protect the several States in the full 
and unfettered exercise of the powers retained by them is everywhere 
                                                 
1 4 Wallace, 2. 
 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
194
conspicuous in this judge’s official career. The history of the times in 
which the framework of the common government was reared, the mutual 
concessions made by the parties to it, the fixed resolves as to what should 
not be surrendered from the custody of the States themselves, had 
convinced him that where the language made use of was plain and easily 
understood, no room was left for conjectural reasoning as to what might 
have been the implied intention, no matter how ingeniously the argument 
of convenience was urged. The union was one of States which had ceded 
large and important faculties of sovereignty for the purposes expressed in 
the creation of the new government, but that which was not surrendered 
by the States was retained by them in all its original force and fulness. 
The thirteen States which came together under the Constitution were 
widely separated by soil, climate, size, and, to a large extent, by 
difference of industries; and the peculiar relation of slavery existing in 
nearly half of them, was of itself a source of jealousy and 
apprehensiveness, which necessitated much concession and forbearance 
by all the parties to the compact. Those who look for the original of our 
government in the institutions of the country from which we have to a 
very great extent taken many, perhaps the most valuable features of our 
polity, are often misled in applying the analogies derived from that system 
to the exposition of our own. While it is true that great landmarks have 
been, from time to time, laid down in what is called the British 
Constitution, which it is supposed no. legislation can transcend, still these 
so-called fundamental principles are not barriers which cannot be 
overpassed but merely beacon lights to guide and warn in times of danger 
and distress. With us, however, it is far different. Lying at the base of the 
whole fabric of government are, or are supposed to be, certain fixed, 
immutable political principles, which cannot be attacked openly or 
covertly, without incurring the risk of disturbing the super-incumbent 
mass reared upon them; and artificial as this system may appear to be, 
and repressive of the action of a great and advancing nation as it may 
seem to the speculatist upon theories of government, still, this system in 
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the apprehension of Judge TANEY was a political reality, and was to be 
dealt with accordingly. It might have been wiser, it may be admitted, had 
some of its provisions had no place in the system, but when seen they 
must be acknowledged and given effect to by the judge called upon to 
expound them; they must not be treated lightly by him, or with want of 
due regard, either to their intrinsic weight, or to their appropriate place in 
the whole structure. To do this, would have been to disregard the solemn 
injunction laid upon those whose duty it is, when officially called upon, to 
explain and give expression, to them. This it is, which enables us to find 
unity of expression, symmetry of purpose, and consistency of judicial 
action in the course of the judge whose conduct we have been 
considering. In the vast majority of the judgments pronounced in nearly 
all of the opinions given by him, whether as the organ of the court of 
which he was the head, or as the occasional dissenter from the judgment 
of the majority of its members, we may trace to the presence of the 
guiding rules of construction which have been attempted to be here 
presented, the judicial utterances which proceeded from this Chief-
Justice’s lips. 
Finally, rigid as was Chief-Justice TANEY’S adhesion to the 
language of the Constitution in giving effect to the supposed powers of the 
General Government, where the words of the instrument were express 
and the meaning plain, yet where room was found for a broader 
interpretation in conformity with the needs and equality of right of all the 
States, no hesitation was felt in overpassing the narrow limits within 
which a formal construction would have confined the jurisdiction of the 
Federal courts. Where a technical reading of the article would have 
cramped the courts in the exercise of a most important power, and have 
operated with partial discrimination against a large section of our common 
country, a paramount duty was felt and expressed of construing the words 
of grant of judicial authority by reference to the conditions of the 
geographical features, and the equal rights of the dwellers in a vast 
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portion of the American territory. This judicial breadth of view is illustrated 
in the admirable opinion by which the extension of the admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction of the Federal courts is made to the entire chain of 
the great lakes and the waters connected with them. 
It is not, perhaps, too much to say at this time, separated as 
we are by a quarter of a century from the date of his death, that in 
making an impartial review of his long judicial career, we shall find but a 
single opinion delivered by him which has been looked upon with 
permanent hostility of criticism. I refer, of course, to the DRED SCOTT 
case. In subjecting his opinion in this case of the closest scrutiny, we must 
keep steadily in view his high ideal of the character of American 
citizenship, and that doubtless influenced to a considerable extent by early 
associations and education, as well as by examination of what he regarded 
as the sources of authoritative decision, he reached the conclusion that 
the attributes of this character were incapable of residing in any 
descendant of the race whose claims were before the court in the person 
of the plaintiff in the suit. And he was merely following in the path so 
often trod by him before, in attributing to the individual States the 
exclusive right to determine judicially the status of freedom, or of slavery, 
of a person found domiciled in them. The case itself, and the relation to it 
of the several members of the Supreme Court, have been already so fully 
spoken of that no further statement in these respects is now necessary. 
In conclusion, I venture to propose to you as the result of this 
inquiry into the relation borne by Chief-Justice TANEY to the Constitution 
of the United States, that during his presidency of the Federal Supreme 
Court, he showed himself to be the able, faithful, and, with very small 
exceptions, the correct expositor of that instrument; and that a large debt 
of gratitude is due to him alike by the members of the profession of the 
law, the students of constitutional history, and the lovers of free 
representative government throughout the world, for the tenor of his 
course while sitting as Chief-Justice of the United States. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES, AS INFLUENCED BY 
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT SINCE 1864. 
 
THE above is the subject upon which I have been invited to 
speak. 
The occasion will not allow a complete treatment of the 
subject. I shall confine myself to questions, which have arisen out of the 
civil war, including the constitutional amendments, which were one of its 
chief results. 
Some preliminary remarks, as to the way in which 
constitutional questions arise in the courts, the effect of their decisions, 
and the causes which determine them may be useful. 
No Federal Court has power to decide a constitutional 
question, unless it arises in a suit. The power is a result of the duty to 
determine the law between litigants. The Constitution of the United States 
is the supreme law. It is also the ultimate basis, on which the validity of 
all acts of the national government must rest. All acts of federal officials, 
which the Constitution does not authorize, are legally void. State 
constitutions and State laws do not depend for their validity on this 
source. But, if in conflict with it, they also are void. When any litigant 
bases his claim on any statute, State or national, or any act of any 
government officer, the question arises, whether such statute or act is in 
conflict with the supreme law. If in the opinion of the court it is, such 
claim is void. The ultimate determination of all such questions rests with 
the Supreme Court, and all other courts are obliged to follow their 
decisions. But before constitutional questions can reach the courts, 
statutes must be passed and enforced. In doing this, the legislative and 
executive departments must judge, each as to the extent of its powers. 
There is no method in which the opinion of the Supreme Court as to the 
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validity of proposed acts can be obtained in advance. Congress must make 
laws, and the President carry on the government, relying on their own 
views of the constitutionality of their acts. Statutes are thus passed, and 
enforced, which are believed valid, and enter into all the business of the 
country. Contracts depending on such validity may involve hundreds of 
millions of dollars. The legal-tender act is an illustration. In times of war 
or rebellion, the President may be compelled to decide questions which 
vitally affect the whole future of the country. Multitudes of lives, and 
expense beyond calculation, may depend on his decision. What 
momentous results rested on President Lincoln when Fort Sumter was 
attacked! The validity of a statute or an act of the Executive may be 
unquestioned for years. If then a suit arises, in which the claims of one 
party are based on such act, its constitutionality must be decided by the 
courts. The power of the courts to declare void acts of the other 
departments, which may have vitally affected the whole history of the 
country, is one of exceeding delicacy, and should be exercised only in very 
plain cases. Nowhere is the American respect for law more emphatically 
shown than in the obedience rendered to decisions of the courts, State as 
well as national, setting aside as unconstitutional statutes of the greatest 
importance, which have been thought valid by the executive and 
legislative departments. 
The Constitution does not in express terms make the decision 
of the Supreme Court on its construction conclusive on the other 
departments. Such construction may be disregarded. And it has been 
earnestly contended that each department of government has an equal 
right to an independent determination of its constitutional power. But 
Congress has no general power to enforce its views. Each house is the 
final judge of the election and qualifications of its members, and the 
exercise of this power has once in our history determined a most grave 
constitutional question. As a rule, Congress can but make laws and leave 
their enforcement to the Executive and the courts. The President may 
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order his subordinates to act on his views of constitutional law in 
opposition to those of the courts, but he can hardly protect them from the 
consequences of assailing the rights of individuals in obedience to such 
orders. 
As Commander-in-Chief of the Army, he may refuse obedience 
to judicial process. This was done by President Lincoln when, claiming that 
he had the power to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, 
he directed General Cadwalader to refuse to produce the body of 
Merryman at the command of Chief-Justice Taney. But such a course 
would be very impolitic, unless the emergency was great and the act likely 
to be justified by public opinion. Perhaps no emergency in time of peace 
would be sufficient. The courts have a body of subordinates, whose duty it 
is to enforce their decrees, and resistance is usually both illegal and 
hopeless. It is of great consequence that the Constitution be interpreted 
alike by all departments of government. The construction by the Supreme 
Court is most likely to be correct, since made by eminent judges, after full 
argument. Public opinion has therefore established the rule, that such 
construction should be followed by Congress and the President. And 
ordinarily the decisions of the Supreme Court, on the most vital 
constitutional questions, are accepted as final. But such decisions do not 
always establish forever the rule laid down. A question may be re-argued, 
before the same or succeeding judges, and the rule changed. This was 
done after the first decision upon the validity of the legal-tender act. And 
when public opinion demands, a rule established by the courts may be 
changed by constitutional amendment. The early decision, making States 
liable to suits by individuals, was thus set aside. And there may be 
decisions so contrary to public opinion, that they will not be regarded as 
settling the law. The famous Dred Scott case is an instance. The court 
there went out of its way to hold unconstitutional a compromise, which 
had kept the country at peace for thirty years, and undertook to settle a 
political controversy, as fierce as any that ever divided parties, and this on 
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grounds which appeared strong only to the party favored. In doing this it 
antagonized moral sentiments against slavery, which controlled the public 
opinion of the civilized world. Courts are too weak for such undertakings. 
The result was what should have been expected. The sentiments, sought 
to be suppressed, were excited to tenfold activity. 
The best judges are far from being infallible. And when they 
go outside of the necessities of a case before them, and seek to determine 
the gravest political and party questions, they should expect to find their 
opinions treated with contempt by all opponents. The utmost which can be 
claimed is, that the decisions in such cases should be respected until 
changed, and that only constitutional means should be used to effect a 
change. 
The doctrine of our law as to precedents, the rule that a 
decision once made should be followed, and reversed only for the 
strongest reasons, has a great influence in the development of 
constitutional as well as other law. This rule is based on the great 
importance of making the law certain, and on that weakness of human 
reason, by which different minds, acting independently, though of equal 
ability and integrity, are so liable to come to diverse conclusions on many 
questions. Whatever certainty the law affords on some subjects, depends 
more on this doctrine of the binding character of precedents, than on the 
reasons, given by the courts for the first decisions. Some rules of 
constitutional law, perfectly settled, might be changed, if they could be 
argued now as new questions. Their chief strength lies in the confusion 
which their overthrow would produce. Still, as has been said, precedents 
may be overthrown. The courts yield to public opinion, though perhaps 
less readily than other departments of government. It may be, that in the 
last analysis, judges are like other public men, but organs of the 
controlling opinion of their time. 
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Constitutional provisions are not like the axioms of 
mathematics, from which conclusions may be drawn in which all intelligent 
minds must agree. They must be expressed in words, which are incapable 
of exact definition, which may have many meanings, which may not 
convey the same shade of thought to different individuals. Constitutions 
must be short. They should contain only general rules. No man is 
sufficiently able to draft such rules, so that their meaning shall always be 
clear. As in religious and philosophical creeds, so in questions of 
government, human reason and human language are inadequate to find 
terms, incapable of more than one construction. 
The correct interpretation of constitutional provisions is usually 
and properly sought in the history of the times in which they were made, 
and in the objects intended to be accomplished. But there may be no 
certain record of some of these objects. It is probable that members of 
the Constitutional Convention of 1787 did not understand alike all of its 
provisions. Individuals may have voted for the same clause for different 
and even conflicting reasons. 
The Constitution was a compromise between sharply 
conflicting views. It is possible, that some things were purposely left 
uncertain, because no agreement could be reached on words, which would 
have removed the obscurity. Soon after the Constitution was adopted, 
there arose two parties, with conflicting views as to its construction. The 
tendencies which created these parties can be traced in our history, in the 
Constitutional Convention, and long prior thereto. They are at work even 
today in our public life, though with much abated force. One party looks 
on government as a necessary evil, whose powers should be abridged as 
much as possible, and whose conduct should be watched with jealousy. It 
thinks the officials of all governments, inclined to hostility to popular 
rights, and to a liberal construction of their own powers. This tendency 
may be in part an inheritance from the times of English tyranny. There 
was too, in the early days of our nation, a special and extraordinary 
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jealousy of the Federal power. Hence the doctrine, that the Constitution 
should be strictly construed, that no power should be held to exist unless 
conveyed in unmistakable terms. 
The opposing party is impressed with the belief, that the 
government of a great nation must have ample powers, that the want of 
power in emergencies is more dangerous than its liability to abuse. Hence 
there is a tendency to construe the Constitution as conferring all the 
ordinary powers of a nation, and especially such as seem necessary for its 
preservation. 
Argument does little to harmonize the views of men with such 
opposing tendencies. In particular instances it may be shown, that the 
narrow or the liberal construction of the Constitution is the better, but the 
general views of which I speak are founded on prejudices too deep to be 
overcome by argument alone. Chief-Justice Marshall and the Supreme 
Court, in the period when the principles of constitutional interpretation 
were forming, inclined to a liberal construction of national powers, and 
this is a fact of immense importance in the history of the court and the 
country. Our political parties have been largely based on these opposing 
views, but the opinions, or at least the practice, of the party controlling 
the government, always tend to enlarged views of their powers, and the 
party in opposition has been generally disposed to charge the 
administration with unconstitutional acts. 
The makers of constitutions designed to unite great states and 
to last for centuries can foresee and provide for but a small portion of the 
difficulties which may come. When emergencies unforeseen arise, the 
officers of government may look in vain to the source of their powers to 
see what should be done. But the government must be administered. The 
state must be preserved. Though a nation may have been formed by a 
written constitution, yet time will knit it together by a thousand ties 
stronger than those of any compact. And no people worthy of the name 
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will allow itself to be destroyed, because of constitutional restraints. The 
thing which seems necessary for self-preservation will be done, and such 
justification found, as circumstances permit. Constitutional provisions will 
be strained, if necessary, and meanings discovered which would never 
have been thought of in quiet times. And the judiciary will feel the 
pressure of necessity, as really as the executive or legislative 
departments. 
No doubt, our theory is, that constitutions are made for all 
times alike, that no emergency can justify the exercise of powers not 
granted. But the fact is, that the judicial interpretation of governmental 
powers will depend much on the circumstances under which such 
interpretation is made. In times of national peril, judges are not likely to 
engage in conflict with the political powers, upon issues vital to the public 
safety. In seeking the causes of judicial decisions, we must ever keep in 
mind the history of the times in which they were made. 
No one can study the decisions of the Supreme Court without 
feeling that many of them have arisen from the characters and prejudices 
of the judges, who happened to be on the bench, and would have been 
different at other periods in the history of the court. Not a few important 
cases have been decided, by a divided court, with a majority of one in 
favor of the prevailing opinion. Judges are often appointed because of 
their eminence in political life. They are always selected from the party in 
power. They do not lose their political prejudices by their transfer to the 
bench. The general character of a judge, his ability, his special 
idiosyncrasies, his personal jealousies even, may affect his decision of the 
gravest constitutional question. Something perhaps in the most important 
cases, less than is generally thought, depends on the ability with which a 
case is argued by counsel. 
The causes which determine opinion on the bench are 
sometimes, like those which control a man’s politics or religion, too 
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obscure to be traced. In the courts, as elsewhere, men of equal ability, 
learning, and integrity come, each with an undoubting conviction that he 
is right, to the most conflicting results. 
The period included in my subject covers the entire terms of 
Chief-Justices Chase and Waite. The former was appointed in December, 
1864, and died in 1873. The term of the latter extended from 1874 to 
1888. The importance of this period in constitutional history is second to 
none. The long controversy of argument, moral, political, and legal, as to 
the rights of slaveholders under the Constitution, had come to an end. 
Eleven slaveholding States had put in practice the doctrine long taught by 
some of their public men, that each State may dissolve the Union for any 
cause which seems to itself sufficient. A fierce civil war had resulted, and 
was in progress when Chase took his seat on the bench. The Supreme 
Court passed on the right of secession, and on the means which | could be 
used for its overthrow. When the rebellion was crushed, questions arose 
as to the legal status of the seceding States during the war, and as to the 
validity of the laws enacted by each State and by the Confederate 
Government. The exigencies of war led the United States Government to 
arrest many persons in the loyal States on charges of disloyalty, to hold 
them in prison without trial, or to try them before military commissions, 
unknown before. The validity of such commissions was judicially 
determined. The government issued its notes, not redeemable in coin, and 
made them legal tender. It established national banks, and, by excessive 
taxation, compelled all State banks to withdraw their bills from circulation. 
The constitutionality of these laws was after much litigation affirmed. 
After the suppression of the rebellion there arose a bitter 
controversy between President Johnson and the republican majority in 
Congress as to the right of the seceding States to immediate 
representation in that body. 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
206
Provisions of the Federal law designed to protect the blacks in 
the exercise of the right of suffrage were the occasion of several important 
decisions. Questions arose as to the validity of the constitutional 
amendments, primarily designed to take away the color line from the laws 
of the country. Litigation over the meaning of certain clauses of these 
amendments has continued to the present day, and the end thereof is far 
distant. 
Before proceeding to a discussion of these questions, some 
account of the members of the court during the period under 
consideration seems important. 
The Dred Scott case was decided in 1857.1 The opinion of the 
court was given by Chief-Justice Taney. He held that the Missouri 
Compromise, prohibiting slavery in the territories acquired from France 
north of thirty-six, thirty, was void, and that Congress had no power to 
make such a prohibition. He also held, that a descendant of an African 
held in slavery in this country could not be a citizen of the United States. 
Five of the other judges, Wayne, Catron, Daniel, Grier, and Campbell, 
concurred in this opinion. Nelson concurred in the judgment of the court, 
on the ground that Scott, who brought the suit, was by the laws of 
Missouri a slave, and hence could not sue in the Federal Court. McLean 
and Curtis dissented, and the opinion of the latter presented the northern 
view of the subject with great ability. Soon after Curtis resigned, and was 
succeeded by Clifford, who was appointed by Buchanan. Daniel died in 
1860, and McLean in 1861. Campbell resigned in 1861, and went with the 
rebels. Swayne, Miller, and Davis were appointed in 1862, Field in 1863, 
and Chase in 1864, all by President Lincoln. Prior to the appointment of 
Chase, who took the place made vacant by the death of Taney, the 
majority of the court were probably in sympathy with the Southern view 
of slavery, though not with the right of secession. Catron died in 1865, 
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and Wayne in 1867, and were succeeded after some delay by Strong and 
Bradley. From the time of Lincoln to that of Cleveland, all the 
appointments have been made by republican presidents, and the 
appointees have been classed as belonging to that party, save Field, who 
has long been considered a democrat. He and Clifford were for years the 
only democratic members of the court, and their frequent dissents have 
suggested the presence in the court of much political bias. 
Chief-Justice Chase was a member of the court but a I little 
over eight years, and during a portion of this time was unable to perform 
his duties on account of sickness. He was first a democrat, but at an early 
period joined the free-soilers, and thence came to the republican party, at 
its organization. Thenceforward he was one of its most eminent leaders. 
He was governor of Ohio, United States Senator, and, under Lincoln, 
Secretary of the Treasury. He administered this last office, under the 
enormous pressure for money caused by the war, with great ability and 
success. He was largely instrumental in the passage of the legal-tender 
act, though he came to its support with great reluctance, and afterwards 
as judge held it unconstitutional. He was a man of fine presence, a good 
speaker, upright, able, and very ambitious. As Chief-Justice, he seems to 
have presided with urbanity and general acceptance. It 4s probable that 
his devotion to political life made him a less learned lawyer than he would 
otherwise have been. His opinions do not indicate familiarity with all 
branches of the law. Most of them are on questions of practice, of prize, of 
confiscation, and of constitutional law. As a judicial writer his style is clear 
and unusually agreeable. Some of his opinions are able. On the whole, I 
think his reputation depends more on his political than his judicial life. It 
would be unwise panegyric to say that his influence on the court was 
comparable to that of Marshall, or even Taney. Had he lived longer and 
preserved good health, his judicial reputation might have been much 
greater. 
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Chief-Justice Waite was appointed January 21, 1874, and died 
early in 1888. His reputation rests wholly on his work as a lawyer and a 
judge. He never held a political office. He never appears to have sought 
any office. When appointed Chief-Justice, his fitness for the place was not 
publicly known, and perhaps even his friends were doubtful as to the 
result. He was more fortunate than Chase in his health and the duration of 
his life on the bench. He may not have been in all respects as able a man, 
but he was a more learned lawyer, and, in my opinion, a better judge. His 
moral character was without reproach. His mind was eminently judicial. 
His style is clear and pointed. His opinions on some important questions 
will continue to be read, as lucid expositions of the law. He was an 
admirable presiding officer, unruffled, prompt, courteous, kind to every 
one. 
Time would fail to speak in detail of the associate justices. 
Several of those now living are probably the equals of Chase or Waite in 
legal learning, and in influence on the court. During the period under 
consideration the court has been an able one, perhaps as able as at any 
time in its history, though no individual has had the commanding influence 
of Chief-Justice Marshall. 
The position is such as to make an able judge out of any 
lawyer of good judicial capacity, who has had a fair legal training, and 
continues on the bench a considerable period. Not a few members of the 
court have made respectable judges, though they were not eminent at the 
bar. No other tribunal in the world has brought before it so many 
important legal questions, and they are usually argued by lawyers of great 
skill, the leaders of the bar in the United States. The court can take its 
own time for decision. The appointments are for life. The salaries, though 
not large, are sufficient for support. A judge can give his entire time and 
all his strength to the duties of the place. A man who, with such 
opportunities for education, does not make an able judge, must be poorly 
endowed by nature with legal ability. The highest judicial capacity is of 
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course rare, but the lawyers are numerous who can fill respectably seats 
in our highest judicial tribunal. 
Positions on the supreme bench should be given only to those 
who have previously demonstrated extraordinary fitness, but the 
respectability and permanency of the place make it sought by politicians, 
and men cannot now become eminent in politics and law at the same 
time. The political influence of the court may be so great that each party 
will always seek to have a majority from its ranks. And more and more, 
even the highest judicial positions are given to those who seek them most 
earnestly. But men of great ability will seldom seek place with the energy 
of inferior persons. Under these circumstances great judges are likely to 
be developed, if at all, from the education the members of the court 
receive in the performance of their duties. 
The States, which seceded in 1861, justified their course by 
the claim that the national Union was formed by a compact between 
independent States, each of whom could rightly judge for itself, whether 
the compact had been violated, and secede for such violation. 
This view finds its chief support in the opinions of some of 
those who united in making or ratifying the Constitution. The celebrated 
Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798 contain perhaps its most 
conspicuous expression. It has little basis in the language of the 
Constitution. It is assumed that the Union was made by the States, rather 
than by the people, and the right of secession is thought to be a logical 
inference from this fact. It is claimed to be justified from the inherent 
nature of a compact between independent states. It is said that in a 
compact between equals, where no arbiter is named, each party must of 
necessity judge whether the agreement has been violated. But why may 
not a compact between independent states result in the formation of one 
state, whose parts can never again be legally separated, just as a contract 
of marriage results in the indissoluble status of marriage. Whether the 
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Constitution produced such a Union is to be determined by its language. 
To us at the North it seems very plain that the intention was to form a 
nation without limit as to duration, a nation which, like other nations, 
could determine all quarrels between its members. 
But if the Constitution were but a league, it was certainly a 
league intended to continue forever, unless broken for good cause, and no 
one State could be the sole judge of the sufficiency of the cause. And if a 
State undertook to secede, for a cause not thought sufficient by other 
States, they certainly must have the right to coerce the seceder by war. If 
the league doctrine had been universally admitted, still, peaceable 
secession would have been very improbable. 
But on the Northern view, that the Constitution established a 
perpetual national government, and made the Supreme Court and the 
people of the whole country the final legal judges of the extent of national 
power, still there remains the right of revolution, to any State or other 
locality complaining of injury not capable of redress in any other way, and 
such locality must judge for itself whether or not the end justifies 
revolution, subject of course to all the penalties of an unsuccessful 
attempt. 
The practical difference between the two views was mainly 
this: Some Southerners, who disbelieved in the wisdom of secession, 
found in the doctrine, that their primary allegiance was due to their 
respective States, and in the legal right of a State to secede, an excuse 
for joining in rebellion more satisfactory than any justification founded on 
the right of revolution. But it is doubtful if the course of any considerable 
number were changed by this view. Even General Lee joined the 
Confederate army before his State had seceded. And Breckenridge and 
many other Southern sympathizers, whose States never seceded, did the 
same thing. 
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The rebellion did not, as Alexander Stephens contends, grow 
out of the constitutional views of its leaders.1 Doubtless they were honest 
in their opinions. They did not originate the claim, that a State may 
secede for any cause it thinks sufficient, but they adopted that view 
because it suited their designs. The real cause of the rebellion was the 
fact, that the national government could no longer be controlled in the 
interests of slavery. Circumstances had made the Southern leaders 
believe, that their peculiar institution was essential to the prosperity of the 
South, and that the institution was not safe except protected and fostered 
by the Federal Government. The desire to protect slavery and justify 
rebellion, as a means to this end, was the real cause of the constitutional 
views of the Southern leaders. 
And the opposing doctrines maintained at the North did not 
come from a greater study of the Constitution there than at the South. 
We, who believed in the indestructible union of the States, adopted this 
opinion largely because it favored our interests. We had, too, an intense 
national pride in the greatness of the country, and secession threatened to 
destroy this greatness, and split the nation into small communities, in 
danger of perpetual war with each other. We disliked slavery, but felt that 
the ultimate defeat of the Southern policy was sure. All the nations of 
Europe were contributing to increase the preponderance of the North. 
The South fought for its peculiar institution, believing, no 
doubt, that its course was legally justifiable. Accustomed to rule, its 
leaders despised the people of the free States. The North fought for one 
undivided country, a grand empire, in which each citizen found his 
greatest pride. It believed, too, that it was maintaining the Constitution, 
and that the seceders were rebels against lawful government. Hatred of 
slavery added vigor to the national arms, but that this was not the main 
motive in crushing secession is evident from the concessions on this 
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subject the leaders of the republican party were willing to make when it 
seemed possible to thus avert war. 
Much question was made during the last months of Buchanan’s 
administration, of the right of the government to coerce a seceding State. 
The President and Attorney-General Black, though denying the right of 
secession, denied also the right of the government to make war on a 
seceding State, and thought that nothing could be done except to repel all 
assaults on the officers and property of the United States. Even President 
Lincoln stated in his inaugural, that he should hold the property and 
places belonging to the United States, and collect the duties and imposts, 
but beyond what was necessary for this purpose, there would be no 
invasion. 
The attack on Fort Sumter made an end of such views. 
Constitutional doubts vanished from government and people. Energetic 
measures for the prosecution of the war were begun. One of the first was 
the blockade of the Southern ports, under the authority of the President 
alone. The validity of the blockade, and of the war thus begun, was first 
brought before the Supreme Court, during Taney’s term, in 1863, in the 
Prize cases.1 The majority of the court held, that it was for the President 
to decide, whether, as a matter of fact, a state of war existed, and that 
the court was bound to follow his decision, and that the right of the 
President to establish the blockade followed from the existence of a state 
of war. The minority, among whom was the Chief-Justice, held that only 
Congress could declare war, and hence that the blockade was not properly 
established. No doubt was suggested by any member of the court, as to 
the power of Congress to make war on the seceding States, though the 
subject was brought to their attention by the arguments of counsel. This, 
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and subsequent decisions,1 made when Chase was Chief-Justice and later, 
establish beyond controversy, that secession was illegal, that the Federal 
Government had the legal right to suppress it by war, with the use of 
every means of warfare permissible against a foreign belligerent. It had 
the right to treat all residents of the seceded States as public enemies 
without reference to their personal loyalty, and to confiscate their 
property. It had the right to establish martial law in every portion of the 
rebel territory occupied by the national troops. And the existence of 
belligerent rights on the part of the United States did not deprive them of 
sovereign rights. The Federal Union is in its nature indestructible. The 
seceding States were never legally out of the Union. During the whole war 
they remained subject to the obligations of the Federal Constitution. All 
acts of their legislatures, Confederate and State, in conflict therewith were 
legally void. So were all acts in aid of the rebellion, and all attempts to 
confiscate the property of loyal citizens.2 Statutes of the individual 
seceding States, about matters having no connection with the rebellion, 
were sustained. Even contracts to be discharged in Confederate notes 
were held good. And it was allowed to be shown, that promises to pay 
dollars meant Confederate dollars. And judgments were rendered in the 
Federal courts, on all such contracts, based on the value of Con-federate 
notes at the time the contract was made.3 Con-tracts to pay for slaves, 
made while slavery was lawful, were sustained, after slavery had been 
abolished,4 and individuals, acting under the direction of the Confederate 
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military authorities, were held not personally liable for the destruction of 
the property of fellow rebels.1 
The end of the war found the governments of the seceded 
States much demoralized. Their chief officers had been prominent in the 
rebellion. Fearful of their lives, they abandoned their positions. Some 
method had to be devised of giving these States the protection of law, and 
providing for their final restoration to their old relations to the Union. The 
question had occupied much of Mr. Lincoln’s attention during the last 
years of the war, and there had developed a difference of opinion between 
him and Congress as to whether the Executive or the legislature should 
provide for reconstruction. If he had lived, this difference would probably 
have been harmonized. The war closed in April, 1865, and Congress had 
adjourned, not to assemble until December. Lincoln’s tragic death made 
Johnson President, a man who, perhaps, with the best intentions, lacked 
Lincoln’s personal influence, knowledge of men, and power to manage 
parties. 
After some hesitation as to his course, Johnson adopted the 
view that restoration of the seceded States should take place as speedily 
as possible, and with no guaranty from those likely to control the restored 
States save an oath of loyalty, and that the Executive was authorized 
alone to take the necessary steps. Accordingly, he appointed provisional 
governors, and directed them to call constitutional conventions, whose 
duty it should be to make constitutions under which State governments 
could be established, and representatives to Congress elected. No one 
could vote at the elections for members of these conventions except such 
as were qualified by the laws of a State just prior to secession, and no 
other qualification was required save an oath of loyalty. This scheme was 
carried out. Naturally the leaders of these conventions and of the 
legislatures subsequently elected were men who had but just laid down 
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their arms against the government. Representatives to Congress were 
elected from the same class, who presented themselves for admission at 
the session beginning in December, 1865. Meantime, the action of the 
new State governments had been such as to awaken great opposition in 
Congress. Though they had ratified the Thirteenth Amendment, abolishing 
slavery, laws had been passed which treated the negroes with great 
cruelty, and practically deprived them of the liberty guaranteed by the 
amendment. Encouraged by the attitude of President Johnson, the 
Southern sentiment of hostility to the Union revived. Their leaders openly 
justified secession. Men who had been loyal to the United States 
Government were treated with hatred and contempt. Alexander Stephens, 
who had been Vice-President of the Confederacy, had been elected 
Senator, and insisted on his constitutional right to a seat, though still 
advocating the right of secession. These facts excited great indignation at 
the North and in Congress. The admission of the Southern representatives 
was refused. Then began a bitter controversy between the President and 
Congress. The latter insisted upon such conditions in the restoration of the 
States in question as would protect the negroes. The republican majority 
was so large, that they were able to maintain their policy over the veto of 
the President. 
In 1866 the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by 
Congress, and its ratification made a condition of the read-mission of the 
Southern States. The ratification was refused by these States, save 
Tennessee, and, in consequence, Congress in 1867 passed a series of 
laws, known as the Reconstruction Acts. By them military government was 
established in these States, and provision was made for the establishment 
of civil governments, and their restoration to the Union, only by giving the 
right of suffrage to the negroes, as well as ratifying the Fourteenth 
Amendment. These conditions were finally complied with, and all the 
States in this way restored to their nor-mal relations with the Federal 
Government. The constitutionality of the reconstruction acts was 
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vehemently assailed in Congress and out. The only special provision relied 
upon in their defence was that by which “the United States shall 
guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government.” 
It is evident, however, that if negro suffrage is now essential to a 
republican form of government, the meaning of the words must have been 
much changed since the Constitution was adopted. 
A better justification of the course of Congress is found in the 
argument, that as they had a right to suppress the rebellion, they must 
have had the right to make such suppression effectual by prescribing such 
terms of restoration as seemed necessary. The reconstruction acts have 
been referred to by the Supreme Court, in two or three opinions.1 Their 
constitutionality has not been fully decided. But the language of the court 
shows that it was the duty of Congress, on the suppression of the 
rebellion, to provide for the establishment of loyal governments in the 
seceding States, and their restoration to their old place on such conditions 
as seemed to that body wise, and that the method and conditions of such 
restoration were political questions in which the court was bound to follow 
the action of Congress. The right of the President to establish provisional 
governments in the seceded States, prior to any action of Congress, is 
sustained, but his power to determine the conditions of restoration, in 
opposition to the will of the Legislature, is impliedly denied. 
During the war Congress, driven by financial necessities, but 
with great reluctance on the part of many, authorized the issue of large 
amounts of United States notes, not then redeemable in coin, and made 
them a legal tender for all private debts. The history of the decisions on 
the constitutionality of this act is a striking illustration of how much 
judicial opinion depends on the men who happen to occupy the bench at a 
given period. It was first held, only one judge dissenting, that a promise 
to pay coin made in 1851 could not be discharged by a payment in legal-
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tender notes, though it was conceded that the legal effect of any promise 
to pay money made at that time was to pay coin.1 It was next held that a 
contract to convey real estate, made before the passage of the legal-
tender act, would not be enforced, except on payment of the amount due 
in coin.2 Then the court decided that the legal-tender act, so far as it 
applied to debts contracted before its passage, was void.3 
This decision was concurred in by four judges; all democrats, 
save Chase, who was originally a democrat. Three republican judges 
dissented. Soon after the membership of the court was increased by the 
appointment of two republicans to fill vacancies, and the question was 
reargued at great length.4 The three who before dissented, and the new 
appointments making a majority, held the act constitutional as to 
contracts made before its passage, as well as to those made after. The 
question was argued again and for the last time in 1884, and before a full 
bench.5 It was held, only Field dissenting, that Congress has power, in 
time of peace as well as war, to make United States notes a legal tender 
for all private debts. 
These changes in the decisions did not result from any change 
in the convictions of any judge, but from the difference in the membership 
of the court. Here were judgments affecting vast pecuniary interests, 
which must probably be traced to the political views of the judges. The 
controlling argument of those who held the legal-tender act valid, seems 
to have been this: The right to issue such notes has been regarded as one 
of the usual powers of government. It is not expressly forbidden by the 
Constitution. The issue of such notes was of the greatest use, if not an 
actual necessity, in putting down the rebellion. Like crises may arise 
again, even in peace. The power, therefore, is one of the means which 
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Congress in its discretion may use in aid of the purposes it is expressly 
authorized to accomplish. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court is of course confined to 
the power of Congress. It does not, as has sometimes been thought, tend 
in the least to justify the theory that irredeemable paper money is a wise 
currency, or that any thing, save a great necessity, can justify its issue. 
In 1863 an act was passed authorizing the formation of 
national banks. The power of the United States Government to establish 
banks had been twice affirmed by the Supreme Court in early cases. Still 
Presidents Jackson and Tyler did not consider these decisions as settling 
the matter, but vetoed acts authorizing such banks on the ground that 
they were unconstitutional. No question seems ever to have been made of 
the validity of the act of 1863, though this point has been involved in 
several cases. In 1865 a tax of ten per cent, was imposed on the notes of 
State banks, with the purpose and effect of driving out of circulation all 
currency save that furnished by the government and the national banks, 
and this act was in 1870 held constitutional, though by a divided court.1 
The question has not again been raised, and from that time all the paper 
money of the country has been based on the credit of the United States. 
The practical advantages of a uniform currency equally good everywhere 
are so great, that we are not likely to go back to the days of State banks, 
with bills varying in value in every locality. 
The war led to many infractions of the ordinary rules of law as 
to personal liberty. Very many persons were arrested by the government 
summarily on mere suspicion, imprisoned a long time, and then 
discharged without trial. President Lincoln, on his own responsibility, 
suspended the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus. Subsequently 
Congress passed an act authorizing such suspension, at the discretion of 
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the President, during the rebellion, and enacting that his order should be a 
complete defence to any suit for arrest or seizure of property during the 
same period. It also provided that suits of this kind should be brought 
within two years. In some States not in rebellion, but containing many 
persons who sympathized with the South and opposed the efforts of the 
government to prosecute the war, military commissions were established 
by order of the President, by whom persons not in the military service 
were tried and condemned for acts considered treasonable. 
A conspicuous instance was the case of Vallandingham, before 
this time a member of Congress, and afterwards democratic candidate for 
governor of Ohio. 
The power of the President to suspend the privileges of the 
writ of habeas corpus was denied by Chief-Justice Taney in the Merryman 
case, to which reference has already been made. This opinion gave rise to 
a great deal of discussion at the time, and opinions for and against it were 
expressed by eminent lawyers. The question was argued before the 
Supreme Court in the celebrated Mulligan case,1 but never decided. In this 
case the military commissions held in the loyal States when the ordinary 
courts were open for the trial of persons not in the military service, were 
held illegal. The majority of the court, consisting of five judges, decided 
that Congress had no power to establish such courts. The minority, four 
judges, held that the commissions were illegal, because, though Congress 
had the power, it had not undertaken to establish them. The case is an 
authority only as to the power of the President to establish such 
commissions, since this was the only point involved. The validity of the 
statute protecting persons who had acted under the authority of the 
President has never been decided by the Supreme Court, but they have 
upheld the short statute of limitations,2 and I do not know that any one 
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ever seriously suffered for infringements of individual rights committed in 
obedience to executive authority. 
The practical result of the exercise of doubtful powers by the 
President during the civil war will probably lead to a like course should any 
similar emergency arise. Public opinion condoned or justified such 
exercise. The Union was saved. Slavery, which long threatened its 
perpetuity, was destroyed. The means taken to accomplish these great 
results were not carefully scrutinized by the prevailing public sentiment. 
But whatever infractions of the law were committed by the government 
during the war, such acts have long since ceased. The liberty of the 
individual citizen, and the security of his property, are today as safe from 
violation by the Federal Government as at any period of our history. 
The Constitution provides: “The times, places, and manner of 
holding elections for senators and representatives shall be prescribed in 
each State by the legislature thereof, but the Congress may at any time 
by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing 
senators.” 
The custom had long existed of holding elections for 
representatives to Congress almost exclusively understate regulation. In 
1870 and 1871, Congress passed acts, providing for a supervision of such 
elections. It left the State officers to conduct the elections, under State 
statutes, but provided penalties for the violation of either State or Federal 
laws and for their enforcement in the Federal courts. The constitutionality 
of these acts was assailed, but they have been sustained in several 
decisions of the Supreme Court.1 These cases show that Congress may 
regulate all elections for representatives in Congress, as fully as it 
chooses. It may enforce State laws or make full provision by national 
statutes. It may provide for the most improved means of registering the 
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will of the voters. The provisions already existing, against bribery and 
against the intimidation of voters, are of the most stringent kind. The 
same is true of the penalties for making false returns by the inspectors of 
elections. 
The primary object of these statutes was probably to prevent 
frauds upon the colored voters of the South, but they apply equally to all 
parts of the country, and they may become as important for the 
repression of bribery at the North, as of intimidation and ballot-box 
stuffing at the South. Security for a free ballot is a subject of immense 
and growing importance. If the government of a numerical majority is to 
be permanent, that majority must be free and unbought. 
Serious question was made at one time as to the validity of 
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth amendments. 
The Thirteenth was proposed in Congress and ratified, while 
none of the seceding States were represented there. And yet the validity 
of the ratification depended on the approval of States thus unrepresented. 
The same objections existed to the other two amendments. And, in 
addition, their ratification was forced on these States. It was made a 
condition of their readmission to their ordinary rights in the Union. 
Had the members of the Supreme Court been opposed to the 
policy involved in these amendments, the objections named might have 
made their validity more than questionable. But the political character of 
that court was such in 1872, when the construction of these amendments 
was first brought before it, that no dispute as to their validity was then 
made, nor has any such question since arisen therein. 
The Thirteenth Amendment, which provides for the abolition of 
slavery, and involuntary servitude, except for crime, has given rise to little 
litigation. 
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Though many laws were passed by Southern States after the 
ratification of this amendment, whose object was to deprive the negroes 
of much of its benefit, no question under them seems to have reached the 
Supreme Court. It was contended in the Slaughter House cases, as they 
are called1, that the words “involuntary servitude” were broad enough to 
cover any restriction of the right of an individual to pursue his calling in 
any proper place, and hence to make void the giving of exclusive 
privileges, by State legislatures, to control any occupation within 
prescribed limits, but the court held the contrary, and the majority 
decided that such privileges were not in conflict with any part of the 
Federal Constitution. Whatever security our institutions afford against the 
grant of a monopoly, must be found in State and not United States laws. 
The meaning of certain parts of the Fourteenth Amendment 
has given rise to much controversy. The main purpose of all these three 
amendments was, as has been decided by the Supreme Court, to make 
sure the emancipation of the negroes, and provide for their protection, 
and against State discrimination on account of color. But these 
amendments do not confer on them the right of suffrage. This still 
depends on the laws of each State. The Fifteenth Amendment does, 
however, provide that no State shall deny to any one this right, because 
of “ race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” And the 2d clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment provides that, if the right of suffrage is denied 
to any males of full age, save for crime, the number of representatives in 
Congress shall be proportionably reduced. 
It is obvious, therefore, that any State may restrict the right of 
suffrage by any line save that of “race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude,” subject, however, to a loss of representation in Congress. It is 
possible, also, that a condition of suffrage, with which a voter may 
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comply, as the learning to read, or the possession of a small amount of 
property, may not be construed as a denial of the right. 
If the legal rights of the negro to vote in the Southern States 
become fully recognized in practice, and the result is that the State 
governments, where the blacks have a majority, become unendurable, 
some restriction of the suffrage, by a change of State or United States 
constitutions, will become necessary. The government of the majority 
cannot permanently endure, anywhere, unless that majority, in a fair 
degree, represents the intelligence of the people. 
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment reads thus: 
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.” 
The object of the first clause is to do away with the effect of 
the Dred Scott decision, which made it impossible that the descendant of 
a slave could be a citizen, and made citizenship the prerogative of birth in 
this country, with an unimportant exception of the children of persons 
who, though residing in this country, are in some foreign service. It is held 
that this clause makes a distinction between citizens of the United States 
and citizens of a State; that one may be a citizen of the United States, 
and not a citizen of any State. Residents of territories and of the District of 
Columbia are of this class.1 
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The clause, “No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” 
has given rise to much discussion. Congress seems to have understood it 
as giving them power to prevent discriminations on account of color, 
though made by private persons. A Federal statute was passed forbidding 
such discriminations by inns, common carriers, and theatres. This statute 
was held void, on the ground that the constitutional prohibition is against 
State and not against individual action. Discriminations by private persons 
are held not subject to the power of Congress.1 
What are the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States which cannot be abridged? It was held by a minority of the court, 
four judges, in the Slaughter House cases, that they are such fundamental 
rights as belong to one as a free man and a free citizen, and that these 
rights, formerly secured only by the State constitutions, are now protected 
by that of the United States. But the doctrine of the court is, that the 
provision means only to secure such rights as are given by other portions 
of the Federal Constitution; but no definition or complete enumeration of 
these rights is attempted. The provision does not give Congress power to 
protect the ordinary rights which arise under State laws. 
The clause which forbids any State to deny to any person the 
equal protection of the laws, forbids any discrimination by any department 
of the State, executive, legislative, or judicial, between persons on 
account of their color. Negroes otherwise qualified must have the same 
right as white men to sit on juries. But it is not necessary, even in the trial 
of a negro, that there should be jurors of his race. It is enough that no 
one is forbidden to be a juror because of his color.2 This clause protects 
                                                 
1 U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S., 629; 109 U. S., 3. 
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Delaware, 103 U. S., 370, 398 ; Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U. S., 110. 
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also the Chinese, and under it ordinances of San Francisco discriminating 
against them in the maintenance of laundries have been declared void. 
The provision that no State shall deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law, has given rise to a great 
deal of litigation. It is found in substance in Magna Charta. There its 
meaning is plain. It was a covenant by certain English kings not to 
exercise arbitrary power, not to deprive any person of his life, liberty, or 
property save by virtue of the common law, or some statute of 
Parliament. It has never been regarded in England as a restraint on 
legislative power. The history of the phrase has made it dear to the 
friends of popular government, and hence when the American 
constitutions were formed it found its way into them, State as well as 
national. In the latter it was but a restriction -on the Federal Government, 
and gave rise to but little litigation. Having got into our constitutions, the 
phrase is a restriction on legislative as well as executive power. It cannot 
mean merely what it did in Magna Charta, protection, except as against 
the law, for every act of a legislature not forbidden by the Constitution, 
State or national, is a law. The courts were therefore bound to find for it 
some additional meaning, and in my opinion they have had but indifferent 
success in doing this. No court has been able to find a definition giving 
that certainty, which is the first requisite of all law, and especially of that 
constitutional law which makes void all supposed law in conflict therewith. 
The chief difficulty is in the words “due process of law,” and especially in 
the word “due.” It means, fit, proper, and with this meaning it seems self-
evident that no one should be deprived of life, liberty, or property by 
process of law unless such process is fit—that is, regular, legal. But the 
real question is, what kind of process of law is fit, and what is so unfit that 
it will be void, though provided for by a statute, and upon this point the 
words under consideration afford no aid. The question is left to the courts, 
with no rule for their guidance save such as they may originate. They may 
hold that due process of law is only such as had been customary when the 
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provision was adopted, and so check any improvement in such process; or 
they may determine what due process ought to be, and make this the 
rule. In either view the provision is substantially made by the courts and 
not by the people, and in doing it they verge on the dangerous doctrine, 
that statutes may be declared void, because in conflict with unwritten 
principles of constitutional law. 
In spite of the uncertainty in the meaning of the phrase in 
question, perhaps because of its uncertainty, and consequent infinite 
possibility of meaning, it was put in the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
consequence has been to give the United States Supreme Court 
jurisdiction, by writ of error to the State Supreme Courts, of every case in 
which the defeated party claims that any State has by constitution, 
statute, or other State action deprived him of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. A large number of cases have on this ground 
reached our highest tribunal. In 1877, in Davidson v. New Orleans,1 Judge 
Miller, in delivering the opinion of the court, says, referring to the phrase 
under discussion: “ While it has been a part of the Constitution, as a 
restraint upon the power of the States, only for a very few years, the 
docket of this court is crowded with cases in which we are asked to hold 
that State courts and State legislatures have deprived their own citizens of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” And again he says:  
“It would seem from the character of many of the cases before us, and 
the arguments made in them, that the clause under consideration is 
looked upon as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this court 
the abstract opinion of every unsuccessful litigant in a State court of the 
justice of the decision against him.” And Judge Miller thinks that there 
“must be some strange misconception of the meaning of the provision.” In 
1885, in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes2, Judge Field, giving the 
opinion of the court, quotes the above language of Judge Miller, and adds: 
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“This language was used in 1877, and now, after the lapse of eight years, 
it may be repeated, with an expression of increased surprise at the 
continued misconception of the purpose of the provision.” And yet neither 
of these eminent judges undertakes to remove this misconception by 
defining the phrase in question. They admit the impossibility of such 
definition. 
Since 1885 the litigation on this subject has continued 
undiminished. But if the Supreme Court will not define “ due process of 
law,” it has been very careful not to set aside State laws, on the ground 
that they are in conflict with this provision. Many as are the suits in which 
its jurisdiction rests on the allegation of such a conflict, in perhaps no case 
has the judgment of the State court been reversed on this ground. A large 
number of important decisions show the tendency of the court. In the 
Slaughter House cases the majority of the court held, after two elaborate 
arguments and much consideration, that a statute of Louisiana giving a 
corporation the exclusive right for twenty-five years to maintain 
slaughterhouses in New Orleans and adjacent district, and providing that 
all cattle must be slaughtered there, did not conflict with this or any other 
provision of the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court has been asked in several cases to set 
aside State laws prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating 
liquors, on the ground that they took away property without due process 
of law, but always without success.1 In 1888 the same result followed a 
like attempt to have that court hold void a law of Pennsylvania prohibiting 
the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine. 
State statutes fixing the maximum which railroads and 
elevators for the storage of grain may charge, have been sustained by the 
Supreme Court, though assailed by eminent counsel, on the ground of a 
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conflict with the provision in question, with the greatest force and 
confidence.1 Whatever injustice may exist in such laws, the Federal 
Constitution affords no relief. 
Jury trials in the State courts are not within the protection of 
this provision of the National Constitution, nor is it necessary that a 
murderer should be indicted by a grand jury before prosecution under 
State laws. 
In the very celebrated and recent murder cases of Spies v. 
Illinois, the anarchist case,2 and Brooks v. Missouri,3 where an Englishman 
murdered his travelling companion, the Supreme Court held that there 
was no error in the trial courts which it could correct. These and other 
decisions show that for the protection of all the ordinary rights of life, 
liberty, and property, each individual must rely mainly on the constitution, 
statutes, and judiciary of his own State, and that the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of the United States can be successfully invoked, at 
present, only in extreme cases. Still, the jurisdiction exists in all this class 
of cases, and the time may come when that court, with a changed 
membership and changed tendencies, may set aside State laws deemed 
most important for the proper administration of justice. 
 This review enables us to estimate the chief constitutional 
changes in the National Government during the period under 
consideration. The permanency of the Union seems assured against all 
opposing forces now in sight. The right of secession has been overthrown 
by the strongest of arguments. The greatest of rebellions has been 
crushed. The National Government has power to vindicate its existence 
and its control against any State or combination of States. And slavery, 
the great source of disunion, has perished. All distinction on account of 
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race, color, or previous condition of servitude has passed away from our 
laws. Unfortunately the black man is still an element in our politics. The 
powers of the National Government, even in time of peace, have been 
increased. The recent amendments have not merely destroyed slavery, 
and given protection to the negro. They have given the United States a 
vague jurisdiction over State laws, which may some time produce results 
now unforeseen. 
But at this time no permanent evil has resulted from this 
extension of national power. Personal rights of all kinds still depend mainly 
on State laws. Nor do I anticipate that the State governments will ever be 
shorn of their essential powers and a consolidated national government 
established. The States will remain as indestructible as the Union. But the 
powers of the National Government may be still further increased. We are 
bound together by so many commercial ties, the business of our great 
railroads and of our great manufacturers and merchants reaches through 
so many States, that it often seems unfortunate that the rules of the law 
should vary so much with State boundaries. It would be a great 
improvement if the laws as to negotiable securities and ordinary 
commerce were one throughout the whole country. The variety of laws as 
to marriage and divorce in the different States and Territories produces 
great disturbance in the family relation, perhaps the most important 
interest of society. The possibility of the perpetuation of the Mormon 
doctrine of a plurality of wives through State laws, is not pleasant to 
contemplate. Public opinion may some time demand a constitutional 
amendment giving to the United States the regulation of the rules of 
marriage and divorce. The advantages of uniformity may bring other 
matters, now left to the States, within the sphere of the National 
Government. And there may be a pressure from those who believe that 
morality can best be advanced by prohibitory laws, to extend the United 
States jurisdiction so that it may put down all pursuits injurious to society. 
But every extension will bring opposing evils. Congress and the Supreme 
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Court may become burdened with business to which they cannot attend. 
It would be very inconvenient for the people of most of the States to have 
to seek in Washington the mass of the legislation their interests require, 
or to do there the other public business now done at the capital of each 
State. 
And interest in public affairs will be best maintained, and 
public expenditure watched, when the people of every State feel that their 
chief burdens are of their own making. What will be the line which shall 
eventually divide State jurisdiction from National, no one can tell. Perhaps 
it will be a line often changing. I see here no cause for fear. 
That the union of these States will be perpetual, that the 
States remain indestructible, that National affairs continue the province of 
the former and local matters that of the latter, is, I believe, the wish of 
every patriot. 
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THE STATE JUDICIARY: ITS PLACE IN THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM. 
 
 
THERE are two obvious and natural divisions of the subject 
which I am set to discuss on the present occasion: First, the place 
intended, by the original frame of our political system, for the State 
Judiciary; Second, the place which it has actually held and now holds in 
that system. 
These topics direct attention to the fact that our political 
system has an outward form which is express and written; that its 
theoretic lines are traced by a written constitution, or charter of 
government, which was intended to fix not only its form, but to guide and 
prescribe its development in the affairs and exigencies of its relations and 
adaptations to practical government; —thus affording a direct contrast to 
the political system of that country from which our descent, institutions, 
laws, and literature, have been chiefly drawn. 
On the other hand, these topics remind us to what a limited 
extent the great forces which underlie society and government are 
controlled or shaped in their practical operation and results by written 
formulae or texts of government. 
We speak, in ordinary phrase, of written and unwritten 
constitutions and laws, but in a high sense the law or force which really 
controls and fixes governmental development and progress is always 
unwritten. It is beyond the wit or power of man completely to trammel up 
the future. Circumstances and exigencies of life, needs and desires of men 
or communities, adapt, modify, or override written laws and constitutions. 
True it is, as one of our great orators has said: “Nature’s live growths 
crowd out and rive dead matter. Ideas strangle statutes. Pulse-beats wear 
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down granite, whether piled in jails or capitols. The people’s hearts are 
the only title-deeds, after all.”1 
The history of the development of our government and law 
under the Constitution of 1789 teaches this lesson. Certain large outlines 
of government were sketched in our Constitution; certain general relations 
between the States and the United States were established; certain broad 
powers to be exercised by the several departments of the national 
government were defined; certain leading limitations upon both the States 
and the United States were ordained; —such was the written Constitution; 
and then this Constitution was committed to the keeping and working of a 
young, hopeful, ardent people, by position and in large degree by training 
dissociated from the traditions of Europe and committed to influences and 
principles opposed to those traditions;—such was the unwritten 
Constitution. No considerate judgment will say less than that the great 
ideas of the written Constitution were wise with the wisdom of experience 
and of the spirit which was fitted to inform with power and beneficence 
the new government. Yet in the light and retrospect of a century, it is 
plain that our Constitution, as it exists and operates to-day,—its success 
as well as its actual development,—is due, more than to its framers, to 
three great facts and forces in our history, outside of the written 
Constitution: the unequalled practical sagacity, influence, and patriotism 
of Washington as President; the intellectual, moral, and judicial greatness 
of Marshall as Chief-Justice; and the profound depth of the influence and 
effects of the Civil War of 1861 and its causes. Without these forces, it is 
entirely conceivable that, with the same written Constitution, our national 
development, political and otherwise, might have been widely and 
essentially different from what we now see,—a conclusion which warrants 
one of Mr. Bagehot’s profoundest aphorisms: “Success in government in 
England, as elsewhere, is due far more to the civil instincts and capacity of 
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our race, than to any theoretical harmony or perfection of the rules and 
formula of governmental conduct.” 
Perfect rigidity of constitution, absolute inflexibility of 
construction, are as impossible as undesirable. If human language would 
lend itself to such results, human society would not. But language is 
incapable of excluding all looseness and uncertainty of meaning. The 
opposing rules of strict construction and liberal construction are applied or 
may be applied to any written document. Centripetal and centrifugal 
forces exist in human society as truly as in physical nature. The radical 
and conservative tendencies are inherent in different mental constitutions. 
These facts make it inevitable that men of equal intellectual integrity and 
power, of equal personal purity and patriotism, will find divergent and 
hostile meanings in the same instrument. So it has been; so it is; so it will 
be. 
I propose, therefore, to consider my subject under this natural 
and necessary two-fold aspect: the place of the State Judiciary as 
indicated by the written Constitution; and its place as determined by our 
political and judicial history. 
The grand general thought and purpose of the Constitution 
was to create a government adequate to secure certain common national 
objects, while at the same time preserving and perpetuating the 
autonomy and independence of the States, so far as compatible with the 
desired and necessary sovereignty of the Nation. It is misleading to say 
the purpose was merely to form a national government. The purpose was 
never the creation of a nation, in the sense in which England and France 
are nations. The object was no other than to form, in the great and 
memorable phrase of Chief-Justice Chase: “an indestructible Union, 
composed of indestructible States.” 
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In the celebrated case of Cohens v. Virginia,1 decided in 1821, 
Chief-Justice Marshall has stated, from the point of view of the Union, the 
purpose of the Constitution, in a manner which leaves nothing to be 
desired. 
“That the United States form,” said he, “for many, and for 
most, important purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied. In 
war, we are one people; in making peace, we are one people; in all 
commercial regulations, we are one and the same people. In many other 
respects, the American people are one; and the government, which is 
alone capable of controlling and managing their interests in all these 
respects, is the government of the Union. It is their government, and in 
that character they have no other. America has chosen to be, in many 
respects, and for many purposes, a nation; and for all these purposes, her 
government is complete; to all these objects, it is competent The people 
have declared that, in the exercise of all powers given for these objects, it 
is supreme. It can, then, in effecting these objects, legitimately control all 
individuals or governments within the American territory. The constitution 
and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the Constitution and 
laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These States are 
constituent parts of the United States. They are members of one great 
empire, —for some purposes, sovereign, for some purposes, subordinate.” 
Chief-Justice Chase, in the well known case of Texas v. White,2 
decided in 1868, in an opinion unsurpassed in its breadth both of forensic 
and historical treatment of this subject, thus presents the purpose of the 
Constitution, from the point of view both of the States and the Union: 
“The perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union,” he says, “by 
no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence or of the 
right of self-government by the States. Under the Articles of 
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Confederation, each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly 
delegated to the United States. Under the Constitution, though the powers 
of the States were much restricted, still, all powers not delegated to the 
United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people. And we have already had occasion to 
remark at this term, that ‘the people of each State compose a State, 
having its own government, and endowed with all the functions essential 
to separate and independent existence,’ and that’ without the States in 
Union, there could be no such political body as the United States.’ 1 Not 
only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent 
autonomy to the States, through their Union under the Constitution, but it 
may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States and the 
maintenance of their governments are as much within the design and care 
of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance 
of the National Government” 
A recent writer upon Constitutional Law, of pre-eminent ability 
and special acuteness of analysis, —the late Professor Pomeroy, —has put 
forward the thesis, not only that the States of the Union are not 
independent or sovereign as members of the Union, but that they never 
were at any time antecedent to the Union.2 Defining a nation to be, “in its 
strict sense, an independent, separate, political society, with its own 
organization and government, possessing in itself inherent and absolute 
powers of legislation,” he declares that “in respect to all these particulars 
which truly constitute a nation, each State must be described in terms the 
exact opposites of those employed in reference to the United States.” 
                                                 
1 Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall, 76. 
 
2 “Constitutional Law,” §§ 25-120a. Similar views are presented in the more recent work 
— Hare’s “American Constitutional Law.” 
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One could hardly find a stronger example of the misleading 
effect of an a priori theory upon such a subject. Apply this definition of a 
nation to one of the States of the Union. Massachusetts, or Michigan, is “a 
separate political society”; it has “its own organization and government”; 
it possesses “inherent and absolute powers of legislation.” Neither the 
United States nor any of the other States can efface its separate, political 
existence, blot out its organization or government, or deprive it of its 
inherent and absolute powers of legislation. It is indisputable that by far 
the greater part of the topics of legislation are exclusively within the 
power of the States. The whole vast range of rights of person and of 
property is chiefly confided to the care and control of the State 
governments. And this constitutes sovereignty and independence. The 
States are limited, in some aspects of ordinary sovereignty, by the terms 
and restrictions of the Constitution of the United States. 
Look, on the other hand, at the sovereignty of the United 
States. Is it not strictly, absolutely limited, in many aspects and 
directions? How few of the topics of State legislation are within the scope 
of the legislative power of the Union! The sovereignty of the States is not 
more truly limited than is the sovereignty of the United States. The 
number of topics of legislation which lie outside the pale of national 
legislation greatly exceeds the number to which the power of State 
legislation does not extend. Why, then, shall the one be called truly 
sovereign, and the other wholly subordinate? Each is truly sovereign; each 
is truly limited in its sovereignty. The States are sovereign, free from, and 
superior to, any other power, as to all matters not excluded from their 
power by the Constitution; they are subordinate as to all matters 
forbidden to them, or committed by the Constitution to the United States. 
The United States is sovereign as to all matters delegated to it by the 
Constitution; it is without any sovereignty, jurisdiction, power, or function, 
as to all matters not placed within its power by the Constitution. Why, 
then, shall sovereignty be affirmed of the United States and denied of the 
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States? Each is under the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the 
United States having only the powers conferred by the Constitution, the 
States having all the powers not denied to them nor conferred on the 
United States by the Constitution. 
The same writer regards the power of amendment contained 
in the Constitution as “utterly inconsistent with any assumed sovereignty 
in the separate Commonwealths.1 
The argument proves too much for those who use it; for, if 
through the power of amendment, as is said, “States may be brought 
under the sanction and obligation of an amendment, without their assent, 
and even with their decided opposition”; and if “the very idea,” as is 
further said, “of sovereignty excludes any power in another body-politic to 
limit the functions of a State against its consent,” it is obvious that this 
power of amendment is equally available to restrict or destroy the powers 
of the United States. It is entirely possible that amendments might be 
adopted in the manner provided by the Constitution, which would deprive 
the United States of its most essential powers; deprive it, for example, of 
the power to levy and collect taxes, or to borrow money, or to raise and 
support armies; in a word, reduce it below the “imbecility,” as the 
Federalist terms it, of the Confederation of 1778. The power of the States, 
acting in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, to amend the 
Constitution, is a power not only to “limit,” but to “destroy the functions of 
the United States, against its consent.” 
Again, it is asserted by the writer referred to,2 that “it is 
demonstrable as a fact of history, … that the separate States, as individual 
bodies-politic, were never independent, never clothed with the attributes 
of nationality.” It is asserted that the colonies, before their revolt, 
“possessed, singly or in combination, none of the powers and attributes of 
                                                 
1 Pomeroy, “Constitutional Law,” §§ 110, 111 
2 Pomeroy, “ Constitutional Law,” § 111. 
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nationality,”—that while “each colony was independent of the others,” 
“each was a dependency and an integral part of the British Empire.” 
If this be true, as it unquestionably is, then when the colonies 
ceased to be dependencies of the British Empire, did they not become 
independent and sovereign? “No,” we are told, “because the Declaration of 
Independence was not the work of thirteen separate colonies, each acting 
in an assumed sovereign capacity, but of the United Colonies acting in a 
national capacity through their delegates in Congress assembled.” I need 
hardly point out how expressly this theory is contradicted by the language 
of the Declaration of Independence: “We, therefore, ... in the name and 
by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish 
and declare, that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, 
FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES”; not a free and independent State, or 
Nation, or Union, or Confederacy, but free and independent STATES. 
And pursuant to this declaration of the individual 
independence of the colonies, the separate States proceeded, each for 
itself, each in its own time and way, to form and adopt separate 
constitutions of government, separate State organizations, separate State 
governments. It is true that these free and independent States continued 
to act together under the Articles of Confederation as they had before 
acted together in what was styled the “Congress of the Delegates 
Appointed by the Good People of these Colonies”; but under the Articles of 
Confederation adopted at Philadelphia, July 9, 1778, it was placed in the 
forefront of the declaration of confederacy, that—“EACH STATE retains its 
SOVEREIGNTY, freedom, and INDEPENDENCE, and every power, 
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly 
delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.” 
Surely, historical evidence could scarcely be clearer than that 
which points to the fact—recognized, declared, undisputed—of the 
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sovereignty and independence of the individual States prior to the 
adoption of the Constitution. 
It is not the less a notable and significant fact, however, that 
the colonies at first and the States afterwards, throughout the struggle for 
independence, and down to the adoption of the Constitution of 1789, had 
acted together, drawn and held in union by the bonds of common hopes 
and aims and a common danger, a fact which warrants us in saying that 
our Union was the growth of a century of colonial and State experience 
and association before 1789, and not the manufacture of the day or hour; 
or, to quote the weighty and accurate words of Chief-Justice Chase in 
Texas v. White :1  
“The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and 
arbitrary relation. It began among the colonies, and grew out of common 
origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and 
geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the 
necessities of war, and received definite form and character and sanction 
from the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly 
declared to ‘be perpetual.’ And when these articles were found to be 
inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained 
‘to form a more perfect Union.’ ”  
To deny, therefore, a limited sovereignty to a State of the 
Union, under the Constitution, is, forensically and historically, as incorrect 
and mischievous as to assert more than a limited sovereignty for the 
United States under the Constitution. Each is sovereign; but each is 
sovereign only within the limits traced by the Constitution. 
I have dwelt thus upon this point of our Constitutional law, not 
primarily to combat and disprove an unsound theory, but because my 
theme has to do directly with the relations of the States to the Union in 
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one of their most vital aspects. Our American political system is strictly 
imperium in imperio, or rather imperia in imperio, —forty-two 
indestructible States constituting one indestructible Nation; States and 
Nation, sovereign, —the one, to the extent not forbidden, the other, to the 
extent prescribed, by the Constitution. 
And one of the most important modes by which the power of 
these separate but connected sovereignties is manifested, is the judicial 
power which each exerts; and the ground which we have already 
traversed enables us to affirm, generally, of the State Judiciary, that in 
the scheme of the Constitution—the plan of our Constitutional system —it 
was intended that it should hold and exercise all the judicial power 
belonging to a sovereign State, which is not by the Constitution vested in 
the United States. 
The words which confer the judicial power of the United 
States, and thereby fix the limitations of the judicial power of the States, 
are few and simple: 
“The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from 
time to time, ordain and establish.” 
Article III., Section I. 
“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under its authority; to all cases affecting 
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States 
shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States, between a 
State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, 
between citizens of the same States claiming lands under grants of 
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different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, citizens, or subjects.” 
Section 2. 
“In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, 
and consuls, and those in which a State is a party, the Supreme Court 
shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, 
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and 
fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress 
may make.” 
Section 3. 
To this is to be added the Eleventh Amendment: 
“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against 
one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens of any 
foreign state.” 
These provisions cover three topics: First, the designation of 
the depositaries of the judicial power—the courts; second, the extent of 
the judicial power; third, the division of the judicial power into original and 
appellate, and its distribution, in this respect, to the Supreme Court. 
The precise effect of these provisions upon the jurisdiction of 
the State courts does not appear to have been thought out in detail either 
in the Convention of 1789 or in the discussions of the Federalist. The 27th 
number of the Federalist certainly suggests the idea that the State courts 
might be made by Congress the judicial agencies for enforcing, apparently 
without other agencies or courts established by the United States, the 
laws of the United States. Thus it is there said: “The plan reported by the 
Convention, by extending the authority of the Federal head to the 
individual citizens of the several States, will enable the Government to 
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employ the ordinary magistracy of each State in the execution of its 
laws’’1 And again in the 81st number, it is said: “To confer the power of 
determining such causes (causes arising out of the National Constitution) 
would perhaps be as much ‘to constitute tribunals’ as to create new courts 
with the like power.” 2 
These suggestions have never been sanctioned in the 
construction of the grants of judicial power to the United States and its 
distribution by the Constitution. On the contrary, the view has prevailed 
that “the Constitution is imperative upon Congress to vest all the judicial 
power of the United States in the shape of original jurisdiction in the 
Supreme and inferior courts, created under its own authority?” “The 
judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, 
and in such other inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, 
ordain and establish.” 
In Martin v. Hunter s Lesse3 The Supreme Court, in one of the 
most valuable expositions of constitutional law ever given by that court, 
says, through Judge Story: “Congress cannot vest any portion of the 
judicial power of the United States, except in courts ordained and 
established by itself.” 
A further conclusion reached in the same case was thus 
stated: “It is manifest that the judicial power of the United States is 
unavoidably, in some cases, exclusive of all State authority, and in all 
others may be made so at the election of Congress”; and the court 
proceeds to designate as within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States courts, the criminal jurisdiction of the United States, and its 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and adds that “it can only be in those 
cases where, previous to the Constitution, State tribunals possessed 
                                                 
1 Federalist (Dawson), p. 179. 
2 Federalist (Dawson), p. 565. 
3 1 Wheaton. 304, 330. 
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jurisdiction independent of national authority, that they can now 
constitutionally exercise a concurrent jurisdiction.” 
Upon the subject of the concurrent jurisdiction of the State 
courts in matters to which the judicial power of the United States extends 
under the Constitution, the Federalist had expressed similar views. 
Discussing the inquiries, whether the jurisdiction of the United States 
courts is exclusive, or whether the State courts possess a concurrent 
jurisdiction in matters arising under the Constitution, the 82d number of 
the Federalist, written by Hamilton, says: 
“The principles established in a former paper teach us that the 
States will retain all pre-existing authorities which may not be exclusively 
delegated to the Federal head; and that this exclusive delegation can only 
exist in one of three cases: where an exclusive authority is in express 
terms granted to the Union; or where a particular authority is granted to 
the Union and the exercise of a like authority is prohibited to the States; 
or where an authority is granted to the Union with which a similar 
authority in the States would be utterly incompatible. Though these 
principles may not apply with the same force to the judiciary as to the 
legislative power, yet I am inclined to think that they are in the main just 
with respect to the former as well as the latter. And under this impression, 
I shall lay it down as a rule that the State courts will retain the jurisdiction 
they now have, unless it appear to be taken away in one of the 
enumerated modes. 
“The only thing in the proposed Constitution which wears the 
appearance of confining the causes of federal cognizance to the federal 
courts is contained in this passage: —’The judicial power of the United 
States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as 
the Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish.’ This might be 
construed to signify that the Supreme and subordinate courts of the Union 
should alone have the power of deciding that cause to which their 
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authority is to extend; or simply to denote that the organs of the national 
judiciary should be one Supreme Court and as many subordinate courts as 
Congress should think proper to appoint; or, in other words, that the 
United States should exercise the judicial power with which they are to be 
invested, through one supreme tribunal, and a certain number of inferior 
ones, to be instituted by them. The first excludes; the last admits, the 
concurrent jurisdiction of the State tribunal; and as the first would amount 
to an alienation of State power by implication, the last appears to me the 
most rational and the most defensible construction. 
But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only clearly 
applicable to those descriptions of causes, of which the State courts have 
previous cognizance. It is not equally evident in relation to cases which 
may grow out of, and be peculiar to, the Constitution to be established; 
for not to allow the State courts a right of jurisdiction in such cases, can 
hardly be considered as the abridgment of a pre-existing authority. I 
mean not therefore to contend that the United States, in the course of 
legislation upon the objects intrusted to their direction, may not commit 
the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation to the federal 
courts, solely, if such a measure should be deemed expedient; but I hold 
that the State courts will be divested of no part of their primitive 
jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal; and I am even of 
opinion that in every case in which they are not expressly excluded by the 
future acts of the National Legislature, they will, of course, take 
cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth. This I infer 
from the nature of judiciary power, and from the general genius of the 
system. The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own 
local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of 
litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of 
dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe. 
Those of Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the objects of 
legal discussion to our courts. When in addition to this we consider the 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
246
State Governments and the National Government, as they truly are, in the 
light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference 
seems to be conclusive, that the State courts would have a concurrent 
jurisdiction, in all cases arising under the laws of the Union, where it was 
not expressly prohibited” 
It is clear, as a result of these discussions and decisions, that 
in some cases enumerated in and arising under the Constitution, the 
jurisdiction of the United States courts is in its nature exclusive; in others, 
it may be made exclusive at the will of Congress; and in others, the State 
courts have concurrent jurisdiction in the absence of its express denial by 
Congress; and that in all cases to which the jurisdiction of the United 
States is extended by the Constitution, the Congress has power to vest 
exclusive jurisdiction in its own courts.1 
The question still remains, whether Congress can vest in the 
State courts any part of the constitutional grant of judicial power to the 
United States. It may permit the exercise of some parts of such 
jurisdiction by the State courts; but this is only to leave to those courts 
such jurisdiction as the State constitutions or laws confer on them; but in 
Houston v. Moore2 it was said by Mr. Justice Washington speaking for the 
court: “I hold it to be perfectly clear that Congress cannot confer 
jurisdiction upon any courts but such as exist under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States; although the State courts may exercise 
jurisdiction in cases authorized by the laws of the State, and not 
prohibited by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,”—a doctrine 
laid down, as has been seen, in the earlier case of Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee, in these terms: “Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial 
power of the United States, except in courts ordained and established by 
itself.” 
                                                 
1 Story on Const., § 1754. 
2 5 Wheaton, 27 
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In view of those judicial decisions and principles, which fix the 
theoretic relations of the State judiciary to the United States, it may be 
observed that in all cases of concurrent jurisdiction of State and Federal 
courts, as well as in cases confided exclusively to either jurisdiction, 
neither class of courts can properly or lawfully interfere to control or 
hinder, or to seek to control or hinder, the exercise of the jurisdiction of 
the other. No State court may enjoin the judgment of a court of the 
United States,1 nor annul or destroy rights acquired under such 
judgment2; nor interfere with or control the process of such court. No 
State court or legislature can prescribe rules or forms of procedure in 
courts of the United States3; nor issue mandamus to an officer of the 
United States or of a, United States court to enforce his duties under the 
laws of the United States4; and while the writ of habeas corpus may be 
issued by a State court or judge, yet when the return shows that the party 
is held under Federal authority, the State court can proceed no further, 
but must leave the validity of the detention or imprisonment to be 
determined by the Federal court5; and generally it may be affirmed that 
no State court can either by virtue of its judicial authority, character, or 
power, or of any authority conferred by any State constitution or 
legislature, control or direct a court of the United States. 
On the other hand, no Federal court is empowered, except in 
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, to enjoin the judgment of a State 
court, or otherwise to arrest, control, or hinder its jurisdiction or 
proceedings6; and whenever the State and Federal courts have concurrent 
                                                 
1 McKim v. Voorhis, 7 Cranch, 279. 
2 United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115. 
 
3 United States v. Wilson, 8 Wheat., 253. 
 
4 McClung v. Silliman, 6 Wheat., 598. 
5 Ableman v. Booth, 21 How., 506. 
 
6 Diggs v. Wolcott, 4 Cranch, 178; Ex Parte Cabrera, I Wash. Circ. R., 232; Buck v. 
Colbath, 3 Wall., 534. 
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jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the subject by 
commencement of suit must adjudicate it.1 
The point which has now been reached enables us to make 
this general statement of the place of the State judiciary in the American 
political system; (1) The judicial power of the several States, under our 
Constitutional system, extends to all matters and cases whatsoever of 
judicial cognizance, which are not vested by the Constitution in the United 
States, or prohibited by it to the States. (2) Of the matters and cases 
embraced in the grant by the Constitution of judicial power to the United 
States, the judicial power of the States extends, concurrently with that of 
the United States, to all matters and cases which do not, by their nature, 
fall exclusively within the prescribed limits of the judicial power of the 
United States, and of which the State judiciary may take jurisdiction 
agreeably to its own constitution and powers under the State constitution 
and laws.2 
In a word, the jurisdiction of the State judiciary covers all 
matters which may be the subjects of judicial cognizance, except such as 
are by their nature, or by the express terms of the Constitution or of acts 
of Congress, placed within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, 
or are excluded from the jurisdiction of the State courts by the State 
constitutions or laws. 
It is to be observed that the whole of the judicial power 
conferred by the Constitution on the United States was not at once 
conferred by the statutes of the United States on its courts. By the 
Judiciary Act of 1789; and from that time until the act of March 3, 1875, 
the jurisdiction of the United States Circuit Courts was extended in civil 
suits only to suits at common law and in equity, where the matter in 
                                                 
1 Smith v. McIvor, 9 Wheat., 532; Wallace v. McConnell, 13 Pet., 136. 
 
2 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, supra. 
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dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of five hundred 
dollars, and an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State 
where it is brought and a citizen of another State. This jurisdiction was 
original and was not made expressly concurrent with that of the State 
courts. By the act of Congress of March 3, 1875, as well as by the similar 
acts of 1883 and of 1887, this jurisdiction is extended to embrace the 
entire extent of judicial power as expressed in Section 2 of Article III. of 
the Constitution, and this jurisdiction is made expressly concurrent with 
that of the State courts. 
By the 12th Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the power to 
remove certain suits from the State to the United States courts was 
conferred on the defendant in such suits. This power has been gradually 
enlarged by statutes until it now covers all suits which might have been 
originally brought in the United States courts, and extends to both plaintiff 
and defendant. Practically, therefore, any party may now have recourse to 
the United States courts in any case falling within the terms of Section 2 
of Article III. of the Constitution. 
The great statute, known as the Judiciary Act of 1789, is 
worthy of more special remark at this point. Its purpose was to develop 
and put into operation the judicial power confided by the Constitution to 
the United States. Drawn by Oliver Ellsworth, afterwards Chief Justice, it is 
a monument of legislative skill and foresight. The framework of a judicial 
system then developed has continued, — marched, it may be said, —pari 
passu with the Constitution itself; for the few changes which have been 
made have been along the lines and in the directions drawn and pointed 
out in this remarkable statute. It has all the authority of a 
contemporaneous exposition of that part of the Constitution with which it 
is concerned. Its scope embraces the organization of the Supreme Court 
and the definition and regulation of its appellate jurisdiction, together with 
the establishment of inferior courts for the exercise of the original 
jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution. 
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One of the most important of the provisions of the Constitution 
creating and defining the relations and place of the State judiciary in our 
political system, is the appellate jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution 
on the Supreme Court. The twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act 
prescribes the cases and conditions in which that court may review the 
proceedings and judgments of State courts. The Constitution provides that 
in all cases to which the judicial power of the United States extends, 
except “cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, 
and those in which a State is a party,” the Supreme Court shall have 
“appellate jurisdiction under such regulations as the Congress shall make.” 
The practical development and definition of this appellate 
jurisdiction, and its exercise by the Supreme Court, present the most 
interesting, delicate, difficult, and probably the most vital, point in our 
dual or compound judicial system. The power of revising the decisions of 
State courts, of courts of separate, and in all respects not excepted by the 
Constitution, sovereign and independent, States, as well as the power of 
authoritatively and finally construing the Constitution in all its aspects and 
relations, are powers more vital, more unique, more controlling, than 
were ever before confided to any court. The power of revising the 
judgments and decrees of State courts was made by the Judiciary Act to 
include all final judgments or decrees of the highest courts of the States in 
all suits drawing in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the 
United States, or an authority exercised under the United States, where 
the decision of the State court is against their validity; or drawing in 
question the validity of a statute of any State, or an authority exercised 
under any State on the ground of its conflict with the Constitution, 
treaties, or laws of the United States, where the decision of the State 
court is in favor of their validity; or drawing in question the construction of 
any clause of the Constitution, or of any treaty, or statute, or commission 
of the United States where the decision is against the title, right, privilege, 
or exemption claimed. Such power of revision and reversal of judgments 
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and decrees is limited to grounds of error appearing on the face of the 
record, and concerning only the specified questions of the validity or 
construction of the Constitution, treaties, laws, statutes, commissions, or 
authorities in dispute. At the end of a century, without substantial 
changes, these provisions remain the definition of this tremendous 
appellate power of the Supreme Court. By this power that court enforces 
by its judgments and decrees, as against the judgments and decrees of 
the State courts as well as of the inferior courts of the United States, all 
the judicial powers of the United States conferred by the Constitution, and 
all the limitations and prohibitions imposed by the Constitution either on 
the United States or the separate States. 
Vitally and directly as this power affects the exercise of power 
by the executive and legislative departments, it is still confined by its 
constitutional limitation to cases and suits at law or in equity. Judicial 
power in its nature is power to hear and decide causes pending between 
parties who have the right to sue and be sued in courts of law and equity. 
The power given to the Supreme Court to construe the Constitution, to 
enforce its provisions, to preserve its limitations, and guard its 
prohibitions, is not political power, but is judicial power alone, because it 
is power exercisible by that court only in the discharge of the judicial 
function of hearing and deciding causes in their nature cognizable by 
courts of law and equity. Hence, as has been recently remarked by Mr. 
Justice Matthews1: 
“Social and political evils that may be supposed to arise from 
abuses of legislative power, which cannot be reduced to the form of 
judicial controversies, and are therefore incapable of judicial remedies, 
can only be met and repaired by a resort to other constitutional methods. 
... If these fail in a given case to furnish a cure for the malady and its 
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mischief, the mischief must be set to the account of that imperfection 
which still marks and mars the administration of all human affairs.” 
This control of State courts by the Supreme Court, thus limited 
and defined, was contemplated by the authors of the Constitution. In the 
82d number of the Federalist, Hamilton remarks: 
“The national and State systems are to be regarded as one 
whole. The courts of the latter will, of course, be natural auxiliaries to the 
execution of the laws of the Union, and an appeal from them will as 
naturally lie to that tribunal which is destined to unite and assimilate the 
principles of national justice and the rules of national decision. The evident 
aim of the plan of the convention is that all causes of the specified classes 
shall for weighty public reasons receive their original or final 
determination in the courts of the Union. To confine, therefore, the 
general expressions, which give appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme 
Court, to appeals from the subordinate federal courts, instead of allowing 
their extension to the State courts, would be to abridge the latitude of the 
terms, in subversion of the intent, contrary to every sound rule of 
interpretation.” 1 
The essential relations of the State courts to the United States 
courts are, therefore, of concurrent jurisdiction in many matters of original 
cognizance in the latter courts, and of original general jurisdiction in all 
matters not committed by the Constitution to the judicial power of the 
United States, their judgments and decrees being subject in all cases 
affecting rights claimed or exercised, or arising under the Constitution, to 
the revising or appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, but in all other cases controlled only by the constitutions and laws 
of the respective States. 
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That such a dual and compound system of judicature, such 
relations between the judicial organs and depositaries of two largely 
independent political States or sovereignties, should result in some 
anomalies, some inconveniences, some conflicts, and even in some 
abuses, might well be apprehended. With few exceptions, however, the 
spirit of comity has guided both State and Federal tribunals, and the 
occasions of conflict or opposition seem to be diminishing rather than 
increasing in number and degree of importance. 
It is obvious that in a mechanism of government, a political 
system, so arranged, with courts whose jurisdictions are at points 
exclusive and at points concurrent, there must be a large class of cases of 
judicial cognizance in which the courts of either jurisdiction are not 
responsible to those of the other, and as to which there is no common 
arbiter. The jurisdiction conferred on the United States by the Constitution 
embraces two classes of cases those of which the jurisdiction arises from 
the subject-matter of the cases, that is, some right, claim, or authority 
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States; and those of 
which the jurisdiction arises from the character of the parties, as aliens or 
as citizens of different States. In the latter class of cases, the United 
States courts are called upon to administer the local law of the respective 
States. Cases of this class brought in the United States courts are as 
completely within the judicial power of the United States as are cases 
directly involving rights or claims arising or asserted under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States. At the same time, the State 
courts have jurisdiction of all cases involving like issues and of like nature, 
in which the character of the parties does not make them cognizable in 
the courts of the United States, and over the decisions of all such cases in 
the State courts, no court of the United States has any degree of judicial 
control. 
We find, therefore, in each State, two courts, or sets of courts, 
dealing with the same persons, and the same subjects, yet each 
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absolutely uncontrolled by the other, or by a common superior. It must 
have been in view of this foreseen result that the Judiciary Act of 1789 
contained this provision: “The laws of the several States, except where 
the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise 
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at 
common law, in the courts of the United States, in cases where they 
apply.” This provision has been constantly in force during the century 
which has now passed since its enactment. 
The earlier decisions of the Supreme Court go far towards 
upholding the view that the laws of the States— meaning by that term the 
statutes of the States as authoritatively construed by the State courts—so 
far as they are in harmony with the Constitution, are absolutely binding on 
the United States courts exercising jurisdiction within the respective 
States. 
In the case of Shelby v. Guy,1 the rule on this point is thus 
stated: 
“That the statute law of the States must furnish the rule of 
decision to this court, as far as they comport with the Constitution of the 
United States, in all cases arising within the respective States, is a 
position that no one doubts. Nor is it questionable that a fixed and 
received construction of their respective statute laws in their own courts 
makes, in fact, a part of the statute law of the country, however we may 
doubt the propriety of that construction. It is obvious that this admission 
may, at times, involve us in seeming inconsistencies, as where States 
have adopted the same statutes and their courts differ in the construction. 
Yet that course is necessarily indicated by the duty imposed on us, to 
administer, as between certain individuals, the laws of the respective 
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States, according to the best lights we possess of what those laws are.” p. 
367. 
The doctrine here announced is unmistakable; —the statutes 
of the States and their fixed and received construction by the State courts 
are to govern the courts of the United States in administering the local law 
within the respective States. 
And this doctrine is supported and followed in many other 
cases. 
It will be observed that in the case just cited it is the “fixed 
and received” construction by the State courts which is to be followed. The 
extent of the limitation thus suggested is obviously an important question. 
What is meant distinctively by the  “fixed and received” construction? May 
there be a construction of a State statute by a State court which under 
this rule may not be followed because not a “fixed and received” or  
“settled” construction? If, for example, the State courts change their 
decisions and overrule what has been the “fixed and received” 
construction, are the Federal courts bound to follow, the later decisions, 
even to the extent of overruling their own former decisions? This question 
was directly and strongly presented in the case of Green v. Meat’s 
Lessee.1 The case was ejectment in the United States Circuit Court sitting 
in Tennessee, and involved the construction of the statute of limitations of 
the State of Tennessee. The Supreme Court in two previous cases— 
Potion’s Lessee v. Easton 2 and Powell’s Lessee v. Harman 3— had 
followed what was supposed to be the construction of this statute by the 
State courts. But in Green v. Neal’s Lessee it was made to appear to the 
court that the former decisions of the State courts “were made under such 
circumstances that they were never considered in the State of Tennessee 
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as fully settling the construction of the act,” but that it had been finally 
settled by a later decision of the highest court of Tennessee. The Supreme 
Court was therefore confronted with the alternative of overruling two of its 
own former decisions, or of refusing to follow the settled construction of 
the act by the State court. The decision is strikingly illustrative of the true 
relations of the two classes of courts.  
The court says:  
“The question is now raised whether this court will adhere to 
its own decision made under the circumstances stated, or yield to that of 
the judicial tribunals of Tennessee. This point has never before been 
directly decided by this court on a question of general importance. The 
cases are numerous where the Court have adopted the constructions 
given to the statute of a State by its supreme judicial tribunal, but it has 
never been decided that this Court will overrule their own adjudication 
establishing an important rule of property where it has been founded on 
the construction of a statute made in conformity to the decisions of the 
State at the time, so as to conform to a different construction adopted 
afterwards by the State. 
“This is a question of grave import, and should be approached 
with great deliberation. It is deeply interesting in every point of view in 
which it may be considered. As a rule of property it is important; and 
equally so, as it regards the system under which the powers of this 
tribunal are exercised.”    p. 294. 
The court then proceeds to examine the view heretofore taken 
by the Supreme Court of the United States of the decisions of the State 
courts, and concludes as follows: 
“This court have uniformly adopted the decisions of the State 
tribunals, respectively, in the construction of their statutes. This has been 
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done as a matter of principle, in all cases where the decision of a State 
court has become a rule of property.” 
Discussing the question generally the court proceeds to say: 
“In a great majority of the causes brought before the Federal 
tribunals, they are called to enforce the laws of the State. The rights of 
parties are determined under those laws, and it would be a strange 
perversion of principle if the judicial exposition of those laws, by the State 
tribunals, should be disregarded. These expositions constitute the law and 
fix the rule of property. Rights are acquired under this rule, and it 
regulates all the transactions which come within its scope. … 
“On all questions arising under the Constitution and laws of 
the Union, this court may exercise a revising power; and its decisions are 
final and obligatory on all other judicial tribunals, State as well as Federal. 
A State tribunal has a right to examine any such questions and to 
determine them, but its decision must conform to that of the Supreme 
Court, or the corrective power may be exercised. But the case is very 
different where a question arises under a local law. The decision of this 
question by the highest judicial tribunal of a State should be considered as 
final by this court, not because the State tribunal in such a case has any 
power to bind this court, but because in the language of the court in the 
case of Shelby v. Guy, — ‘a fixed and received construction by a State in 
its own courts, makes a part of the statute law.’ 
“The same reason which influences this court to adopt the 
construction given to the local law in the first instance, is not less strong 
in favor of following it in the second, if the State tribunals should change 
the construction. A reference is here made not to a single adjudication but 
to a series of decisions which shall settle the rule. Are not the injurious 
effects on the interests of the citizens of a State as great in refusing to 
adopt the change of construction, as in refusing to adopt the first 
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construction? A refusal in the one case as well as in the other has the 
effect to establish in the State two rules of property. 
“Would not a change in the construction of a law of the United 
States by this tribunal be obligatory on the State courts? The statute, as 
last expounded, would be the law of the Union; and why may not the 
same effect be given to the last exposition of a local law by the State 
court? The exposition forms a part of the local law and is binding on all the 
people of the State and its inferior judicial tribunals. It is emphatically the 
law of the State, which the Federal court while sitting within the State, 
and this court when a case is brought before them, are called to enforce. 
If the rule as settled should prove inconvenient or injurious to the public 
interests, the legislature of the State may modify the law or repeal it. 
“If the construction of the highest judicial tribunal of a State 
form a part of its statute law as much as an enactment by the legislature, 
how can this court make a distinction between them? There could be no 
hesitation in so modifying our decisions as to conform to any legislative 
alteration in a statute, and why should not the same rule apply where the 
judicial branch of the State government in the exercise of its 
acknowledged functions, should by construction give a different effect to a 
statute from what had at first been given to it? The charge of 
inconsistency might be made with more force and propriety against the 
Federal tribunals for a disregard of this rule than by conforming to it. They 
profess to be bound by the local law; and yet they reject the exposition of 
that law which forms a part of it. It is no answer to this objection that a 
different exposition was formerly given to the act, which was adopted by 
the Federal court. The enquiry is, — what is the settled law of the State at 
the time the decision is made? This constitutes the rule of property within 
the State by which the rights of litigant parties must be determined. 
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“As the Federal tribunals profess to be governed by this rule, 
they can never act inconsistently by enforcing it. If they change their 
decision, it is because the rule on which that decision was founded has 
been changed.” 
And in this case, the Supreme Court, although it had rendered 
two decisions, based, as has been seen, upon a different construction of 
the statute of limitations of the State, overruled its former decisions and 
followed the latest decisions of the State court. 
In the case of United States v. Morrison,1 which was an appeal 
from the judgment of the United States court sitting in Virginia, the court 
below had rendered its decision adversely to the claim of the United 
States, but soon afterwards, and while the appeal was pending, the Court 
of Appeals of the State rendered a decision giving such a construction to 
the statute involved as would have upheld the claim of the United States. 
Chief-Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: “This 
court, according to its uniform course, adopts that construction of the act 
which is made by the highest court of the State.” 
And in the case of Leffingwell v. Warren2 the court, on the 
authority of the cases already referred to, laid down the rule thus: 
“If the highest judicial tribunal of a State adopt new views as 
to the proper construction of such a statute, and reverse its former 
decisions, this court will follow the latest settled adjudications.” 
There is, however, in these decisions, a clear limitation of the 
rule to cases where the law of the State is “settled.” “Reference,” says the 
court in Green v. Neal’s Lessee, “is here made not to a single adjudication, 
but to a series of decisions which shall settle the rule.” 
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There is also to be assumed or expressed in all cases, the 
other limitation, that the decision of the State court shall comport with the 
Constitution of the United States. 
In accordance with these qualifications of the rule of absolute 
obligation, the Supreme Court in many later decisions has declined to 
follow decisions of State courts construing State statutes and 
constitutions, on one of the two grounds, —(1) that the decision in 
question did not “settle” the law, did not represent its “fixed and received”  
construction, or (2), that the State statute as construed by the State court 
did not comport with the Constitution of the United States. Thus, in the 
case of Groves v. Slaughter,1 the court construed the Constitution of 
Mississippi as affecting the validity of a note given for the purchase of 
slaves imported into that State, there being at that time no decisions of 
the State courts on the point in question. Subsequently the highest court 
of the State rendered decisions contrary to the decision in Groves v. 
Slaughter, but the Supreme Court, with the dissent of two justices, 
refused to change its decision to conform with the latest State decisions. 
In Rowan v. Runnels2 Chief-Justice Taney said: 
“Undoubtedly this court will always feel itself bound to respect 
the decisions of the State courts, and from the time they are made will 
regard them as conclusive in all cases upon the construction of their own 
constitution and laws. But we ought not to give them a retroactive effect 
and allow them to render invalid contracts entered into with citizens of 
other States, which, in the judgment of this court, were lawfully made. 
For, if such a rule were adopted, and the comity due to State decisions 
pushed to this extent, it is evident that the provision in the Constitution of 
the United States, which secures to the citizens of another State the right 
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to sue in the courts of the United States, might become utterly useless 
and nugatory.” p. 139. 
Here the decision is put upon the ground that the construction 
adopted by the State court was, in effect, in conflict with the Constitution 
of the United States. 
In the case of Peon v. Peek,1 a law, as published in the State 
of Michigan, had long been acknowledged by the people, and had received 
a harmonious interpretation in the State courts for a series of years, and 
the legislature of the State had sanctioned the law as published; 
subsequently the original manuscript act was discovered to differ from the 
published act, and it is stated that the Supreme Court of Michigan decided 
that the manuscript act must be held to correct the published act. But the 
Supreme Court of the United States refused to follow the decision of the 
State court, and Judge Grier, delivering the opinion of the court, uses 
language which it is difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of all the other 
decisions of that court. 
“There are,” he says, “many dicta to be found in our decisions, 
averring that the courts of the United States are bound to follow the 
decisions of the State courts on the construction of their own laws. But 
although this may be a correct, yet a rather strong, expression of a 
general rule, it cannot be received as the enunciation of a maxim of 
universal application. Accordingly, our reports furnish many cases of 
exceptions to it. In all cases where there is a settled construction of the 
laws of the State by its highest judicature, established by admitted 
precedent, it is the practice of the courts of the United States to receive 
and adopt it without criticism or further inquiry. But when this court have 
first decided a question arising under State laws, we do not feel bound to 
surrender our convictions on account of a contrary subsequent decision of 
                                                 
1 18 Howard. 595. 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
262
a State court, as in the case of Rowan v. Runnels.1 When the decisions of 
the State court are not consistent, we do not feel bound to follow the last, 
if it is contrary to our own convictions; and much more is this the case 
where, after a long course of consistent decisions, some new light 
suddenly springs up, or an excited public opinion has elicited new 
doctrines subversive of former safe precedent. …  Nor do we feel bound in 
any case in which a point is first raised in the courts of the United States, 
and has been decided in a circuit court, to reverse that decision contrary 
to our own convictions, in order to conform to a State decision made in 
the meantime. Such decisions have not the character of established 
precedent declarative of the settled law of a State.” 
These terms are certainly loose and apparently not well 
considered, for ft cannot be said that the doctrine that “the courts of the 
United States are bound to follow the decisions of the State courts on the 
construction of their own laws,” is in any sense a dictum, for, as we have 
seen, it is the express decision of the court in the determination of many 
cases which have arisen. Nor does the reference to “the convictions of the 
court “seem to be appropriate, for under the decisions which we have 
examined, it is not “the convictions” of the court but the fact of the 
decisions of the State court, which require the application of the rule in 
question, under the two limitations or exceptions already stated: —that 
the decisions of the State court shall be “settled”; and shall be 
conformable to the Constitution of the United States. And this decision 
seems really to have been put upon the ground that the latest decision of 
the State court was not the settled law of the State, and it seems clear 
that the remarks quoted from the opinion of Mr. Justice Grier, are not to 
be regarded as a correct statement of the rule in question. 
In a large class and series of cases arising mainly from the 
issue of bonds upon the faith and credit of counties, towns, and 
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municipalities, the court has likewise refused to follow State decisions 
upon one or the other of the grounds already stated. 
In the well known case of Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,1 the 
Supreme Court of Iowa, by a series of decisions had upheld the power of 
the State to authorize its cities and counties to subscribe for the stock of 
railroad companies and issue bonds in payment. Subsequently the same 
court held its former decisions erroneous and denied the power then 
ascribed to the State legislature. The Supreme Court of the United States, 
against the very vigorous, if not violent, dissent of one of its ablest 
members, held that the latest decision in question of the State court could 
not be regarded as the settled law of the State, as well as that the latest 
decision would have the effect to impair the obligation of contracts. 
The case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque has been followed in many 
later cases, notably in the case of Butz v. City of Muscatine,2 a case which 
has, however, been thought to have modified to some extent the former 
decisions of the court. In that case, the decisions of the State court that a 
limitation of the power of a city to tax, to one per cent, of the assessed 
value of the property of the city, forbade the levy of a tax in excess of 
that limit for the payment of interest on the city’s bonds, were held not 
binding on the United States courts, because such a construction rendered 
the State law violative of contracts, and on this ground repugnant to the 
Constitution of the United States. 
In the case of Olcott v. The Supervisors,3 an act of the 
legislature of Wisconsin had authorized the people of a county to vote 
upon the question of aiding a certain railroad company and provided, in 
case the vote should be in favor of granting aid, that “county orders” 
should be issued. A vote being taken and resulting in favor of granting aid, 
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county orders were issued and a part of them passed into the hands of 
Olcott as a bona-fide purchaser for value. Subsequently to the issue of 
these orders, but prior to the trial of the case in the United States Circuit 
Court for Wisconsin, the Supreme Court of the State held the act to be 
void on the ground that the object was not a public one for which a tax 
could be levied. 
The United States Supreme Court declined to follow the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, upon the express ground that 
the decision of that court was not of the construction of the constitution or 
statutes of that State, but of a question of general law relating to the 
nature of taxation and the uses which are public and private, and the 
extent of legislative powers over such subjects; and upon the further 
ground that as the contract embodied in the “orders” which were issued 
under the act in question, was valid under the constitution and laws of the 
State at the time they were made, no subsequent action by the legislature 
or the judiciary would be regarded as establishing their invalidity. 
“Parties,” says the court, “have a right to contract, and they 
do contract in view of the law as declared to them when their 
engagements are formed. Nothing can justify us in holding them to any 
other rule.” 
This decision does not appear to be in conflict with the other 
decisions which we have examined, although three justices of the court 
dissented. 
In the case of Fairfield v. County of Gallatin,1 the Supreme 
Court of Illinois, in a number of cases construing the constitution of that 
State, held that under the constitution of Illinois the issue of bonds for 
certain purposes, if sanctioned by popular vote under pre-existing laws, 
was not forbidden. The bonds in question were issued in 1870, and in 
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1874 the highest court of the State, in the cases referred to, decided that 
such bonds could be lawfully issued and were not forbidden by the 
constitution. The United States Supreme Court, in the case of The Town of 
Concord v. Portsmouth Savings Bank,1 in ignorance of this decision of the 
highest court of Illinois, had construed the constitution of that State as 
prohibiting the issue of bonds like those in question, by counties or by 
municipalities, and the question which arose here was whether the court 
should adhere to its own former decision, or should follow the decision of 
the State Supreme Court referred to. The court says: 
“We are now asked to decline following the construction given 
and since recognized by the State court, and to adhere to that adopted by 
us in ignorance of the prior judgment of the State court, and that, not, as 
in Rowan v. Runnels, to uphold contracts, but to strike them down, though 
they were made in accordance with the settled law of the State. We 
recognize the importance of the rule stare decisis. We recognize also the 
other rule that this court will follow the decisions of State courts giving a 
construction to their constitutions and laws, and more especially when 
those decisions have become rules of property in the States, and when 
contracts must have been made or purchases in reliance upon them. … 
With much more reason may we change our decision construing a State 
constitution when no rights have been acquired under it, and when it is 
made to appear that before the decision was made, the highest tribunal of 
the State had interpreted the constitution differently, when that 
interpretation within the State fixed a rule of property and has never been 
abandoned. In such a case, we think it our duty to follow the State courts, 
and adopt as the true construction that which those courts have declared.” 
pp. 54, 55. 
The rule to be drawn from the cases now examined, as well as 
from numerous other cases which have arisen in the Supreme Court of the 
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United States, seems to be well-settled and defined, and may be thus 
stated: (1) The statutes of a State and the construction put upon them by 
the highest court of a State are binding and conclusive upon the courts of 
the United States in all cases where such statutes so construed are not in 
conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and where such 
decisions can be regarded as the settled, fixed, and received, law of the 
State ; (2) but that whenever, in the judgment of the United States 
courts, State statutes as construed by State courts are in conflict with the 
Constitution of the United States, or (3) whenever the decisions of the 
State courts are conflicting, so that any specified decision or decisions of 
the State courts cannot fairly be regarded as expressing the settled law of 
the State, the United States courts are not bound by such statutes or 
decisions. This rule, with these limitations, seems to be well settled and to 
have been adhered to with somewhat unusual consistency by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. 
There is a class of cases in which it is specially well settled 
that the courts of the United States will follow the decisions of the courts 
of the State, viz.: questions affecting property rights in the several States 
in which the property in question may be located, and especially in the 
case of real property. 
Thus, in Polk’s Lessee v. Wendell,1 an action was brought 
involving the title to land in Tennessee, and although the Supreme Court 
regarded the decisions of the State courts as of “glaring impolicy,” yet it 
declared: 
“The sole object for which jurisdiction of cases between 
citizens of different States is vested in the courts of the United States, is 
to secure to all the administration of justice upon the same principles on 
which it is administered between citizens of the same State. Hence, this 
court has never hesitated to conform to the settled doctrines of the States 
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on landed property where they are fixed, and can be satisfactorily 
ascertained; nor would it ever be led to deviate from them in any case 
that bore the semblance of impartial justice.” p. 302. 
In Jackson v. Chew,1 which involved the construction and 
validity of a devise of lands in New York, the Supreme Court said: 
“The enquiry is very much narrowed by applying the rule 
which has uniformly governed this court, that where any principle of law, 
establishing a rule of real property, has been settled in the State courts, 
the same rule will be applied by this court, that would be applied by the 
State tribunals. … This court adopts the State decisions because they 
settle the law applicable to the case; and the reasons assigned for this 
course apply as well to rules of construction growing out of the common 
law as the statute law of the State, when applied to the title of lands. And 
such a course is indispensable in order to preserve uniformity; otherwise, 
the peculiar constitution of the judicial tribunals of the States and of the 
United States, would be productive of the greatest mischief and 
confusion.” pp. 162, 167. 
Here again it is seen that the rule applicable in cases involving 
property rights is subject to the limitation that the State decisions shall 
have settled the law, and of course, that where the decisions are 
conflicting, the United States courts will act without reference to State 
decisions, or will follow those which most commend themselves to its 
approval. 
The case of Brine v. Insurance Company2 is among the latest 
and most strongly emphasized determinations upon this topic. The case 
was this: a statute of Illinois allowed a mortgagor of real property twelve 
months to redeem after sale in foreclosure, and to a judgment creditor of 
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the mortgagor, three months additional. The case was ably argued, and 
the opinion of the court is carefully drawn, and the case, while subjected 
to some criticism of the profession, both as to its statement of principles 
and its conclusion, is a high authority as to the law as it now stands. The 
court in this case remarks that if the laws of a State are not to be followed 
by Federal courts sitting within the same State, there being no common 
arbiter, there is at once “introduced into the jurisprudence of Illinois the 
discordant elements of a substantial right which is protected in one set of 
courts and denied in the other, with no superior to decide which is right.” 
p. 635. 
It may therefore be said that the United States courts, when 
administering the local law of the different States between parties who are 
entitled by reason of citizenship to litigate their causes in those courts, are 
bound by the statutes of the States and by the construction given to those 
statutes by the courts of the State in which they sit, whenever the 
decisions of the State court are found to have settled the construction of 
the statutes or the law of the State; and that this rule applies with special 
rigidity to cases of real property, or cases affecting real property, or 
contracts, like mortgages, affecting real property; but that the rule in all 
cases is subject to the qualification that the statutes and decisions of the 
State shall violate no right granted or secured by the Constitution of the 
United States. 
There remains a large class of cases which usually fall under 
the denomination of “general commercial law,” in which the courts of the 
United States do not regard themselves bound to follow, and do not 
follow, the decisions of the State courts. This class embraces contracts, 
negotiable securities, and the many questions of common law which arise 
in commercial and business transactions. In the celebrated and leading 
case of Swift v. Tyson1 this rule was most amply stated and defended by 
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Judge Story, and it has been steadily adhered to in subsequent cases. The 
case involved the question whether the fact, that the bill of exchange on 
which the suit was brought had been received in payment of a pre-
existing debt, was a good defence. The case was very fully argued, and 
lacks none of the qualities of an authoritative decision, and was rendered 
by a court unanimous upon the question now under consideration. 
Mr. Justice Story, after stating the facts of the case, says: 
“The plaintiff is a bona-fide holder without notice for what the law deems 
a good and valuable consideration— that is, for a pre-existing debt, and 
the only real question in the cause is, whether under the circumstances of 
the present case, such a pre-existing debt constitutes a valuable 
consideration in the sense of the general rule applicable to negotiable 
instruments.” He then states that it is contended that “by the laws of New 
York as expounded by its courts, a pre-existing debt does not constitute in 
the sense of the general rule a valuable consideration applicable to 
negotiable instruments.” Examining the decisions of the courts of New 
York, he finds that “it admits of serious doubt whether any doctrine upon 
this question can at the present time be treated as finally established.” 
“But,” he continues, “admitting the doctrine to be fully settled in New 
York, it remains to be considered whether it is obligatory upon this court, 
if it differs from the principles established, in the general commercial law.” 
After stating that it is contended that the Judiciary Act of 1789, which 
provides that “the laws of the several States, except where the 
Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise 
require ox provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at 
common law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they 
apply,” furnishes a rule obligatory upon the court, Judge Story says: 
“In order to maintain the argument it is essential therefore to 
hold that the word ‘laws’ in this section includes within the scope of its 
meaning the decisions of the local tribunals. In the ordinary use of 
language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of courts constitute 
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laws. They are at most only evidence of what the laws are, and are not of 
themselves laws. They are often re-examined, reversed, and qualified by 
the courts themselves, whenever they are found to be either defective or 
ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect. The laws of a State are more usually 
understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the 
legislative authority thereof or long-established local customs having the 
force of laws. In all the various cases which have hitherto come before us 
for decision, this court have uniformly supposed that the true 
interpretation of this section limited its application to State laws strictly 
local, that is to say, to the positive statutes of the State and the 
construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles 
to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real 
estate, and other matters immovable and ultra-territorial in their nature 
and character. It has never been supposed by us that the section did 
apply or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, 
not at all dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and 
permanent operation, as, for example, the construction of ordinary 
contracts or other written instruments, and especially to questions of 
general commercial law, where the State tribunals are called upon to 
perform the like functions as ourselves—that is, to ascertain, upon general 
reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract 
or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of 
commercial law to govern the case.” pp. 18, 19. 
The court then proceeds to hold that the section of the 
Judiciary Act is limited to local statutes and local usages of a fixed and 
permanent character, and does not extend to contracts and other 
instruments of a commercial nature, and proceeding to hold that a pre-
existing debt does constitute a valuable consideration, decides that the 
Supreme Court is not bound by the decisions of the State court. 
This view of the intent and scope of the section of the Judiciary 
Act in question is not only authoritative, but seems to be founded upon 
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reason. English commercial law, in the absence of positive regulations or 
statutes, or, in the language of Judge Story, of usages having a “fixed and 
permanent operation’“ is not of a local nature, but is the result, like the 
English common law, of the decisions of courts, sometimes enunciating 
rules of law and sometimes sanctioning customs of a greater or less 
degree of prevalence and force. It might indeed have been determined 
that the United States courts should take their law in all respects which 
concern ordinary business or commercial affairs and transactions from the 
courts of the States. But it seems perfectly clear that such was not the 
scheme or intent of the framcrs of the judiciary system indicated by the 
Constitution, or by the great Judiciary Statute of 1789. On the contrary, 
the purpose appears plainly to have been to vest, by constitution and 
statute in the courts of the United States, judicial power to protect and 
enforce all rights granted or secured in any respect by the Constitution of 
the United States, or by laws passed in conformity to that Constitution; 
and in all other cases in which the constitutions or laws of the States or 
the decisions of the State courts construing State constitutions and laws, 
have established the law in any respect, but especially with respect to 
landed property, and where such decisions have settled the law of the 
State, and where the State constitutions, laws, and decisions comport 
with the Constitution of the United States, to bind the United States 
courts, as a matter of legal obligation, to observe the laws of the States 
and to follow the decisions of the courts of the States. This scheme 
secures, on the part of the United States, the enforcement and protection 
of its Constitution and laws through its own courts; it secures further the 
complete judicial autonomy and self-government of the States, so far as 
the States have expressed their will in the form of statutes or of 
permanent and fixed usages, or of constructions given by their courts to 
their statutes. But outside of these limits and subjects there is a wide 
range of matters which are not now regulated in the States by statutes, or 
by permanent local usages, or by the settled decisions of courts; and as to 
all such matters, it was the wise, as well as obvious, purpose of the 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
272
authors of the judicial system of the United States to leave the State 
courts to their own independent judgment and action; and to leave the 
United States courts equally independent in reaching their conclusions. 
Other features of the law than that commonly known as 
general commercial law have been held to fall within the same rule of the 
independence of Federal courts sit-ting within the States and deciding 
cases arising between citizens of different States. Thus, in the case of 
Railroad Company v. Lockwood,1 a case arising and tried in the State of 
New York, the Supreme Court of the United States held, contrary to the 
current and tendency of the New York decisions, that it was against public 
policy and unlawful for railroad companies carrying passengers for hire, to 
stipulate not to be answerable for their own or their servants’ negligence 
in reference to such carriage; and in the case of Tilden v. Blair,2 a case 
arising and tried in the same State, the same court held, contrary to the 
derisions of New York, that a draft dated in Illinois and drawn by a 
resident of Illinois on a resident of New York, and accepted by the latter, 
but first negotiated in Illinois, is an Illinois contract, and governed, in a 
suit by a bona-fide holder, by the law of Illinois and not of New York, in 
respect to the defence of usury. 
It is undeniable that some evils have arisen from this mutual 
independence of the State and Federal courts. It is an anomaly and 
inconvenience, no doubt, that, within the same territory, in the same 
State and community, questions of law in cases strictly similar may be 
and are decided in opposite ways. It is true that the citizen cannot always 
know or be advised what his legal obligations and rights are, or will be 
declared to be, until he learns in what courts, State or Federal, they will 
be adjudicated. 
                                                 
1 17 Wallace, 357. 
2 21 Wallace, 241. 
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It is worthy of remark here that if absolute uniformity of 
decision is desired by the States, it is within their power by statutes to 
effect such uniformity. State statutes can fix the law upon any given topic 
not denied to the States nor committed by the Constitution to the power 
of the United States. If, for example, the State of New York regards it as 
important that the law, both in State and Federal courts sitting within her 
territory, should be that one who receives negotiable paper on account 
merely of a pre-existing indebtedness, should not stand as a bona-fide 
holder for value where there are defences to the paper, a brief statute will 
effect the result. State statutes, as construed by State courts, within the 
limits already noted, are rules of decision in courts of the United States. 
It is often urged, however, that the true remedy consists in 
the Federal courts conforming their decisions in all cases not involving 
Federal questions to the decisions of the State courts. Let us consider this 
proposition. 
Our dual or compound constitutional system—States and 
Nation—suggested and required a dual or compound judicial system—
State courts and Federal courts. Federal questions naturally were assigned 
to Federal courts; State questions, or, more accurately speaking, all 
questions not Federal, were naturally left to the State courts. But to 
secure the rights of litigating citizens of different States against the 
possible or apprehended partiality or injustice of the courts of the State 
which might become the forum of adjudication, and as part of the general 
scheme of the relations of the States to the Union, it was deemed 
important that controversies arising between citizens of different States 
should be assigned to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. In 
carrying into effect this scheme, the local laws of the States, —statutes 
and long-standing usages having the force of law, —were made rules of 
decision in all United States courts. In the remaining realms of the law to 
be administered by the latter courts, why should the law as declared by 
the decisions of State courts be made controlling in the Federal courts? 
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Why, in such cases, should a citizen of Massachusetts, bringing his suit in 
the Federal courts for New York, be subjected to the law of New York as 
declared by its courts? And why should not the forum which he is allowed 
to seek, be also allowed to administer the law in his case according to its 
own judicial conceptions? If the non-resident citizen must accept the same 
law, under a Procrustean rule of conformity to State decisions, he can 
hardly be said to be protected in any rights by his constitutional power to 
bring his suit in the Federal forum. As respects local statutes and local 
usages of the States, not conflicting with the Constitution, the degree of 
States, autonomy contemplated by the Constitution would suggest and 
call for their recognition and enforcement by Federal courts administering 
the law within the States. But, as respects that part of the law not 
dependent on State statutes or usages, it is not easy to see why the 
Federal courts should not be left free to render judgments and follow rules 
conformable only to their own independent conclusions. If, as I have said, 
the right of citizens of different States to seek the Federal tribunals is a 
valuable or essential right, a safeguard both of the rights of individuals 
and of the peace and harmony of the States of the Union, the power to 
decide freely in all cases not controlled by positive local statutes or settled 
local usages, seems essential to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the 
Federal courts in this class of cases. 
In other words, our political system, in its nature and true 
intent, looks to the supremacy of the Constitution and statutes of the 
United States as interpreted by the courts of the United States, and to the 
supremacy of the State constitutions as interpreted by the State courts, 
wherever the Constitution and statutes of the United States do not apply; 
while within the domain of law not covered either by the Federal 
Constitution or statutes, or by the State constitutions or statutes, the two 
courts shall exercise independently the judicial power belonging to each.1 
                                                 
1 Vide, on this point, especially, Mr. Webster’s argument in Groves, v. Slaughter, supra, 
pp. 489-495. 
Constitutional History of the United States 
 
 
 
275
The present result, as we have now examined it, seems to be 
in harmony with this scheme of our constitutional system, and the evils 
and inconveniences which arise in the practical working of the system 
must, in language already quoted, “be set to the account of that 
imperfection which still marks and mars the administration of all human 
affairs.” It is a fact of every-day observation that a resident of one State 
may have property or commercial interests at the same time in several 
different States. He may also at the same time have agents making sales, 
contracts, and collections in several other States. He may thus be subject 
in his pecuniary interests to many separate jurisdictions and to many 
discordant decisions of courts and rules of law. While no thoughtful 
student of our political system will seek to escape these inconveniences by 
enlarging the domain of the national judiciary, quite as little will he seek 
to restrict within narrower limits the independence of the Federal courts, 
which to-day, within the sphere of their constitutional jurisdictions and 
powers, furnish and apply the only system of domestic law co-extensive 
with our national boundaries. 
We may borrow and adopt on this topic the luminous 
expressions of an eminent authority:  
“A Federal court,” says Mr. Justice Matthews, “sitting in a 
State to enforce rights of action against one of its citizens, is authorized to 
administer that law alone which ought to prevail in the courts of the State 
itself. … Inasmuch as, with some exceptions, the common law of England, 
brought with them by our ancestors in the settlement of the country, with 
such modifications as have been introduced by local customs, prevails 
generally in all the States, and as, happily, the uniformity of that system 
has been largely preserved by the homogeneous development of the 
people and their institutions, the differences of judicial decision are mainly 
differences as to its interpretation. The courts of the United States, thus 
sitting in every State to adjust and determine controversies between 
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citizens of different States arising mainly under a single system of 
jurisprudence, acting in harmony with each other, under the correcting 
and revising power of the supreme appellate tribunal, are well calculated 
to contribute by the weight of their judicial reason to that unity and 
certainty of the law which are so important as elements of justice.” 1 
No fact connected with our political development since  
Address at the Yale Law School, 1888. 1789 seems to me more 
remarkable than the infrequency of the instances of serious conflict of 
jurisdiction between the courts of the States and of the United States. No 
more striking evidence exists of the civil capacity of the American people, 
—of what Bagehot, in words already quoted, calls “the civil instincts and 
capacities of our race.” The self-restraint, the respect for law, the 
essential patriotism thus exhibited, are among the highest and noblest 
civil qualities. 
In the decade preceding the Civil War, when the moral 
indignation of the people was roused by the hideous barbarities and 
political encroachments of slavery, one case arose which stands in our 
judicial records as a warning that the strongest constitutional or legal 
barriers cannot always stand against the settled moral convictions of a 
people. In the cases of Ableman v. Booth and United States v. Booth, 
Booth had been arrested and held on the charge of aiding the escape of a 
fugitive slave. While so held by the United States marshal, he was 
released on a writ of habeas corpus by a judge of the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin. He was subsequently indicted and convicted upon the same 
charge, and while undergoing sentence of the United States court, was 
again released on writ of habeas corpus by the Supreme Court of the 
State. The cases were carried to the Supreme Court of the United States 
on writ of error, and gave occasion for one of the ablest and most 
permanently valuable decisions of Chief-Justice Taney. 
                                                 
1 18 Howard, 476, 479. 
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I suppose no lawyer or statesman of standing would today 
undertake to defend the action or decisions of the court of Wisconsin on 
legal grounds. Those decisions were indeed without a shadow of support 
in law, and could never be defended except upon revolutionary grounds. 
They show impressively the dangers to every part of our political system 
involved in the protection afforded by the Constitution to that baleful and 
deadly foe to our national peace as well as to our great constitutional 
system and experiment, —warranting President Lincoln’s brave and 
sagacious vaticination: “This Government cannot endure permanently 
half-slave and half-free.” 
The view which has now been taken, prolonged, as it has 
been, beyond the ordinary limits of a single discourse, of the relations 
both in theory and in fact, in a forensic as well as in an historical, aspect, 
of the State judiciary to our political system, must, I feel sure, awaken 
some new sense of the profound wisdom of the arrangements and 
adaptations embodied in our Constitution, and put into operation by the 
Judiciary Act of 1789. That wisdom lay, be it ever remembered, in 
following no fascinating theories of natural right and justice, nor brilliant 
philosophical speculations upon the nature of society and government, but 
in a profound knowledge and appreciation of the familiar, home-bred, 
hard-won, slowly-maturing results of the political life and experience of 
the American people as colonies and as States under the Confederation. 
The authors of our political and judicial systems wrought with materials 
furnished by that long, symmetrical, Providential training which, through a 
century and a half of political dependence, through eight years of war, and 
ten years of feeble and futile confederation, had schooled them for their 
sublime task of preserving and perpetuating their local governments 
through familiar local agencies, and yet binding them all, by indissoluble 
bonds, into one harmonious Plural Unit. Honored be their memories! Their 
abounding and unselfish patriotism; their grave and serene trust in their 
cause; their lofty and invincible faith in human nature; their brave and 
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unshaken confidence in our capacity for self-government; but more than 
all, except their antique and severe public virtues, their simple reliance on 
what history and experience had taught them! 
There is a feature of our subject to which I should be glad to 
turn, if time permitted—I mean the general character of the State 
Judiciary as a body or succession of individual men. At no time, I think, 
has the average of judicial fitness and ability represented by the judges of 
the highest courts of at least our oldest and best-governed States, fallen 
below the average of like qualities displayed by those occupying the seats 
of the Federal judiciary. Great names come thronging from the memory as 
the backward glance is cast over our judicial history. One supreme name 
there is, to which the annals of our State and national judiciaries furnish 
no equal; of whom, in the judicial aspect, we may say: 
“Of whose true-fixed and resting quality,  
There is no fellow in the firmament,”— 
John Marshall— “that most exquisite picture in all the receding 
light of the days of the early republic.” 1 
But after that name, there are none more illustrious for 
forensic and judicial learning, or for juridical power and character, than 
the names of Kent, of Parsons, of Gibson, of Shaw, of Walworth, of 
Sharswood, and all the long line of State judges whose figures rise 
unbidden as one looks back. But I must not pause. 
The highest achievement of the English-speaking race is, I 
make no doubt, the subordination of all other powers and authorities to 
the power and authority of Law, —the enthronement over all, the 
apotheosis, of that idea and fact which is the nearest approach, the most 
faithful echo which human ears ever catch, of the voice of God, —not the 
                                                 
1 E. J. PHELPS, Address before American Bar Association, Saratoga, 1879. 
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voice of the people as heard at any given moment, but the voice of 
incarnated Reason and Truth—of Justice and Authority, —Law: 
“Sovereign law, that state’s collected will,  
O’er thrones and globes elate.” 
In a just relative estimate of the different functions of 
government as duly distributed in a system worthy the name of free or 
constitutional, I should with deliberation assign an essential superiority to 
the function which is concerned with the definition, the determination, of 
what is the Law, and the application of what is so declared to the manifold 
actual affairs of men in society. This is the power which in the last analysis 
gives law to the lawmaker, the law-giver, and the law-executor alike. 
What is the law, when it is to be concretely applied, is declared by the 
judicial power both to the legislative and executive powers. A group, at 
first of six, later of seven, now of nine, elderly lawyers, exercising this 
power, has moulded, harmonized, and applied the principles and ideas 
expressed in our national Constitution through the first century of our 
unexampled growth in national power, social development, and scientific 
and literary progress. To the mad waves of nullification, insurrection, 
anarchy, and socialism, it has calmly said: “Hitherto, but no farther!”; and 
in humbler guise it has brought and is bringing, peace, security, the hope 
of gain, the reward of labor, for ourselves and our children. In reaching 
these results—the most precious in the lives of men as social beings—let 
us be assured that it is not our national judiciary, alone or chiefly, that 
has been and must hereafter be our hope and confidence. Over the 
greater part of our lives, our rights, our highest interests, stretches the 
arm of State power. There, there, we most live and move, and have our 
being. “There we have garnered up our hearts— there we must either live 
or bear no life.” 
It is time my last word was spoken. The theory of our 
governments, State and national, is “opposed to the deposit of unlimited 
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power anywhere.” Not only may no person say, but no power, 
department, or function, of government, may say, here and now: “L’État, 
c’est moi” Let me give you a word from one of the noblest opinions of the 
Supreme Court: 
“It must be conceded that there are rights in every free 
government beyond the control of the State. A government which 
recognized no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the 
property of its citizens, subject to the absolute disposition and unlimited 
control of even the most democratic depositary of power, is after all but a 
despotism.”1  
The old-time omnipotence of the English sovereign, succeeded 
in our day by the omnipotence of the English Parliament, has no place in 
our political system, no analogue in our political vocabulary. 
The most imposing fabric of political power the world has ever 
seen—a power whose name and memory still thrill the imagination—
inspired the patriotic Roman to sing: 
“Blest and thrice blest the Roman 
 Who sees Rome’s brightest day;  
Who sees that long victorious pomp  
Wind down the Sacred Way,  
And through the bellowing Forum,  
And round the Suppliant’s grove,  
Up to the everlasting gates  
Of Capitolian Jove.” 
The fabric of Roman political power was long ago broken in 
pieces; and I know not how much of the wisdom of today will be the folly 
of to-morrow; but sure I am, that if our system of government shall 
                                                 
1 Mr. Justice S. F. Miller, in Loan Association vs. City of Topeka, 20 Wallace, 655. 
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outlast those that have gone before it, it will be because, founded at first 
on experience and buttressed by law, we and our descendants shall 
preserve, clear and high, its original great ideas and circumscriptions. 
Faithful in this, the poet’s apostrophe and prophecy may have warrant: 
“Thy sun is risen and shall not set 
Upon thy day divine; 
Ages of unborn ages yet,  
America, are thine !” 1 
 
                                                 
1 F. Marion Crawford, “ New National Hymn,” 1887. 
 
